Probably assume that this token process acquires *its* value by standing in a singular causal relation to the true belief in question. This is what I would call *token instrumentalism*. The puzzle about token instrumentalism is how the process token can "return" any of the value it inherits from the true belief it causes so that the latter's total value exceeds the value it would have were it instead caused by an unreliable process.

However, a token reliable process might acquire "derivative" epistemic value in an entirely different way without encountering the same problem. It is widely assumed in moral theory that something's being a token of a valuable type automatically confers value (at least prima facie value) on that token. For example, an action's being a case of promising keeping automatically confers (prima facie) value on that action token. Similarly, if we assume that being reliable makes some *type* of belief-forming process epistemically valuable (for example, taking visual appearances at face value), then any token of such a belief-forming type would also have epistemic value. Thus, to qualify as epistemically valuable, a token belief-forming process would not have to succeed in generating any true belief. It would not have to stand in a singular causal relation to a true belief. Value might accrue to it in a different, two-step fashion. In step 1, the type acquires value because many instances of it produce token true beliefs. In step 2, a token of the process type acquires epistemic value because it instantiates that valuable type, whether or not it produces a true belief of its own. If all this is correct, then it's false that the only way for a belief-forming process-token to acquire (instrumental) epistemic value is *for it* to cause an epistemically valuable upshot, for example, a true belief.

This point helps position reliabilism for an escape from the swamping problem. If the source of a process token's value needn't be a true belief that it produces, then there's no guarantee that the value of the resulting true belief must swamp, or trump, that of the token. There remains, however, a nagging problem. How can the value of the token increase the value of the true belief? Value theory routinely assumes that value transmission runs "from" achieved goals, outcomes, or ends "to" the means that produce them. How could it countenance the idea that value transmission runs in the opposite direction, viz., from means to ends? That is what would be required if a (valuable) reliable process is to *increase* the value of a true belief by virtue of causing it. Is this scenario the slightest bit plausible?

I think it is. Here is an example to illustrate the indicated pattern of transmission. Any work by Rembrandt, whatever its intrinsic aesthetic quality, will be assigned a high degree of value simply because it was produced by Rembrandt. The fact that Rembrandt painted it is enough to confer significant value on it, as its price in the art market would reflect. The extra value assigned to a genuine Rembrandt need not be merely a recognition of market value. Instead, it may be a recognition of what explains that market value, i.e., the fact that people admire or esteem such a work because it's the product of a masterful hand (and eye).
(PR) does not warrant the specified conclusion in the scientist case. There are three ways the alleged interpretation fails to comport with PR. First, the scientist example proceeds on the assumption that relativism is a value-maximizing kind of theory. But PR does not equate justified belief with belief that maximizes (final) epistemic value. This was clear in *Epistemology and Cognition*, where right J-rules—conformity with which yields justification—are ones that authorize processes with a high truth ratio, not necessarily a high quantity of true belief (Goldman, 1986: 106). The high truth ratios standard gives more weight to error avoidance than to truth acquisition. Belief-forming processes can earn high truth ratios by forming beliefs very cautiously and carefully—generating very few beliefs, hence rarely falling into error, but also rarely generating truths. Thus, unlike the most famous forms of moral consequentialism, e.g., utilitarianism, it is not a value-maximizing theory.

Second, one could only impute to relativism the implication that the scientist’s belief is justified in the specified example by ignoring the process component of relativism. PR does not determine a belief’s justificational status simply by its direct or indirect causal consequences (actual or hypothetical). In fact, it doesn’t look at the consequences of the target belief at all. Instead it looks—most immediately—at the process (or processes) of which the target belief is an effect. If the process that causes the belief is a token of a type such that its (the type’s) belief upshots have a high truth ratio, then the belief is justified. If not, not. What is the belief-forming process in the scientist case? Since the presented case is one of propositional justificiation, the case is one where the agent has not (yet) formed a belief. Therefore, some assumption must be made about how—i.e., by what psychological route—she would form the belief if she adopted it. What might such a psychological route be? Presumably, something like “being driven to believe a proposition by irrelevant goals or desires”—irrelevant, that is, to the truth of the believed proposition. No such candidate process would have a very high truth ratio. So PR implies that the scientist would be unjustified in forming a belief in God’s existence. That such a belief would nonetheless have favorable downstream epistemic consequences has no bearing, under PR, on its justificational status. Only upstream cognitive activity—i.e., psychological activity actually or potentially involved in the target belief’s production—is relevant to that belief’s justificational status. Notice that the anticipated downstream consequences (true beliefs in scientific propositions) would presumably be formed by very different belief-forming processes than the one that would generate a belief in God. So, even if those subsequent, science-generated beliefs would themselves be justified, this in no way suggests that the scientist’s belief in God (were she to form this belief in the manner specified) would be justified.

Berker stresses that justificational assessments of belief must observe the principle of “the epistemic separateness of propositions.” This principle states that when determining the epistemic status of a belief in a given proposition, “it is epistemically irrelevant whether or not that belief conduces (either directly or indirectly) toward the promotion of true belief and the avoidance of false belief in other propositions beyond the one in question” (unpublished, p. 29). Moreover, he contends that veritistic epistemic teleology flouts this principle and that relativism is a species of veritistic epistemic teleology. These contentions are mistaken. As explained previously, PR does not flout the principle, because it is not really a species of veritistic epistemic teleology.

I turn next to a historical examination of Williamson’s (2001) theories of knowledge. Because Williamson’s global view is relativist through and through, we are very congenial, at least in general contours. Nonetheless, the details of the theory are less successful than the framework that he has defended, for example, in the specific treatment of knowledge attainment. I also suggest that limiting the epistemology downplaying the process element in PR. In response to this, Williamson has replied that he did not intend to distance himself from the view. If so, all well and good, but this fact was not readily apparent.

The final two sections of essay 7 address the topic of evidence. Williamson holds that a person’s body of evidence is all and only what she knows (E = K). A battery of intriguing and powerful arguments were offered in *Knowledge and Its Limits* to show that no rival view could account for the intuitive data better than (the quite surprising and initially counterintuitive) E = K thesis. I respond by arguing that at least one rival view performs at least as well as E = K in accounting for Williamson’s “data,” namely, the view that evidence is non-inferential propositional justification (E = NPJ). This dispute is relevant to Williamson’s knowledge-first treatment of epistemology, of which I am not yet persuaded. In his response, Williamson (2009) repeats his claim that evidence is factive, and that this feature favors a knowledge account as opposed to the E = NPJ view. He also recognizes the possibility of strengthening E = NPJ by adding the factivity component. He doesn’t say much to favor his preferred view over this alternative. He only remarks that E = TNPJ is a “rather unnatural hybrid” (2009: 311). He doesn’t spell out, however, what makes this particular hybrid “unnatural” or what makes E = K natural.

**Cluster 4: Essays 8, 9, and 10**

The three essays in this cluster belong in the category of social epistemology, a subfield of epistemology to which I have recently devoted a lot of attention (more than the present volume indicates). Essay 8 addresses two rather distinct topics in social epistemology, peer disagreement and epistemological relativism. Here I confine my summary remarks to relativism.