SIXTH SYMPOSIUM

Death

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"The syllogism he had learnt from Kiesewetter’s Logic: ‘Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal,’ had always seemed to him correct as applied to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself . . . What did Caius know of the smell of that striped leather ball Vanya had been so fond of?"

Tolstoy
The Death of Ivan Ilych

If, as many people believe, death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question arises whether it is a bad thing to die. There is conspicuous disagreement about the matter: some people think death is dreadful; others have no objection to death per se, though they may hope their own will be neither premature nor painful.

Those in the former category tend to think those in the latter are blind to the obvious, while the latter suppose the former to be prey to some sort of confusion. On the one hand it can be said that life is all one has, and the loss of it is the greatest loss one can sustain. On the other hand it may be objected that death deprives this supposed loss of its subject, and that if one realizes that death is not an unimaginable condition of the persisting person, but a mere blank, one will see that it can have no value whatever, positive or negative.
Since I want to leave aside the question whether we are, or might be, immortal in some form, I shall simply use the word ‘death’ and its cognates in this discussion to mean *permanent* death, unsupplemented by any form of conscious survival. I wish to consider whether death is in itself an evil; and how great an evil, and of what kind, it might be. This question should be of interest even to those who believe that we do not die permanently, for one’s attitude towards immortality must depend in part on one’s attitude towards death.

Clearly if death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positive features, but only because of what it deprives us of. I shall try to deal with the difficulties surrounding the natural view that death is an evil because it brings to an end all the goods that life contains. An account of these goods need not occupy us here, except to observe that some of them, like perception, desire, activity, and thought, are so general as to be constitutive of human life. They are widely regarded as formidable benefits in themselves, despite the fact that they are conditions of misery as well as happiness, and that a sufficient quantity of more particular evils can perhaps outweigh them.

I wish to add only two observations. First, the value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening. And secondly, like most goods, this one can be multiplied by time: more is better than less. (It should be remarked that the added quantities need not be temporally continuous. People are attracted to the possibility of long-term suspended animation or freezing, followed by the resumption of conscious life, because they can regard it from within simply as a *continuation* of their present life. If these techniques are ever perfected, what from outside appeared as a dormant interval of three hundred years could be experienced by the subject as nothing more than a sharp discontinuity in the character of his experiences.)

If we turn from what is good about life to what is bad about death, the case is completely different. Essentially, though there may be problems about their specification, what we find desirable in life are certain states, conditions, or types of activity. It is *being* alive, *doing* certain things, having certain experiences, that we consider good. But if death is an evil, it is the *loss of life*, rather than the state of being dead, or non-existent, or unconscious, that
is objectionable. This asymmetry is important. If it is good to be alive, that advantage can be attributed to a person at each point of his life. It is a good of which Bach had more than Schubert, simply because he lived longer. Death, however, is not an evil of which Shakespeare has so far received a larger portion than Proust. If death is a disadvantage, it is not easy to say when a man suffers it.

Two other facts indicate that we do not object to death merely because it involves long periods of nonexistence. First, as has been mentioned, most of us would not regard the temporary suspension of life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a misfortune. If it develops that people can be frozen without reduction of the conscious lifespan, it will be inappropriate to pity those who are temporarily out of circulation. Secondly, none of us existed before we were born (or conceived), but few regard that as a misfortune. I shall have more to say about this later.

The point that death is not regarded as an unfortunate state enables us to refute a curious but very common suggestion about the origin of the fear of death. It is often said that those who object to death have made the mistake of trying to imagine what it is like to be dead. It is alleged that the failure to realize that this task is logically impossible (for the banal reason that there is nothing to imagine) leads to the conviction that death is a mysterious and therefore terrifying prospective state. But this diagnosis is evidently false, for it is just as impossible to imagine being totally unconscious as to imagine being dead, (though it is easy enough to imagine oneself, from the outside, in either of those conditions). Yet people who are averse to death are not usually averse to unconsciousness (so long as it does not entail a substantial cut in the total duration of waking life).

If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad, it must be on the ground that life is a good and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss, bad not because of any positive features but because of the desirability of what it removes. We must now turn to the serious difficulties which this hypothesis raises, difficulties about loss and privation in general, and about death in particular.

Essentially there are three types of problem. First, doubt may be raised whether anything can be bad for a man without being positively unpleasant to him: specifically, it may be doubted that there are any evils which consist merely in the deprivation or absence of possible goods, and which do not depend on someone's
minding that deprivation. Secondly, there are special difficulties, in
the case of death, about how the supposed misfortune is to be
assigned to a subject at all. There is doubt both as to who its sub-
ject is, and as to when he undergoes it. So long as a person exists,
he has not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists; so
there seems to be no time when death, if it is a misfortune, can be
ascribed to its unfortunate subject. The third type of difficulty con-
cerns the asymmetry, mentioned above, between our attitudes to
posthumous and prenatal nonexistence. How can the former be bad
if the latter is not?

It should be recognized that if these are valid objections to
counting death as an evil, they will apply to many other supposed
evils as well. The first type of objection is expressed in general form
by the common remark that what you don’t know can’t hurt you. It
means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends, ridiculed be-
hind his back, and despised by people who treat him politely to his
face, none of it can be counted as a misfortune for him so long as he
does not suffer as a result. It means that a man is not injured if his
wishes are ignored by the executor of his will, or if, after his death,
the belief becomes current that all the literary works on which his
fame rests were really written by his brother, who died in Mexico
at the age of twenty-eight. It seems to me worth asking what as-
sumptions about good and evil lead to these drastic restrictions.

All the questions have something to do with time. There cer-
tainly are goods and evils of a simple kind (including some pleasures
and pains) which a person possesses at a given time simply in
virtue of his condition at that time. But this is not true of all the
things we regard as good or bad for a man. Often we need to know
his history to tell whether something is a misfortune or not; this
applies to ills like deterioration, deprivation, and damage. Some-
times his experiential state is relatively unimportant—as in the case
of a man who wastes his life in the cheerful pursuit of a method of
communicating with asparagus plants. Someone who holds that all
goods and evils must be temporally assignable states of the person
may of course try to bring difficult cases into line by pointing to the
pleasure or pain that more complicated goods and evils cause. Loss,
betrayal, deception, and ridicule are on this view bad because
people suffer when they learn of them. But it should be asked how
our ideas of human value would have to be constituted to accom-
modate these cases directly instead. (This would enable us to ex-
plain why their discovery causes suffering.) One possible account is
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that most good and ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by his history and his possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical state of the moment—and that while this subject can be exactly located in a sequence of places and times, the same is not necessarily true of the goods and ills that befall him.

These ideas can be illustrated by an example of deprivation whose severity approaches that of death. Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the mental condition of a contented infant, and that such desires as remain to him are satisfied by a custodian, so that he is free from care. Such a development would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only for his friends and relations, or for society, but also, and primarily, for the person himself. This does not mean that a contented infant is unfortunate. The intelligent adult who has been reduced to this condition is the subject of the misfortune. He is the one we pity, though of course he does not mind his condition—there is some doubt, in fact, whether he can be said to exist any longer.

The view that such a man has suffered a misfortune is open to the same objections which have been raised in regard to death. He does not mind his condition. It is in fact the same condition he was in at the age of three months, except that he is bigger. If we did not pity him then, why pity him now; in any case, who is there to pity? The intelligent adult has disappeared, and for a creature like the one before us, happiness consists in a full stomach and a dry diaper.

If these objections are invalid, it must be because they rest on a mistaken assumption about the temporal relation between the subject of a misfortune and the circumstances which constitute it. If, instead of concentrating exclusively on the oversized baby before us, we consider the person he was, and the person he could be now, then his reduction to this state and the cancellation of his natural adult development constitute a perfectly intelligible catastrophe.

This case should convince us that it is arbitrary to restrict the goods and evils that can befall a man to nonrelational properties ascribable to him at particular times. As it stands, that restriction excludes not only such cases of gross degeneration, but also a good deal of what is important about success and failure, and other features of a life that have the character of processes. I believe we can go further, however. There are goods and evils which are irre-
ducibly relational; they are features of the relations between a person, with spatial and temporal boundaries of the usual sort, and circumstances which may not coincide with him either in space or in time. A man's life includes much that does not transpire within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him can include much that does not take place within the boundaries of his life. These boundaries are commonly crossed by the misfortunes of being deceived, or despised, or betrayed. (If this is correct, there is a simple account of what is wrong with breaking a deathbed promise. It is an injury to the dead man. For certain purposes it is possible to regard time as just another type of distance.) The case of mental degeneration shows us an evil that depends on a contrast between the reality and the possible alternatives. A man is the subject of good and evil as much because he has hopes which may or may not be fulfilled, or possibilities which may or may not be realized, as because of his capacity to suffer and enjoy. If death is an evil, it must be accounted for in these terms, and the impossibility of locating it within life should not trouble us.

When a man dies we are left with his corpse, and while a corpse can suffer the kind of mishap that may occur to an article of furniture, it is not a suitable object for pity. The man, however, is. He has lost his life, and if he had not died, he would have continued to live it, and to possess whatever good there is in living. If we apply to death the account suggested for the case of dementia, we shall say that although the spatial and temporal locations of the individual who suffered the loss are clear enough, the misfortune itself cannot be so easily located. One must be content just to state that his life is over and there will never be any more of it. That fact, rather than his past or present condition, constitutes his misfortune, if it is one. Nevertheless if there is a loss, someone must suffer it, and he must have existence and specific spatial and temporal location even if the loss itself does not. The fact that Beethoven had no children may have been a cause of regret to him, or a sad thing for the world, but it cannot be described as a misfortune for the children that he never had. All of us, I believe, are fortunate to have been born. But unless good and ill can be assigned to an embryo, or even to an unconnected pair of gametes, it cannot be said that not to be born is a misfortune. (That is a factor to be considered in deciding whether abortion and contraception are akin to murder.)

This approach also provides a solution to the problem of temporal asymmetry, pointed out by Lucretius. He observed that
no one finds it disturbing to contemplate the eternity preceding his own birth, and he took this to show that it must be irrational to fear death, since death is simply the mirror image of the prior abyss. That is not true, however, and the difference between the two explains why it is reasonable to regard them differently. It is true that both the time before a man’s birth and the time after his death are times when he does not exist. But the time after his death is time of which his death deprives him. It is time in which, had he not died then, he would be alive. Therefore any death entails the loss of some life that its victim would have led had he not died at that or any earlier point. We know perfectly well what it would be for him to have had it instead of losing it, and there is no difficulty in identifying the loser.

But we cannot say that the time prior to a man’s birth is time in which he would have lived had he been born not then but earlier. For aside from the brief margin permitted by premature labor, he could not have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier than he was would have been someone else. Therefore the time prior to his birth is not time in which his subsequent birth prevents him from living. His birth, when it occurs, does not entail the loss to him of any life whatever.

The direction of time is crucial in assigning possibilities to people or other individuals. Distinct possible lives of a single person can diverge from a common beginning, but they cannot converge to a common conclusion from diverse beginnings. (The latter would represent not a set of different possible lives of one individual, but a set of distinct possible individuals, whose lives have identical conclusions.) Given an identifiable individual, countless possibilities for his continued existence are imaginable, and we can clearly conceive of what it would be for him to go on existing indefinitely. However inevitable it is that this will not come about, its possibility is still that of the continuation of a good for him, if life is the good we take it to be.

We are left, therefore, with the question whether the nonrealization of this possibility is in every case a misfortune, or whether it depends on what can naturally be hoped for. This seems to me the most serious difficulty with the view that death is always an evil. Even if we can dispose of the objections against admitting misfortune that is not experienced, or cannot be assigned to a definite time in the person’s life, we still have to set some limits on how possible a possibility must be for its nonrealization to be a
misfortune, (or good fortune, should the possibility be a bad one.)
The death of Keats at 24 is generally regarded as tragic; that of
Tolstoy at 82 is not. Although they will both be dead forever, Keats’s
death deprived him of many years of life which were allowed to
Tolstoy; so in a clear sense Keats’s loss was greater, (though not in
the sense standardly employed in mathematical comparison between
infinite quantities.) However, this does not prove that Tolstoy’s
loss was insignificant. Perhaps we record an objection only to evils
which are gratuitously added to the inevitable; the fact that it is
worse to die at 24 than at 82 does not imply that it is not a terrible
thing to die at 82, or even at 806. The question is whether we can
regard as a misfortune any limitation, like mortality, that is normal
to the species. Blindness is not a misfortune for a mole, nor would
it be for a man, if that were the natural condition of the human race.

The trouble is that life familiarizes us with the goods of which
death deprives us. If we put aside doubts about their status as goods
and grant that their quantity is in part a function of their duration,
the question remains whether death, no matter when it occurs, can
be said to deprive its victim of what is in the relevant sense a possible
continuation of life. The situation is an ambiguous one. Observed
from without, human beings obviously have a natural lifespan and
cannot live much longer than a hundred years. A man’s sense of his
own experience, on the other hand, does not embody this idea of a
natural limit. His existence defines for him an essentially open-ended
possible future, containing the usual mixture of goods and evils that
he has found so tolerable in the past. Having been gratuitously
introduced to the world by a collection of natural, historical, and
social accidents, he finds himself the subject of a life, with an
indeterminate and not essentially limited future. Viewed in this
way, death, no matter how inevitable, is an abrupt cancellation of
indefinitely extensive possible goods. Normality seems to have noth-
ing to do with it, for the fact that we will all inevitably die in a few
score years cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to live
longer. If there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be
good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for us all.