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The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands

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Wake up any expert on immigrant integration in the middle of the night and ask that person to name a country known for its multiculturalism. Ten to one that the answer will be Canada, Australia or the Netherlands. In recent years, however, multiculturalism has come increasingly under fire in all three, but probably most of all in the Netherlands. In this chapter I will first analyze the rise and fall of Dutch multiculturalist policies for immigrants. I will then place the recent turnaround in the perspective of the current debate on citizenship and multiculturalism, the general theme of this book. Can public policy in the Netherlands indeed be seen as an example of a renewed emphasis on citizenship and shared values in response to earlier tendencies towards postnationalism and multiculturalism? If so, what are the reasons for this change, what arguments have been put forward by different sides, and how are current trends likely to evolve further?

Migrants in the Netherlands

For all but one of the past 40 years the number of people settling in the Netherlands has been higher than the number of those departing. As a consequence, 1.4 million residents – almost 9 percent of the population – now are foreign born (from parents who themselves are also foreign born). If we include persons born in the Netherlands with one or two foreign-born parents the percentage goes up from 9 to 17. This means that just over one in every six persons living in the country has an immigrant background or a parent to whom this applies. This is not unusual by current West European standards, but not everyone realizes that the level in the United States is roughly the same. The number of foreign passport holders in the Netherlands is considerably lower than the number of
immigrants. Although, on a per capita basis, recent immigration has been above the West European average, the share of foreigners in the population has been oscillating around 5 percent for many years. This is largely an effect of naturalizations keeping pace with new immigration. In the wake of Indonesia’s (1949) and Surinam’s (1975) independence there was also a relatively significant immigration of persons who were already Dutch citizens when they arrived. Dutch passport holders still migrate from the two remaining “overseas parts of the Kingdom:” in the Caribbean, the Netherlands Antilles and – to a much lesser extent – from Aruba.

Today’s immigrants to the Netherlands come from all over the world. In the years 1965–70 only six countries accounted for 75 percent of all migrants arriving. Twenty-five years later (1990–94) the corresponding number had risen from six to twenty (Zlotnik 1998: 444). Table 3.1 gives an overview of the resident immigrant population by citizenship as well as by country of origin. The largest numbers of people of migrant origin stem from Indonesia, Turkey, Surinam, Morocco, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, former Yugoslavia (most recently the quickest riser) and from three nearby countries: Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The migrant communities differ significantly in their proportion of Netherlands citizens as well as in their relative weight of the first and the second generations. Settlement patterns in the Netherlands also vary for the different groups. There is a concentration of migrants in the densely populated West, particularly in the largest cities, and particularly from non-Western countries. Almost one-third of the Amsterdam population, for example, is foreign born, and three in five Amsterdam schoolchildren are of immigrant origin. Corresponding numbers for Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht are only slightly lower.

Temporary residence and preservation of identity

It was not until the early 1980s that the Dutch government began to develop a coherent policy to promote immigrant integration. In 1980 the government publicly recognized that most migrants would stay for good. However, prior to that year there was also an active public involvement with immigrants in spite of the assumption that their presence was only temporary, an assumption that, admittedly, was shared by most migrants themselves. In those days in particular, the Netherlands enjoyed a reputation of being the almost prototypical welfare state, in which the government saw it as its task to care for everyone. The objective, of course, could not be integration, but at least the temporary “guests” should be provided with a decent reception and it should be ensured that they could preserve their “cultural identity.” To this purpose special social work agencies were set up for them with public money, which also had a task in organizing cultural manifestations. Rules were laid down which required employers to provide decent accommodation for their foreign workers. Most of the welfare state provisions such as unemployment benefits, public assistance, healthcare and housing subsidies were also made available to the temporary migrants. Later, the first immigrant associations were warmly supported by the state. Mother-tongue teaching for migrant children was introduced in primary schools after family reunion had begun to gain momentum. This would enable the children to retain their cultural identity and it would facilitate their reinsertion upon returning home. As early as 1974 the Law on Primary Education was changed to allow for this.

As time went by and as the migrants stayed on, the limitations of this approach became more apparent. Its focus on “identity preservation” did

Table 3.1 Residents of immigrant background and foreign citizens in the Netherlands, by country of origin and country of citizenship, January 1, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin (1)</th>
<th>Country of citizenship (2)</th>
<th>(2) as a percentage of (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>407 000</td>
<td>8 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>403 000</td>
<td>54 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>102 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>297 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>252 000</td>
<td>129 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>112 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL Antilles + Aruba</td>
<td>99 000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>67 000</td>
<td>39 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>63 000</td>
<td>22 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>33 000</td>
<td>18 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>17 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>29 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>28 000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>28 000</td>
<td>7 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>27 000</td>
<td>9 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>13 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>2 699 000</td>
<td>662 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) This column shows all residents of the Netherlands who have at least one parent born in the country indicated (first or second generation migrants).
(2) This column shows all resident non-citizens of the Netherlands by country of citizenship.
not always tally with the needs of most migrants, who increasingly had to cope with Dutch institutional arrangements, but who were not always able to do so. Their numbers went up and concentrations of immigrants began to develop in certain urban districts. A fundamental restructuring of industry around 1980 dramatically reduced the availability of unskilled jobs and pushed up unemployment among migrants. Tensions began to develop between the local population and the newcomers. Racism and discrimination became manifest in a country that until then had believed that such phenomena only existed elsewhere. Unlike Germany, the Netherlands did not encourage large-scale returns of unemployed migrants. This was politically not feasible. The feeling prevailed that one does not send home people to whom the economy owes so much. Yet, something had to be done to prevent the situation from getting worse.

A number of terrorist acts, including the hijacking of two trains by Moluccan youngsters created a sense of urgency. Although these youngsters claimed more autonomy for the Indonesian region from which their parents originated, many felt that the real motive for their acts was their inability to cope with the uncertainties of temporary residence and lacking integration perspectives.

The Ethnic Minorities’ policy

In 1979 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), a think tank close to the Prime Minister, published its report Ethnic Minorities, which became very influential. On the basis of research evidence and similar experiences in other countries the Council stated that most migrants were going to stay for good even though they might not be aware of it themselves. The Council claimed that a concerted policy effort was needed to promote their incorporation (Scientific Council for Government Policy 1979). A year later the government endorsed the Council’s views. This marked the beginning of what became known as Dutch ethnic minorities’ policy. Under this policy migrants were perceived in terms of their group membership and not primarily as individuals, as in most other European countries. In France, for example, immigrés is the term most commonly used to designate the newcomers; in Germany they are referred to as Ausländer (foreigners). Both terms, though reflecting vastly different perceptions of the permanency of settlement, define migrants as individuals. By contrast, in the Netherlands so much importance was attached to the racial, national or ethnic origin that the migrants were believed to share, that etnische minderheden (ethnic minorities) became the most generally used term to designate them. In sociological terms membership of an ethnic minority was perceived as a master status, a dominant social characteristic that takes precedence over all other characteristics (Hughes 1994: 146–56).

Ethnic minorities’ policy or, briefly, minorities’ policy took shape during the early 1980s. It was then laid down in the Minderhedennota, which was accepted by Parliament in 1983. From its onset, coordination of minorities’ policy has been a task of the Ministry of the Interior, even though other ministries (Education, Employment, Social Welfare, Justice, Housing, etc.) remain fully responsible for their own domains. The rationale of charging the Ministry of the Interior with coordinating tasks is that it supervises local government. Much of minorities’ policy is actually implemented at the local level. Many years later (in 1998) a special Minister for Integration Policy (the current name for this policy area) was appointed. His responsibilities also include Urban Policies and he is equally based in the Ministry of the Interior.

The basic assumption of minorities’ policy was that, as a result of immigration, the Netherlands had become a multi-ethnic society in which the majority and minorities should live together in harmony and in mutual respect for each other. There should be equality of opportunity for everyone. The public authorities have a responsibility in creating the necessary conditions for achieving this. The Minderhedennota defines as the formal overall objective of Dutch minorities’ policy: “Achieving a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development” (Minderhedennota 1983: 10). In more colloquial terms the policy’s objective became known, particularly during its early years, as “integration with retention of identity.” Surprisingly, the policy did not apply to all ethnic minorities, but only to those “for whose presence the government felt a special responsibility.” These were mainly groups from former colonies (but not the Eurasians from Indonesia, since they were believed to have assimilated), and groups recruited under the “guest worker” schemes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Other communities, such as the Chinese or those originating in European countries other than the former recruitment states did not qualify. The three basic objectives of minorities’ policy became:

1. emancipation in a multicultural society;
2. equality before the law;
3. promoting equal opportunity.

I will briefly discuss all three.
Emancipation in a multicultural society

The first element, emancipation in a multicultural society, can be seen as a natural successor to the respectful approach towards the migrants' cultural identity prior to 1980. It reflects the notion that immigration has enriched the country's cultural diversity. The difference, however, was that preservation of identity was earlier seen as a precondition for a successful return, whereas under the new policy it became an instrument in promoting multiculturalism within the Netherlands. This approach is reminiscent of the Dutch tradition of institutionalized pluralism, known as “pillarization” (verzuiling) (Liiphart 1975). Since the late nineteenth century each of the major religious and ideological communities in the country had been developing their own institutional arrangements (e.g. schools, housing corporations, hospitals, trade unions, newspapers). Such arrangements enabled the members of these communities to live their lives in accordance with the respective communities' values, and to limit inter-community contacts to a basic minimum, almost exclusively at the top. Hence the metaphor of pillarization, reminiscent of a Greek temple with its roof supported by a number of separate pillars. Within each “pillar” a process of collective emancipation took place, of which schooling constituted a very important element. Gradually, especially since the 1960s, pillarization lost much of its significance in Dutch society as a result of secularization and individualization. However, up to the present day many institutional arrangements in the Netherlands reflect the era of pillarization. The antiquated public broadcasting system is one example. Here, numerous publicly funded private organizations still reflecting pre-World War II ideological diversity are struggling to prevent their viewers from moving over to their commercial competitors. Education is another example. Groups of parents may set up their own school, which will be fully supported with public funds if certain curricular conditions are fulfilled. Only about one-third of all Dutch primary schools are public schools. The other two-thirds are privately run and are mostly based on different religious denominations or on specific educational ideologies.

The notion of creating and supporting separate provisions and institutional arrangements as a means of preserving group identity and promoting emancipation simultaneously is also vividly present in the minorities' policy. It was felt that ethnic minorities should be given a chance to emancipate while preserving and further developing their own cultural identity. Therefore, a generous public support was given to various aspects of immigrant social and cultural life, such as subsides for ethnic organizations, newspapers and broadcasting facilities. In an effort to institutionalize the promotion of migrants' interests, consultative councils for ethnic minorities were set up both at local and national levels. This occurred mostly at the initiative of the authorities seeking to justify their policies, rather than at the migrants' own request. In primary education, mother-tongue teaching was expanded to a maximum of five hours per week for the more sizeable minorities. During the 1980s the first initiatives developed within the respective communities for the establishment of Muslim and Hindu schools. Even though the authorities often showed a certain reluctance to endorse the plans, there are now well over 30 Muslim and a handful of Hindu schools in the country. These schools function on the same conditions as Protestant, Roman Catholic or Jewish schools (Dwyer and Meyer 1995; Rath et al. 1996). However, the schools attract only a small minority of the Muslim and Hindu population, in spite of research evidence that the academic results of children attending these schools are not different from other schools. Finally, Dutch law does not allow for financial support to churches or mosques, but certain activities organized by the latter (e.g. social work, language training, courses for women) are in fact subsidized with public money.

Equality before the law

The second element of minorities' policy was aimed at promoting equality before the law. When the policy was launched in the early 1980s it was stipulated that foreign residents should not be forced to take up Netherlands citizenship or be disadvantaged because of their foreign citizenship. The government considered this to be the most respectful manner of dealing with the growing number of foreign residents. This approach led to a range of measures aimed at gradually eliminating differences in treatment between citizens and non-citizens in almost every field. An example is the lifting of the ban for foreign residents on entering the public service, with only a few exceptions such as the armed forces and the police. Also, the social security system and other social policy instruments were applied to long-term foreign residents in exactly the same way as to Netherlands citizens. All these measures were supplemented by a reinforced anti-discrimination policy.

The best known measure in this field has been the granting of voting rights at the local level in 1985. Since then, foreign citizens with a residence record of at least five years have been able to vote and to be elected in local polls. It is relevant to note that the foreign residents did not really ask for this. It was the Dutch political majority that saw this as a logical consequence of changed conditions. An extension of voting rights to the provincial, the national and the European levels has been under discussion
from time to time. At present it is not very likely to materialize, except for citizens of other EU countries who, under the Amsterdam Treaty, are allowed to vote in European elections. Since immigrants have had the right to vote their turnout at local elections has always been well below the Dutch average. The Turks are an exception to this rule. Nevertheless, the number of elected councillors who are foreign citizens or who are of immigrant origin has been increasing, particularly in the larger cities. At the district council elections in Amsterdam and Rotterdam the ethnic vote has become of great significance, especially in districts with substantial immigrant communities.

Contrary to what some may have expected, most migrants cast their vote for the established Dutch political parties, predominantly on the left side of the political spectrum, and not for immigrant or ethnic parties (Tillie 2000). This may be seen from Table 3.2. Again, the Turks constitute an exception to this pattern: at the 1998 municipal elections about 20 percent of the Turkish vote went to parties set up by Turkish migrants, while nearly 30 percent went to the Christian Democrats. The Dutch electoral system is one of proportional representation, where the vote is primarily for a party list and only in the second instance for a specific candidate. Virtually all parties have been stepping up their efforts to put one or more candidates of immigrant origin on their lists, also in national elections. As Table 3.3 indicates, these candidates do indeed attract the ethnic vote, apparently without chasing away Dutch voters. As a consequence, 11 of the 150 members of the Second Chamber of Parliament are now Dutch citizens of immigrant origin. It appears that the immigrant vote is an attractive vote.

During the 1980s the conditions for naturalization were gradually eased, in particular for the second generation. A key change occurred in 1992 when the government introduced the possibility of dual citizenship (Van den Bedem 1994). Shortly after that decision the number of naturalizations began to increase dramatically, in particular among Turks, Moroccans and refugees (see Table 3.4). As can be seen from Table 3.4, more than half of all people of Turkish and Moroccan origin living in the Netherlands now hold a Dutch passport. Interestingly, the new measure did not change anything formally for the Moroccans, since the constitution of their country stipulates that a Moroccan can never lose his or her citizenship, not even upon becoming naturalized in another country. Yet, the measure apparently encouraged many Moroccans to apply for a Dutch passport. It seems that the very existence of the option of dual citizenship has an important symbolic value. As we will see later on, the possibilities for dual citizenship were severely reduced in 1997.

### Table 3.3  Voting for ethnic candidates by ethnic origin of the voter, 1998 local elections in five major cities in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity voter</th>
<th>Dutch (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (%)</th>
<th>Moroccan (%)</th>
<th>Surinamese (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3.4  Naturalizations in the Netherlands by country of previous citizenship, 1990–98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3030</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>12790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>6110</td>
<td>7300</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>29110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>11520</td>
<td>7990</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>36240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>18000</td>
<td>7750</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>43070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>23870</td>
<td>8110</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>49450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2360</td>
<td>33060</td>
<td>13480</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>71440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>30700</td>
<td>15600</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>82690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2670</td>
<td>21190</td>
<td>10480</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>59830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2420</td>
<td>13480</td>
<td>11250</td>
<td>6670</td>
<td>59170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Netherlands Statistics.

*National score in parliamentary elections 1998.

Promoting equal opportunity
The third element of Dutch minorities’ policy was the promotion of equal opportunity. The range of measures taken under this heading aimed at guaranteeing minorities an equal share in all relevant institutions in domains such as housing, healthcare, education and employment, a practice well known from the pillarization tradition. The catchword here was “proportionality.” Minorities should participate in the institutions mentioned in proportion to their numerical size, and this should be achieved by making these institutions more accessible to them. In order to achieve proportionality an active policy of equal opportunity had to be pursued. Part of this policy was a review of discriminatory elements in mechanisms used for the distribution of scarce resources, such as in the large public housing sector of the country. This has been quite successful. Over the past two decades the housing conditions of ethnic minorities have become roughly similar to those of the Dutch of comparable socio-economic status (Tesser et al. 1996). Nevertheless, ethnic minorities do tend to be concentrated in the poorer segments of the housing market, as much as they tend to be concentrated in the lower income brackets in general.

Less progress has been made in those sectors where the impact of the state on distribution mechanisms is more limited. A good example is the labor market. American-inspired attempts to overcome selective recruitment practices and discrimination by introducing certain forms of preferential treatment, or even quota, were usually faced with an unwillingness of employers to cooperate. Their argument was that it was not (or not primarily) discrimination by employers, but a lack of skills that made immigrant unemployment so high. Until well into the 1990s unemployment for the different minority groups oscillated between 20 and 40 percent, with a particularly bad record for the Turks and the Moroccans, including those of the second generation (Tesser et al. 1999). Thus, special training courses were set up for ethnic minorities. However, these could reach only small numbers of people. Sometimes their very existence was used as an excuse for other courses not to accept members of ethnic minorities. In 1993 a special law was introduced, modeled after the Employment Equity Act in Canada. This law does not set any quota, but it obliges employers to report publicly and on an annual basis on the ethnic minority share in their staff, as well as on their plans to increase that share. Since its introduction the law has been much criticized, mainly by the employers’ associations. The latter consider legislation of this type an attack on their freedom of selection, while claiming that registration of ethnic origin – a condition for a proper application of the law – violates the privacy of individuals. Initially, only a small minority of employers actually fulfilled their legal obligations. Later, in 1997, the law was modified and simplified. However, recent reports show that its implementation still leaves much to be desired. The government is not very strict in enforcing it and thus implicitly seems to admit that it sees this law largely as symbolic.

In education a combination of creating special facilities for ethnic minorities and an intensified use of mainstream policy instruments to overcome deprivation was chosen. Reception classes and remedial teaching for children of immigrant origin, for example, have been going hand-in-hand with changes in the curricula for all pupils, so as to make them reflect the increasingly multicultural nature of society. Generous sums were set apart for intensified education of ethnic minority children. For every such child a school receives 1.9 times the amount that the state pays for most Dutch children. Yet, all these investments have hardly contributed to bringing the ideal of “proportionality” any closer. Ethnic minority children continued to be over-represented in the lower types of secondary education and dropout from school continued to be twice as high as among Dutch students. Had the government chosen the wrong policy instruments, or was it simply too impatient?

Shifting paradigms
By the early 1990s, ten years after the launching of the minorities’ policy, several major changes had taken place. First, ethnic minorities had almost doubled in size, roughly from half a million to one million. This was a consequence not only of continuing immigration – largely family reunion – but also of high birth rates among certain groups. In certain neighborhoods minorities were becoming majorities. Secondly, after a few years of low immigration in the early 1980s, immigration gained momentum again after 1985, reaching an unprecedented peak in the early 1990s. In addition to the continuing flows from the “traditional” countries – Turkey, Morocco and Surinam – new flows also began to develop. Some of these consisted largely of refugees and asylum seekers, an effect of the changing geopolitical situation in the world, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thirdly, within the more established migrant communities a new generation was emerging, partly or fully educated in the Netherlands and much more familiar with that country than their parents. These three developments – growing numbers, proliferation of groups, and more diversity within
each group – slowly began to challenge the basis of the minorities’ policy. A policy targeted at a limited number of clearly defined “ethnic minorities” becomes more difficult to implement when these minorities become larger, more numerous, and more heterogeneous.

Moreover, as we have seen, the social and economic situation of minorities remained bad, in spite of all efforts to improve it. Unemployment was high, programs for training and targeted employment were not very successful, barriers to self-employment were not easily taken, and ethnic minorities became increasingly dependent on public support. Doubts began to develop about the effectiveness of facilitating immigrant cultures and of creating separate provisions for them as key elements of public policy (De Jong 1997). Again, the government turned to the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) for advice. In its report Allochtonenbeleid (“Immigrant Policy”) the Council stated that in the implementation of its first report the government had put too much weight on facilitating multiculturalism, and too little on promoting immigrant participation in society at large. In the Council’s view, a further continuation of the ethnic minorities’ policy would make the immigrants even more dependent on public support and therefore vulnerable and subject to further marginalization. This should be avoided, particularly in times of economic slowdown and also in times when public responsibilities are transferred to the private sector (Scientific Council for Government Policy 1989). In fact, both trends were clearly present in the years around 1990. As an alternative, the Council recommended putting more emphasis on education, employment policies and Dutch language training so that the migrants would be better qualified to participate in their own capacity. The emphasis on culture in the Council’s second report was only very limited relegating it to a private affair.

The government did not seem as willing to endorse the Council’s recommendations as it had been ten years before, but the report certainly generated a series of lively public debates on matters related to immigration and integration. Two themes stood out in particular in these debates, both related to multiculturalism and its limits. The first was mother-tongue teaching, a debate which took place largely in educational and in academic circles (Lucassen and Köbben 1992). Certain linguists and educationalists argued that a child who speaks his mother tongue fluently has less difficulty in learning other languages. Others, however, claimed that, in practice, the five weekly hours of mother-tongue teaching took place while the Dutch children were following their lessons in Dutch and in other core subjects. This seemed to widen rather than to narrow the gap between both groups. There were also discussions on the contents of what was being taught. The lessons were often amateurish, given by teachers recruited in the countries of origin, and largely inspired by textbooks used in those countries and reflecting their lifestyles and their dominant ideological and political views. Moreover, determining a child’s mother tongue became increasingly problematic for two reasons. First, children of Berber or Kurdish origin who live in the Netherlands did not always speak and understand Arabic or Turkish, the languages in which the lessons were given. Secondly, an increasing number of children born and raised in the Netherlands began to speak Dutch better than what the educational authorities assumed to be their mother tongue. Although mother-tongue teaching had never been compulsory, most ethnic minority children attended it, probably as a result of strong social control within the communities. In the early 1990s it was gradually stripped of its controversial characteristics. Its cultural elements and many references to the country of origin were dropped, so that in fact it became reduced to language training; it was gradually put outside the core curriculum and its voluntary nature was accentuated. Consequently, the number of migrant children attending it decreased dramatically.

The second debate was less restricted to experts and much more political. Frits Bolkestein, the then parliamentary leader of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the conservative liberals, triggered it. He had acquired a reputation of not shying away from controversial issues. In a speech to the Liberal International in September 1991 he stated that “Islam” and “Western values” were irreconcilable. Therefore, he claimed, immigrants should adapt to the dominant cultural pattern and observe the existing rules wherever these clash with their own cultural background. He mentioned a few all-too-familiar examples, such as polygamy and the Rushdie affair, to justify his views (Bolkestein 1991). Bolkestein’s statements were fiercely contested by pro-multiculturalists, but he also received support, which he received in at subsequent elections. The Netherlands appeared to have a “silent majority,” weary of multiculturalism, but unwilling to speak up until then, probably fearing to be accused of racism. It should be mentioned here that openly racist parties have never played a prominent role in Dutch politics. Anti-immigrant parties, such as the Centrumpartij, have never obtained more than 2 percent of the national vote (but more than that in several of the larger cities) and they are currently not represented in parliament. However, since the VVD was the largest opposition party in those
days, the success of Bolkestein’s populist intervention was a sign for the government to reconsider the justifiability of specific arrangements for ethnic minorities, the quintessence of its policy.

Indeed, shortly before the next elections, in May 1994, the government published its policy document *Contourennota integratiebeleid etnische minderheden*, which was meant to replace the 1983 *Minderhedennota*. In the new approach less emphasis was put on promoting and facilitating multiculturalism, while the need for integration was underlined more strongly, in particular through an increased participation in education and labor. The minorities’ policy was rechristened *integration policy*. Integration, a term that had been almost a taboo in political circles until then, was defined as “a process leading to the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for identity is seen as a necessary condition” (*Contourennota* 1994: 24). With respect to the objectives, the departure from the minorities’ policy is not so extreme, except that the word “mutual” indicates that a more active involvement is expected from the native population. With respect to the policy instruments, however, the *Contourennota* strongly contrasts with its predecessor. The three main dimensions characterizing the minorities’ policy – the social and economic, the legal and political, and the cultural dimensions – are still to be found within the new integration policy. However, their relative weight has shifted. The emphasis is no longer on culture. Here, the government advocates a freedom of choice: members of minority groups should decide for themselves whether and, if so, to what extent they would like to retain and further develop their cultural identity. This is not seen as a task of the government any longer. Besides, the *Contourennota* states that it is “important to note that culture is not a static concept, but that it develops in interaction with other cultures.” (*Contourennota* 1994: 20). In the next paragraphs the change is further illustrated for each of the three dimensions.

**Social and economic integration**

Since integration policy no longer limits itself to the immigrant communities, or – as the minorities’ policy did – to an arguable selection of these, it is less easy to describe it systematically. Its major aim is to help overcome social deprivation by providing instruments for anyone who is in a disadvantaged situation, including immigrants. This is the classical social policy approach, with an “ethnic or immigrant zest” wherever this is seen as necessary, for instance in healthcare. Its basic philosophy, however, is that “the ethnic or immigrant factor” should be an integral aspect of public policy in all fields. Consequently, most programs and policy instruments specifically designed to promote the integration of immigrants in the social and economic area have now been discontinued or, alternatively, made accessible to disadvantaged people of non-immigrant origin alike. Specific educational facilities for immigrant children, for example, have been transformed into “educational priority programs.” Programs for the long-term unemployed have replaced targeted employment projects for ethnic minorities or for people with low skills, many of whom have an immigrant background. Other elements of the minorities’ policy, often at the local level, have been incorporated into policies for “social innovation,” anti-poverty programs and into urban renewal policies. To underline this new approach, known as “mainstreaming,” some local authorities decided to drop the term “ethnic minorities” and to replace it by “(immigrants)” or by the newly created word *allochtonen*, the opposite of the slightly more familiar term “autochthonous.” These terms can be used much more readily to designate individuals, rather than communities. Moreover, the shift relieves the authorities of the delicate task to decide which groups do and which groups do not qualify for their policy measures. Likewise, it has solved the problem of what to do about the offspring of the increasing number of inter-ethnic alliances, particularly among Surinamese and Antilleans. Half of all Antilleans in the Netherlands and one-third of the Surinamese marry a native Dutch person. This contradicts the idea that ethnic minorities are relatively closed communities, even though intermarriage rates among people of Turkish and Moroccan origins are (still?) much lower.

Thus, the group approach, a long-standing characteristic of Dutch migrant policies, has been replaced by a more individual approach. It attempts to open up the existing institutional arrangements to immigrants and non-immigrants alike, rather than aiming at the development of new, parallel institutions. At the same time, people of immigrant origin are expected to participate more fully in these institutions. Thus, integration is increasingly perceived as a two-way process (*Contourennota* 1994: 6). Providing immigrants with the instruments for a fuller participation in society has replaced the “caring” approach of the 1970s and 1980s. One of the unsolved paradoxes of the new approach remains that, although the emphasis is on providing opportunities for individuals, the effects of this policy can only be measured at a group level. Therefore, the term “ethnic minorities” has not completely disappeared from government rhetoric.

The new approach has been further elaborated in the latest policy document of Roger van Boxtel. He took office in 1998 as the first special
Citizenship and civic integration

In the 1994 Contourennota citizenship is a key concept, although the document does not give a precise definition. It means definitely more than encouraging foreign immigrants to obtain a Dutch passport. More than in the past, the need is emphasized for migrants to identify with the political community and to become part of it. As in the social and economic field, this is thought to require an effort from both sides. Of course, naturalization can be a major prerequisite for political participation. As we saw earlier, the option of dual citizenship was introduced in 1992, more or less on an experimental basis. This led to a dramatic increase in the number of applicants for Dutch passports. When the experiment was to be confirmed in 1996 by a change of the Aliens Law, the First Chamber of Parliament, the Senate, did not accept the proposal. The VVD and the Christian Democrats, who held a majority in the First Chamber, but not in the Second, were fiercely opposed. The nationalist arguments that they put forward were almost a novelty in the Dutch political debate on citizenship, which – unlike similar debates in neighboring countries – had been largely instrumental until then. Indeed, the spokespersons of the two parties claimed that most migrants had been obtaining a Dutch passport for pragmatic reasons – easy travelling within the EU – rather than as a sign of loyalty to the Netherlands. The government, not willing to risk a crisis on this, decided to discontinue the dual citizenship option in 1997, but it maintained a considerable number of exceptions. Since then naturalizations have dropped, but not to pre-1992 levels. Meanwhile, most people of Turkish or Moroccan descent hold a Dutch passport. A survey which we recently carried out among Turkish and Moroccan youngsters in Rotterdam indicates that their identification with the Netherlands indeed is very limited. They are much more ready to identify with Turkey or Morocco but, surprisingly, also with the city of Rotterdam (Phalet et al. 2000).

In a comparative perspective the Dutch citizenship debate is less unique than the debate on inburgering, which may best be translated as “civic integration.” In a certain way I was at the start of it myself, together with my colleague Arie van der Zwan. Just before the 1994 turnaround, the Minister of the Interior, Ien Dales, asked us to develop new policy incentives that would be more in line with the 1989 Immigrant Policy report of the Scientific Council, to which I had also contributed. On the basis of an assessment of the economic and social situation, as well as of experiences in traditional immigration countries, Van der Zwan and I developed a proposal (Van der Zwan and Entzinger 1994). Our central
argument was that many immigrants arriving in the Netherlands were not sufficiently qualified to enter the labor market on the requirements set by a highly developed economy. Thus, the labor market problem was not primarily a demand side problem (too little demand, discrimination), but there were also problems on the supply side. We put forward three proposals, of which the first was to create special traineeship positions for newly arrived immigrants with remuneration below the customary level for comparable work. This would enable them to acquire work experience without having to compete with native workers. Our second suggestion was to relax some rules in high immigration areas so as to facilitate residents in setting up their own businesses. Our third recommendation was to organize mandatory language and social skills training for new arrivals. Elements of all three proposals appeared in the program for the coalition cabinet that took office in 1994, but the third proposal was seen as the most prominent one. It gave rise to a vivid public and political debate, largely because of the mandatory nature of the courses.

Those who were opposed to mandatory language training claimed that this suggested that immigrants were not willing to learn Dutch. The long waiting lists for optional courses were proof of the opposite. Moreover, requiring mandatory schooling from adult people is highly unusual in a liberal democracy. Why not just improve and expand the courses, and still leave migrants a freedom of choice? Finally, opponents were wondering what would happen to those who would not comply with their obligations. Would they be extradited? This is a rather severe punishment, and in many cases it would mean a violation of international agreements. Our counterarguments were threefold:

1. Mandatory courses not only compel the migrants, but they also force the state to make sure that enough courses of good quality are available.
2. Even though the vast majority of newcomers may be eager to follow a course, its mandatory nature makes it easier to include categories that otherwise can be difficult to reach, such as traditional Muslim women or school dropouts.
3. Finally, we argued that compulsory schooling for a young person normally lasts 12-14 years. Without so many years of schooling it is impossible to function in a highly developed European society. Many newcomers have never had an opportunity to receive so much education. In order to mobilize their potential and to avoid life-long dependency on welfare state provisions, the state must have the right to oblige people to qualify themselves for life and work in the Netherlands. If they do not do so the risk is that an "ethnic underclass" may develop with all negative effects for social cohesion.

In the following years some experiments that already existed were expanded and many new courses were set up. In 1997 Parliament approved the Wet inburgering nieuwkomers (Law on Civic Integration for Newcomers) with a vast majority. The law has been operative since September 1998. It requires migrants who arrive from outside the European Union to report to the local authorities for an interview. Failing to do so will be fined with a maximum of €2269. On the basis of certain criteria (knowledge of Dutch, level of education, age) it is decided whether that person has to attend a course. The course takes 600 hours, of which 500 are for language training (at different levels), and 100 for social and civic skills and labor market orientation. In 1999, the first full year in which the law was operative, more than 17,000 newcomers registered for a course. The budget set aside by the government for that year was €138 million; all courses are free of charge for the participants. One of the biggest practical problems is to make students finish the course. So far, only about half the participants have taken the final test. A rather paradoxical phenomenon is that, given the tight labor market, many students find a job long before the end of the course, while the course was meant to improve their chances in the labor market. However, this is not the only purpose of the course. Its more general ambition is to familiarize all newcomers with the language, culture, and society of the Netherlands, an ambition almost unthinkable under the minorities’ policy. Meanwhile, Finland and Denmark have copied the idea of mandatory civic integration courses and it is being discussed in a number of other countries, including Germany and Belgium. In the Netherlands, pressure is growing to set up similar arrangements for “old” immigrants, but after so many years it seems unrealistic that they can be obliged to attend.

The cultural dimension: A return to nationalism?

Finally, what has happened to the cultural elements of the ethnic minorities’ policy? The pillarization philosophy under which migrants would have their own institutional arrangements in all major sectors of society, inside which they could emancipate, has been abandoned clearly and decisively. It should be remembered that the Christian Democrats – since long the strongest proponents of pillarization – lost dramatically in the 1994 elections. For the first time since the early twentieth century they did not become part of the new cabinet. The three secular parties that have constituted the government coalition since then (Labour,
VVD and Democrats 66) have been giving a more modest place to the cultural dimension in their integration efforts. The establishment of ethnic and cultural organizations is primarily considered to be the migrants' own responsibility. In recent years immigrants have been setting up such organizations in large numbers. They may acquire state subsidies for certain activities, like sports or in the performing arts, but on the same conditions as for any other organization with a social or a cultural objective. In those cases where legal provisions for specific arrangements do exist, such as for schools, the checking of credentials has become stricter. Recently, a newly created Turkish broadcasting organization was not admitted to the public system.

An exception to this rule is the perpetuation of the consultative bodies for the different ethnic minorities at the national level. These did already exist prior to the change in 1994. The government consulted them on a regular basis, but it was not until 1996 that these bodies acquired a legal basis. The law now obliges the government to consult ethnic minorities' representatives on any measure that affects them. The representatives, however, only have an advisory role. Consulting them may help to justify government policies if not always in the eyes of immigrants then at least in the eyes of politicians. In contrast, many local authorities have abolished their local advisory councils. Often these were dominated by members of the first generation who were not always aware of the major changes occurring in their own communities as a result of the ascent of a new generation with different demands.

In the early months of 2000 yet another debate took place, which attracted an unprecedented amount of public attention, and which seems very illustrative for the new thinking on immigrant integration in the Netherlands, particularly on its cultural dimension. It was triggered by a long article entitled "The Multicultural Tragedy" (Het multicultural drama) in the quality newspaper NRC Handelsblad by Paul Scheffer, a historian, but also a prominent member of the Labour Party (Scheffer 2000). Scheffer voiced the concern that many Dutch people feel about continuing immigration, stagnant integration, increasing segregation and a growing Muslim population. The "tragedy," in his view, is that an "ethic underclass" is developing that consists of people who do not feel attached to Dutch culture and society and who are unwilling and unable to integrate. Eventually this will undermine social cohesion and the functioning of the liberal democratic state, particularly because of the supposedly illiberal ideas of Muslims. In Scheffer's view, the trouble is that the Dutch elite has remained largely indifferent to these developments. Their cosmopolitan ideology and their cultural relativism have prevented them from demanding the newcomers to adapt. Respect for cultural identity has prevailed over defending the principles of liberal democracy. The only possible answer, in Scheffer's perception, is a "civilisation offensive," which includes more obligatory policy efforts to overcome deprivation as well as demanding from the immigrants to adapt to the principles of liberal democracy. Moreover, immigrants should have a much better knowledge of "our" culture and history.

Scheffer's observations, which ten years earlier would have been disposed of as conservative or perhaps even as racist, now generated a lot of support, but also strong criticisms. Significantly, it was a debate among the Dutch elite, in which only very few people of immigrant origin took part. Critics claimed that Scheffer seemed to ignore that the government had already made the move away from multiculturalism, even though this might not always be so easy in practice. They also pointed to the fact that Scheffer appealed to the familiar stereotypes of immigrants. Although many immigrants and people of immigrant origin are not even Muslims at all, the stereotype makes them all sympathize with Muslim fundamentalism and reject liberal democracy. Scheffer has been accused of ignoring the immense diversity among immigrants as well as the educational progress that has been made, particularly among the second generation. He also seems to ignore that cultures are not static, particularly in situations of migration. In our recent Rotterdam survey we have found that Turkish and Moroccan youngsters, like Dutch youngsters, certainly do experience a tension between Islamic and European values, particularly family values (Phalet et al. 2000). However, most young Muslims have a highly personalized or "Westernized" interpretation of Islam and are in full agreement with principles such as individual freedom and equality, which are fundamental for liberal democracies. Besides, as their educational level goes up and their length of residence increases, their ideas become more liberal, and differences with Dutch young people of the same educational background almost disappear. Scheffer seems to be insufficiently aware of the dynamics of integration.

Possibly the most significant part of Scheffer's indictment are his rather strongly nationalist accents, epitomized by the need for immigrants to familiarize themselves with Dutch history. This was not what one might have expected from a prominent member of the Labour Party, which so far had been a prudent supporter of multiculturalism without however wishing to alienate their traditional urban electorate. In 1991 the conservative liberal Frits Bolkestein stopped at signaling a tension between "Muslim" and "Western" values and requiring the Muslims to
abandon their values wherever a clash would occur. The social democrat Scheffer went beyond that point, when he underlined the need for a shared ideology, which should have its roots not only in liberal democratic principles, but also in Dutch history. By claiming this he seems to turn Bolkestein's populism into nationalism, but it is a nineteenth-century nationalism in which the sense of sharing a common history plays a dominant role. Unfortunately, Scheffer does not specify how the teaching of history to immigrants should be arranged. There are numerous controversial episodes in Dutch history, many of which precisely relate to multiculturalism. Thus, whereas the already existing legal obligation to follow Dutch language courses and courses in social and civic skills can be seen as instrumental in promoting a fuller and more independent immigrant participation in major social institutions, Scheffer's recommendations go beyond that objective. In fact, he points at the need for a shared ideology, which comes much closer to assimilation in its traditional meaning.

Although it may be technically difficult to put his recommendations into practice, Scheffer has certainly pointed at the weak underbelly of liberal democracies, which is how to cope with those who do not share a sense of belonging and who may not adhere to the principles of liberal democracy. The problem Scheffer seems to overlook is that a liberal democratic state that pursues an active policy of assimilation will soon clash with its own principles of freedom and tolerance. The tension between striving for multiculturalism and the requirements of liberal democracies cannot be solved as easily as Scheffer suggests, but handling it may be discussed and negotiated, as many immigration countries are beginning to learn. Since the public debate on "the multicultural tragedy" the parameters finally have been defined on both sides of the political and ideological spectrum. The debate has generated a respectable non-racist assimilationist view that can be opposed to the long existing multiculturalist option. It is therefore highly illustrative for the shift in Dutch immigration discourse.

Discussion

The Dutch case offers an interesting example of how ideologies of immigrant incorporation may evolve over time, largely under the influence of actual developments. Until well into the 1970s immigration to the Netherlands was defined as temporary. Consequently, all policy measures taken were understood in the light of the migrants' eventual return, except in the case of those who had come "home" from Indonesia in the aftermath of decolonization. This made it unnecessary to reflect on modes of integration. Around 1980 awareness developed that many migrants would stay for good. They were defined primarily in terms of their shared origins, and therefore labeled as "ethnic minorities." The authorities developed an elaborate "ethnic minorities' policy," that aimed at promoting their participation in Dutch society without forcing them to abandon their identity as an ethnic group. This approach of institutionalized multiculturalism should be understood in the light of the Dutch tradition of "pillarization." However, it became more difficult to pursue this approach as the migrant communities began to grow in numbers and in size because of continuing immigration. Most communities also became more differentiated as their length of residence went up. As time went by, it became more obvious that policies of institutionalized multiculturalism have a tendency to freeze cultures, rather than to do justice to their dynamism. This was particularly visible as a second generation, born and raised in the Netherlands, began to come of age.

In the early 1990s the multiculturalism as advocated by the Dutch authorities became increasingly under fire, primarily because it had not contributed significantly to overcoming the migrant's socially deprived position, another major objective of the minorities' policy. Unemployment figures remained very high, school achievements among the second generation were below expectations, and segregation was increasing. Their prospects for a fuller participation in society remained limited. Fears about a majority backlash were also growing. Then another shift in policy objectives occurred. The major focus moved from facilitating the migrants to preserve their cultural identity to promoting their integration into mainstream institutions. This implied that the initial group approach, which had focused primarily on migrant communities, changed into an approach concentrating on the individual immigrant. The "minorities' policy" was rebaptized "integration policy," thus reflecting the idea that the entire society should be an object of policy efforts, not just the immigrants. The new view put a stronger emphasis on what majority and minorities have in common, rather than accentuating differences, as is likely to occur under a multiculturalist approach. Prior to the recent policy change the main debate was on the tension between diversity and equality. What institutional arrangements would do justice to cultural difference without leading to social and economic marginalization? Since the change the major axis of the debate has been on the tension between diversity and unity. What should all members of a society have in common in order to make that society
function, while at the same time acknowledging differences between groups and individuals?

Along with this shift of emphasis, policies also became more obliging, particularly towards the migrants. The benevolent attitude of the 1980s, which made immigrants heavily dependent on government support, was replaced by one that appealed to the newcomers to step up their integration efforts and to familiarize themselves more quickly with the language and customs of the Netherlands. The Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers of 1998 is one of the most outspoken examples of this new approach, but not the only one. The new approach has been going hand in hand with a major transformation of the welfare state. In the Netherlands, as in much of Northern and Western Europe, liberal-egalitarian views, so dominantly present in public policy making since the post-war years, have gradually been losing ground to other, more neo-conservative ideologies. Where the former tended to stress entitlements, provided by the state to anyone in need, the latter brought individual responsibility and the ability to cope for oneself back to the foreground. The concurrent shift from state to market implied that immigrants could no longer rely on the benefits of public support, but that they had to develop their own human capital. Luckily, in the Netherlands the substantial economic growth during the last decade has helped create more opportunities for immigrants.

However, more is happening than just a change in the appreciation and the working of the welfare state. Not only the balance between state and market has changed, but there has been a growing emphasis on communitarian values as well. The extreme cultural relativism, which lay at the basis of Dutch multiculturalism in the 1980s, has lost ground to the notion that there is no universalist idea of justice and that it is the task of the public authorities to protect and defend existing values and practices. Awareness has grown that every society has a built-in cultural bias. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that there is no room for pluralism, but the dominant values clearly set the pace. In this perspective, integration is not just a matter of providing equal opportunity and granting cultural rights, but it also requires a sufficient degree of participation by all members, no matter what their origins are, and it demands their commitment and identification with the society in which they live. For its proper functioning every democratic society needs a certain degree of solidarity, which can develop better if some of the basic values are shared by virtually everyone.

The crucial question, of course, is the one about the nature of these values in a society that is becoming increasingly diverse, precisely as a result of immigration. In many of the societies from which the migrants originate, religion provides a coherent set of dominant values that plays this unifying role, particularly in Muslim societies. In Western democracies, given their separation of church and state, this is not a realistic option. In the Dutch political spectrum only a few small orthodox-Calvinist parties advocate a unifying role for religion. Unavoidably it would require from migrants of a different religious background either to assimilate or to leave (Fermin 1997). This is not to say, however, that religion does not play any role in the debate in immigration and multicultural society in the Netherlands. Quite the contrary, particularly in the case of Islam. As Islam is becoming more institutionalized and as its expressions are becoming more visible, the debate on the reconciliability of certain Muslim and Christian-Humanist values is gaining momentum. This is particularly so where the public recognition of such values is at stake, some of which imply controversial stances on women or homosexuals.

An appeal to non-religious values as a basis for common identifications seems more realistic. It is in this context that nationhood has come to the foreground lately. There is ample research evidence that the Dutch are not among the most nationalist peoples of Europe, and that xenophobic and racist ideologies do not appeal to large numbers of Dutch men and women (SORA 2001). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that classical nationalist considerations, such as the right to protect one's language and culture, an emphasis on common descent and the importance of a shared history are increasingly heard as arguments to support the need for immigrant incorporation. The majority in the Senate that rejected the option of dual citizenship in 1997 largely based itself on such considerations, as well as on the view that loyalty to a nation-state can only be exclusive. Similar arguments could be heard frequently in the public debate on integration in 2000 that followed Paul Scheffer's article. The gradual marginalization of mother-tongue teaching in Dutch primary education and the encouragement of migrants to learn Dutch are all recent trends that point in the same direction. It should be kept in mind, however, that other developments, such as the stepping up of European integration as well as omnipresent globalization, are equally seen as threats to national identity by many. Some would label these trends as nationalist, others would rather see them as symptoms of a revival of communitarianism, but whatever label we stick on them, they certainly do not point in the postnational direction to which Soysal has shown us the way (Soysal 1994).
Citizenship is a third binding force that has played a significant role in the Dutch debate lately. It was first introduced as a central notion in the 1994 Contouremnota, in which the government laid down the broad lines of its integration policy that it has been pursuing since then. The problem with citizenship is that it is a complex concept, used in different meanings, while the government has never really made clear how it wishes to understand it itself (Fermin 2000). Some attach primarily or even exclusively a legal meaning to citizenship: citizenship as a status that entails rights. In the liberal democratic perception it is built into the notion of citizenship that all citizens are equal citizens. From this perspective, an active naturalization policy must be pursued in order to avoid inequality of rights. Dutch naturalization policies have never been very rigid, but, as we have seen, attempts to alleviate them by allowing dual citizenship were abandoned in 1997 after a few years of experimenting. Judged by the steep rise in the numbers of applicants during the mid-1990s, the experiment can be qualified as highly successful. However, its opponents argued that most applicants saw citizenship not as an expression of “membership” and identification, but as an instrument, for example to obtain more entitlements or to facilitate intra-European travelling. These two views reflect the two other dimensions usually distinguished in the notion of citizenship. One, indeed, is the communitarian dimension, that refers to identification with shared cultural values in a society, and therefore relates to nationalism, as discussed earlier. The other dimension finds its roots in neo-republicanism, and stresses the need for individuals to participate in the political community and in civil society. The public authorities should facilitate this to the largest possible extent. Granting citizenship rights to immigrants is one important aspect of this, but it may not be enough. The compulsory language courses for newcomers, in existence since 1998, have to be seen in this perspective as well. These courses include lessons on social and civic skills. Interestingly, communitarians and neo-republicans tend to agree on the need for such courses as both consider language to be a major vehicle for communication and identification, albeit for different reasons.

Conclusion

We may conclude that integration policies in the Netherlands no longer are as outspokenly multicultural as they have been in the past. The initial multiculturalist approach was ill conceived. Although it was said to respect cultural diversity and to facilitate the migrants’ emancipation, in reality it perpetuated their marginalization and their dependency on public support. It also served as an excuse for not sufficiently opening up existing institutional arrangements to newcomers. Dutch multiculturalism was based on a static interpretation of culture, rather than on a dynamic one. Implicitly it served to protect traditional values in Dutch society from new outside impulses. Therefore it can hardly be seen as postnational; conservative seems a more appropriate label. The debate on values that unite or divide society has only begun since Dutch policies have been moving away from multiculturalism in its institutionalized form. It is in this debate that communitarian and neo-republican views are competing with one another. It is much too early to say who will win, but it is for sure that the competition will not stop anytime soon.

Note

1 Since 1999 Mr Bolkstein has been the Dutch member of the European Commission.

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4

Citizenship and Integration in Europe

Randall Hansen

For many scholars, citizenship has been devalued as a tool of integration.\textsuperscript{1} Large-scale migration, laid against the globalization of capital, commodity and service markets, has undermined the logic of national citizenship by breaking the link between it and the nation-state.\textsuperscript{2} As social and economic entitlements are legitimized not by nation-states and national policy but by the discourse of “universal personhood,” international norms and treaties, the traditional association between citizenship and rights, between the national state and the individual, has been broken. The most robust (and least modest) version of the thesis is presented by David Jacobson in Rights Across Borders. According to Jacobson,

Transnational migration is steadily eroding the traditional basis of nation-state membership, namely citizenship. As rights have come to be predicated on residency, not citizen status, the distinction between “citizen” and “alien” has eroded. The devaluation of citizenship has contributed to the increasing importance of international human rights codes, with its premise of universal “personhood”…Social, civil, economic, and even political rights have come to be predicted on residency, not citizenship (with some national variations). Citizenship, consequently, has been devalued in the host countries: aliens resident in the United States and in Western European countries have not felt any compelling need to naturalise even when it is possible.\textsuperscript{3}

For the postnationalists, integration occurs independently of national citizenship: the complex of social and economic rights enjoyed by permanent residents affords them the opportunity to work, attend school, join political parties and/or other associations, lobby politicians