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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
IN A DIGITAL WORLD

Orin S. Kerr*


How does the Fourth Amendment apply to the search and seizure of computer data? The Fourth Amendment was created to regulate entering homes and seizing physical evidence, but its prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is now being called on to regulate a very different process: retrieval of digital evidence from electronic storage devices. While obvious analogies exist between searching computers and searching physical spaces, important differences between them will force courts to rethink the basic meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s key concepts. What does it mean to “search” computer data? When is computer data “seized”? When is a computer search or seizure “reasonable”?

This article offers a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer data. It begins by exploring the basic differences between physical searches of physical property and electronic searches of digital evidence. It then proposes an exposure theory of Fourth Amendment searches: any exposure of data to an output device such as a monitor should be a search of that data, and only that data. The exposure approach is then matched with a rule for computer seizures: while copying data should not be deemed a seizure of that data, searches of copies should be treated the same as searches of the original. In the final section, the article proposes a rethinking of the plain view exception in computer searches to reflect the new dynamic of digital evidence investigations. The plain view exception may need to be narrowed or even eliminated in digital evidence cases to ensure that digital warrants that are narrow in theory do not devolve into general warrants in practice. Tailoring the doctrine in light of the new realities of computer investigations will protect the function of existing Fourth Amendment rules in the new world of digital evidence.

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INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a police detective, and that the target of your investigation has used his personal computer to help commit his crimes. Perhaps you are investigating a murder, and the target left evidence on his computer that he had staged a fake kidnapping to kill his wife.\(^1\) Perhaps you are investigating tax fraud, and your target keeps her financial records on a laptop.\(^2\) Or maybe you are investigating a gang that smuggles drugs, and a gang member keeps a spreadsheet file on his computer recording which members of the gang owe him money.\(^3\) In all of these cases, the critical evidence needed to prove your case in court is stored inside the target’s computer. To catch and convict the suspect, you will need to seize the computer and retrieve the evidence it contains.

Now imagine that you are a person wrongly suspected of committing a serious crime. A police detective believes that evidence of the crime is stored on your home computer, and seizes the computer to retrieve the evidence. As the cops haul your computer away, you know that you have been wrongly targeted. But you also know that your computer contains a world of very private and potentially embarrassing information. By seizing your computer, the detective has seized a virtual world including your diary, thousands of private e-mails, a stash of pornography, and drafts of your tax returns indicating you were not entirely honest with Uncle Sam when you filed your returns last year. The computer also contains much more information that you didn’t even know existed, such as webserving records indicating every website you visited and every search engine query you entered for the last twelve months. All of that information is stored on your computer, now in police custody and awaiting a search.

The increasing role of computers in American society has made the retrieval of computer evidence an increasingly common and important part of criminal investigations. In 1990, search of a computer during a criminal investigation was a notable event; in 2005, it is relatively common. By 2020 it will be routine. The thorny issue for the courts – and the fascinating issue for scholars – is how the Fourth Amendment should regulate the process. How should the Fourth Amendment govern the steps that an investigator takes when searching a personal computer for evidence? As a doctrinal matter, no one knows how the Fourth

\(^3\) See, e.g., United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1997).
Amendment applies to computer searches and seizures. No scholarly work has analyzed the problem in depth. Lower courts have just begun to grapple with the issues, resulting in a series of tentative and often contradictory opinions that raise as many questions as they answer.

The problem is difficult because important differences exist between the mechanisms of physical evidence collection and digital evidence collection. The Fourth Amendment was drafted to regulate searches of homes and physical property, and has developed clear rules to regulate the enter-and-retrieve mechanism of traditional physical searches. Computer searches offer a very different dynamic: electric heads pass over billions of magnetized spots on metal disks, transforming those spots into data that is processed and directed to users via monitors. How can the old rules fit the new facts? What does it mean to “search” computer data? When is computer data “seized”? When is a search or seizure of computer data “reasonable”? The questions are particularly challenging because computers challenge several of the basic assumptions underlying Fourth Amendment doctrine. They store different information, and do so in different ways. Computers are like wallets in a physical sense, homes in a virtual sense, and vast warehouses in an analogical sense. Which insights should govern?

This article develops a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer hard drives and other electronic

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It attempts to reformulate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures for an environment of digital evidence. The new facts of computer searches should prompt a rethinking of Fourth Amendment doctrine to preserve the function of existing law. To that end, the article attempts a pragmatist fitting of existing rules to the new technological practices. This approach not only creates a viable set of doctrinal results to apply in computer searches, but also suggests a deeper understanding of the Fourth Amendment by seeing existing law as a contingent answer to a basic set of questions on how legal rules can regulate police investigations. Asking old questions in a new context offers a fresh perspective on the nature of existing Fourth Amendment law.

The article contains three sections. Section I explores the four basic differences between the dynamics of traditional home searches and the new computer searches that trigger a need to rethink how the Fourth Amendment applies. First, home searches occur via physical entry and visual observation, while computer searches occur via passing an electric current over rotating magnetic points, processing the data and then outputting it. Second, home searches occur at the target’s residence, while computer searches typically occur offsite on a government computer that stores a copy of the target’s hard drive. Third, homeowners can store only so much property in a home and have significant control over that property, while computers can store entire virtual worlds of information often unbeknownst to the user. Fourth, homes are searched only at a physical level, while computers need to be searched at both a physical level and a virtual level. Each of these differences raises the prospect that

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7 This article focuses on searches of computer storage devices owned or exclusively used by suspects and stored locally. It does not address the surprisingly difficult questions raised by the application of the Fourth Amendment to remotely stored data. I plan to address the question of how the Fourth Amendment might apply to access of remotely stored data in my next article.

8 Professor Lessig has argued that when applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies, courts should “translate” the original rules into something new to restore the old purpose in light of technological change. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity as Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). I have something less abstract in mind. Lessig’s translation theory operates at a high level of generality; he views the Fourth Amendment as a general command to protect privacy, and wants judges to interpret the Fourth Amendment in new technologies so as to protect privacy and therefore be true to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 118. My approach attempts to rethink existing rules at a particular level, not a general one; it seeks to maintain the specific goals of specific doctrinal rules in light of changing facts, not to generalize the Fourth Amendment into a policy concern for courts to implement.
rules established for physical searches may no longer be appropriate for digital searches.

Section II explores how the Fourth Amendment applies to the data acquisition stage of computer searches. It offers what I term an “exposure-based approach” to the foundational question of what is a search and seizure in the context of digital evidence. It proposes that a search of data occurs whenever that data is exposed to human observation such as through a computer monitor. In light of how computers work, every access of data stored on a computer hard drive, no matter how minor, should be considered a distinct Fourth Amendment search. Merely copying a file does not seize it, but copies of files should be treated the same as originals. Computers access information by generating copies; every computer file is a copy. As a result, it proves unworkable, if not nonsensical, to treat copies of data as distinct from the so-called “original.” Considered together, these definitions offer a coherent and data-focused approach to the threshold questions of Fourth Amendment law that settle the legal framework regulating the data acquisition phase of the computer forensics process.

Section III considers how Fourth Amendment applies to the data reduction stage of computer searches. The key question is how to limit the invasiveness of computer searches to avoid the digital equivalent of general searches. There are two basic approaches: \textit{ex ante} restrictions articulated in warrants themselves, and \textit{ex post} standards applied during judicial review. This section argues that \textit{ex ante} restrictions are inappropriate given the highly contingent and unpredictable nature of the forensics process. To limit and regulate computer searches, the admissibility of evidence discovered beyond the scope of a warrant should be governed by a restrictive prophylactic rule applied \textit{ex post}. The plain view exception developed for physical searches should be reconfigured for digital searches. While it is too early to tell exactly what rule is best – forensic tools, practices, and computer technologies are still evolving rapidly – the arrow of technological change points in the direction of eliminating the plain view exception entirely. As computers play a greater role in our lives, they record more and more private information. A tremendous amount of private information can be exposed in even a targeted search. If future forensic tools do not enable the targeted location of evidence on a hard drive, a restrictive rule that no evidence can be used beyond that named in a warrant may be needed. Narrowing or even eliminating the plain view exception may eventually be necessary to ensure that warrants to search computers do not become the functional equivalent of general warrants.

By rethinking Fourth Amendment rules in the context of digital evidence, the article also offers a deeper perspective on Fourth
Amendment rules as a whole. Common wisdom teaches that the Fourth Amendment exists to protect privacy – and that it does a miserable job of it. Considering the Fourth Amendment in the electronic world of zeros and ones suggests that the truer purpose is regulating government acquisition and use of information. In a sense, the digital environment creates a more pure version of the physical world; pure in that everything in the digital world is information, and there are no physical boundaries to limit and shape how and when information is obtained. While existing law relies heavily on property concepts, the reliance on property can be exposed as a contingent product of physical architecture. Today’s Fourth Amendment doctrine is merely one answer to how the law should regulate acquisition of information. The challenge ahead is to see a new digital Fourth Amendment for a world of computers and digital evidence. This article attempts to start the process of developing an answer.

I. THE NEW FACTS OF COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The Fourth Amendment was enacted in response to the English and colonial-era experience with general warrants and writs of assistance. General warrants permitted the King’s officials to enter private homes and conduct dragnet searches for evidence of any crime. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment wanted to make sure that the nascent federal government lacked that power. To that end, they prohibited general warrants: every search or seizure had to be reasonable, and a warrant could issue under the Fourth Amendment only if it particularly described the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. Inspired by this history, the modern Supreme Court has used the text of the Fourth Amendment to craft a comprehensive set of rules regulating law enforcement that tends to reflect widely shared notions of the proper role of law enforcement. The textual requirement that searches and seizures must above all else be “reasonable” has permitted the Supreme Court to

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9 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 7.
11 See id. at 29.
12 U.S. CONST. AMEND IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
13 See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 553 (1992) (noting that Fourth Amendment rules “seem designed to approximate a negligence standard—to ensure that the police behave reasonably.”).
craft a set of rules that balance law enforcement needs with individual interests in the deterrence of abusive law enforcement practices.\textsuperscript{14}

Over two hundred years after the Fourth Amendment was enacted, the search of a home remains the canonical fact pattern of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case.\textsuperscript{15} The Fourth Amendment rules governing the search of a house are well-settled. The act of entering the home triggers a “search” that invades the reasonable expectation of privacy of whoever lives there; the government can only enter the home if investigators have a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement applies.\textsuperscript{16} Once legitimately inside the home, the police are free to walk around open spaces inside without a new “search” occurring.\textsuperscript{17} Opening cabinets or moving items does constitute a search, however; like the entry into the home, that search must be allowed by the warrant or an exception.\textsuperscript{18} If the police have a warrant, the warrant allows them to take away any evidence named in the warrant. The taking away of physical property is a “seizure,” and is reasonable if the property is named in the warrant.\textsuperscript{19} The police can also take away other evidence that they come across in plain view so long as the incriminating nature of the other evidence is “immediately apparent.”\textsuperscript{20} Viewed collectively, the rules that govern house searches effectively regulate privacy in the home.

Enter computers, and the world of digital evidence. The rise of computers in the last few years has triggered the arrival of a new type of search: searches of computer data stored on computer hard drives and other storage devices. As computers become more closely integrated into our day-to-day lives, the importance of computer searches will only increase. The question is, how does the Fourth Amendment apply to retrieval of data from computer storage devices? My prediction is that computer searches will place considerable pressure on Fourth Amendment doctrine. The dynamics of computer searches turn out to be substantially different from the dynamics of home searches. Computers replace the enter-and-take-

\textsuperscript{14} See id. at 562 (“Innocent suspects would presumably agree to be subject to some types of searches and seizures, because they have an interest in reducing the level of crime, and permitting searches facilitates that goal. But they presumably also value freedom from capricious police conduct, and so would insist on some level of cause to justify intrusive police actions, and might bar some types of police action altogether.”)

\textsuperscript{15} See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”).


\textsuperscript{17} Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).


away dynamic of home searches with something more like copy, scan, and copy.

The process of retrieving evidence from a computer is known as the computer forensics process.\(^{21}\) It is mostly experts’ work: computer forensics analysis typically is performed pursuant to a search warrant by a trained analyst at a government forensics laboratory.\(^{22}\) Weeks or months after the computer was seized from the target’s home, an analyst will comb through the world of information inside the person’s computer to try to find the evidence justifying the search. She will use a range of software programs to aid the search, and the search itself can take many days and even weeks. While the programs are still evolving and their features change every year, the tools help analysts sift through the mountain of data in a hard drive and locate specific types or pieces of data. Often they will find a great deal of detailed evidence helping to prove the crime; in a few cases, the search will come up empty. In a number of cases, the search for one type of evidence will result in the analyst stumbling across unrelated evidence of a more serious crime, which then will lead to criminal charges for the more serious crime.\(^{23}\)

Computer searches and home searches are similar in many ways. In both cases, the police attempt to find and retrieve useful information hidden inside a closed container. At the same time, it turns out that the shift from home searches to digital searches also involves several key differences with important implications for legal rules. While most judges and lawyers have a vague sense that investigators “look through” computers, the process of searching computers turns out to be considerably different from the process of searching physical spaces. Understanding how the Fourth Amendment should apply to computer searches requires appreciating those differences. This section explores the four basic factual differences between home searches and computer searches: the environment, the copying process, the storage mechanism, and the retrieval

\(^{21}\) See, e.g., BILL NELSON, ET. AL., GUIDE TO COMPUTER FORENSICS AND INVESTIGATIONS 2 (2004) (“Computer forensics involves obtaining and analyzing digital information for use as evidence in civil, criminal, or administrative cases.”).

\(^{22}\) See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS Ch. 2 (2002) (hereinafter, “DOJ Manual”) (“In most cases, investigators will simply obtain a warrant to seize the computer, seize the hardware during the search, and then search through the defendant's computer for the contraband files back at the police station or computer forensics laboratory.”). This is particularly true in the context of federal investigations; state investigations are more likely to occur at the police station. In civil cases, forensic analysis typically is performed by private companies hired by the litigants.

mechanism.

A. The Environment: Homes vs. Hard Drives

The traditional focal point of Fourth Amendment law is physical entry into a home.24 Homes offer predictable, specific, and discrete physical regions for physical searches. Police can enter through a door or window and can walk from room-to-room. Most houses and apartments will consist of anywhere from 2 to 10 rooms, and the police can search each room first by visually observing each room and then by opening drawers and cabinets and looking through them. The basic mechanism is walking in to physical space, observing, and moving physical items so as to expose additional property to visual observation. Enter, observe, and move.

Computer storage devices are very different. Computer storage devices come in many forms: hard drives, floppy disks, thumb drives, zip disks, and many others.25 All of these devices perform the same basic function: they store zeros and ones that computers can convert into letters, numbers, and symbols. Every number, letter, or symbol is understood by the computer as a string of eight zeros and ones. For example, the letter “m” would be stored by a computer as 01001101, and the number “6” as 00110110.26 A string of eight zeros and ones representing a single letter, number, or symbol is known as a “byte” of information. The total storage available on a particular storage device is represented by the number of bytes it can store. For example, a 40 gigabyte hard drive can store roughly 40 billion bytes;27 in other words, the hard drive stores the equivalent of about 320 billion zeros and ones.

The drive itself consists of several magnetized metal platters, something like magnetized compact disks, that contain millions and even billions of tiny individual magnetized points placed in concentric circles.

24 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”).
26 This is the standard ASCII format. See Daniel Benoliel, Comment, Technological Standards, Inc.: Rethinking Cyberspace Regulatory Epistemology, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1069, 1082 (2004).
27 I say “roughly” because computers use binary numbers, not decimal numbers. A gigabyte actually refers to 2 to the 30th power bytes, which is about 1.073 billion bytes. See, e.g., E. GARRISON WALTERS, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO COMPUTING 12-13 (2001); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 491 (10th ed. 2001) (defining “gigabyte” as “1,073,741,824 bytes”).
like growth rings of a very old tree.\textsuperscript{28} The magnetized points either can be
left in a magnetized state, which represents 1, or a demagnetized state, which represents 0.\textsuperscript{29} Whenever the user enters a command that requires
the computer to access data stored on the hard drive or write data onto the
hard drive, the disks spin and magnetic heads are directed over that portion
of the hard drive where the particular information is stored. The magnetic
heads pass over the magnetized points on the platters, generating an
electrical current.\textsuperscript{30} That current is the signal representing the zeros and
ones that can be inputted into the computer processor or outputted from it.

While houses are divided into rooms, computers are more like virtual
warehouses. When a user seeks a particular file, the operating system must
be able to find the file and retrieve it quickly. To do this, operating
systems divide all of the space on the hard drives into discrete sub-parts
known as “clusters” or “allocation units.”\textsuperscript{31} Different operating systems
use clusters of different size; typical cluster sizes might be 4 kilobytes or
32 kilobytes.\textsuperscript{32} You can think of a cluster as akin to a filing cabinet of a
particular size placed in a storage warehouse. Just as a file cabinet is
known to store particular items in a particular place in the warehouse, so
the operating system might use a cluster to store a particular computer file
in a particular place on the hard drive. Each operating system keeps a list
of where the different files are located on the hard drive; this list is known
(depending on the operating system) as the File Allocation Table or Master
File Table.\textsuperscript{33} When a user tells his computer to access a particular file, the
computer consults that master list and then sends the magnetic heads over
to the physical location of the right cluster.\textsuperscript{34}

The differences between homes and computers prompt an important
question: what does it mean to “search” a computer storage device? In the

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\textsuperscript{28} See Keogh, supra note 25, at 144, 153; CRAIG BALL, COMPUTER FORENSICS
FOR LAWYERS WHO CAN’T SET THE CLOCK ON THEIR VCR 9 (2004), available at
\textsuperscript{29} See Keogh, supra note 25, at 141.
\textsuperscript{30} See id. at 142, 152.
\textsuperscript{31} PETER STEPHENSON, INVESTIGATING COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME 99-100
(2000).
\textsuperscript{32} See Keogh, supra note 25, at 147-49.
\textsuperscript{33} See HANDBOOK OF COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATIONS 137 (Eoghan Casey
\textsuperscript{34} If a file is larger than the cluster size used by that operating system, the
operating system will assign multiple clusters to that file. The operating system’s
master list would keep the list of the different clusters where parts of that file are
stored, and when the file is accessed the heads will be brought to the different clusters
one after the other so the file can be gradually assembled and presented to the user. See
Keogh, supra note 25, at 149.
\end{flushright}
物理世界，进入一个家构成了一个搜索。^35 观察每一间房间不构成一个搜索，但打开容器和柜子去查看里面的东西。^36 动态是进入，观察，移动。警察官不物理地进入一台计算机，他不物理地移动里面的东西；他不视觉地观察到零和一。从计算机中检索信息意味着输入命令来复制数据从磁盘，处理它，并将其发送给用户。确切地什么时候发生“搜索”？

B. The Copying Process: Private Property vs. Bitstream Copies

一个第二个差异之间的物理和家庭搜索涉及所有权和控制权所搜索的项目。当警察官搜索一个家庭，这个家庭和他正在搜索的财产通常属于调查的目标。确实，一些合法关系在搜索的财产和被告是需要来生成第四修正案的权利。^37 再次，计算机是不同的。为了确保原始证据的证据有效性，计算机取证过程总是以创建完美“比特流”复制或“图像”原始存储设备保存为“只读”文件。^38 所有分析的计算机是运行在比特流副本而不是原始。

一个比特流副本是不同的类型的副本用户通常在从一台计算机到另一台计算机复制单个文件。^39 一个正常的副本只复制标示的文件，但比特流图像副本每比特和字节在目标驱动器上准确地按顺序出现原始——包括所有文件，空闲空间，MFT，元数据，和类似。^40 比特流图像可以保存为“只读”文件，意味着分析的成像驱动器不能改变。一旦生成，比特流副本的准确性一般将被确认使用计算机科学家称为的“单向哈希函数”，或更
simply, a "hash." A hash is a complicated mathematical operation performed by a computer on a string of data that can be used to compare two files to determine if they are identical. If two non-identical computer files are each inputted into the hash program, the computer will output wildly different results. If the two files are exactly identical, however, the hash function will generate exactly identical output. Matching output from the hash proves that all of zeros and ones of the two inputted files are exactly the same. Forensics analysts can use these principles to confirm that the original hard drive and bitstream copies are identical. An analyst will enter data from the original and then data from the bitstream image into the hash function. Matching outputs from the hash function will confirm that the bitstream copy is an exact duplicate of the original drive.

The fact that computer searches generally occur on government property rather than the suspect’s raises important legal questions. First, what is the legal significance of generating the bitstream copy? Does that “seize” the original data, and if so, is the seizure reasonable? Relatedly, how does the Fourth Amendment apply to analysis of the copied data stored on the government’s computer? Does the retrieval of evidence from the government’s computer constitute a search? Or can the government search its own copy of data without legal restriction?

C. The Storage Mechanism: Home vs. Computer Storage

A third important difference between computers and homes concerns how much they can store and how much control people have over what they contain. Physical size tends to limit how much physical stuff exists in a home. A room can only store so many packages, and a home can only contain so many rooms. Further, residents have a great deal of control over what is inside their homes. Physical evidence can be destroyed, and a person usually knows when it is destroyed. These background rules for the physical world tend to limit how much evidence exists when the police wish to search a home. The home can only store items that fit in the home, and it can only store so many things; if a target suspects that the police are investigating him, he often can destroy at least some of the evidence before the police arrive.

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42 See id.
43 Id.
44 See Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm, 719 P.2d 926, 947-98 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting) (discussing encryption and hash functions).
Not so with computers. First, computers are repositories for a staggering amount of information. Computer hard drives sold in early 2005 generally have at least 40 gigabytes storage capacities, roughly equivalent to 20 million pages of text or about half the information stored in the books located on one floor of a typical academic library. By the time you are reading this, these figures likely will be outdated: storage capacities of new computers tend to double about every two years. At this rate, a new computer purchased in ten years will store about ten trillion zeros and ones. While computers are small at a physical level, every computer is akin to a vast warehouse of information.

Computers are also remarkable for storing a tremendous amount of information that casual users do not know about and cannot control. For example, forensic analysts often can recover deleted files from a hard drive. They can do that because marking a file as “deleted” normally does not actually delete the file; operating systems do not “zero out” the zeros and ones associated with that file when it is marked for deletion. Rather, most operating systems merely go to the master list of which clusters contain what files and mark that particular cluster (or clusters) as available for future use by other files. If the operating system does not use that cluster again for another file by the time the computer is analyzed, the file that was marked for deletion will remain at that cluster undisturbed. It can be accessed by an analyst just like any other file.

These details mean that a tremendous amount of data often can be recovered from the computer hard drive’s “slack space.” Slack space refers to space left temporarily unused within a cluster. Data can be hidden in slack space because files often are smaller than the clusters that contain them. When a file is smaller than a cluster, the cluster will contain unused space. Just like a filing cabinet reserved for a particular topic may be only partially filled, the cluster may be only partially occupied with its associated file. Unlike a filing cabinet, however, empty space in a cluster isn’t really empty. Because deleting a file does not actually erase the file, but merely marks it as available for rewriting, the temporarily used space may still contain pieces of previously “deleted” files. Analysts can look through the slack space and often find important remnants of previously stored and incriminating files.
Computer operating systems and programs also generate and store a wealth of information relating to how the computer and its contents have been used. For example, the popular Windows operating system generates a great deal of important metadata about how a computer has been used. For example, newer versions of Windows contain a New Technology File System (NTFS) log file that maintains a detailed log of system activity to allow the operating system to be reconfigured in the event of a crash. The NTFS includes the Master File Table, which keeps records of where files are located, who created them, and what users have access rights to them. The MFT also stores the so-called “MAC times” associated with each file: when each file was Modified, Accessed, and Created. MAC times are often important to determine when a particular file was created, or to help establish that it was not (or was) tampered.

Each software program also generates a distinct set of information. As a person uses more programs on his computer, that information becomes broader and more comprehensive. For example, common word processing programs like Wordperfect and Microsoft Word generate detailed information about how particular word processing documents were created. Whenever you run WordPerfect or Microsoft Word, the programs create temporary files at regular intervals saving a version of your file. Temporary files are very helpful in the event of a system failure: the files allow a user to return to a recently saved version of the file even if the user has not remembered to save the file. At the same time, temporary files sometimes remain on your hard drive even when they are no longer needed; a forensic analyst can then reconstruct the development of a file, or else restore an otherwise deleted file. Word processing documents can also store data about who created the file, as well as the history of the file.

Browsers used to surf the World Wide Web can store a great deal of detailed information about the user’s interests, habits, identity, and online whereabouts, often unbeknownst to the user. Browsers typically are programmed to automatically retain information about what websites the user has visited in recent weeks; users often use this history to trace their steps or revisit a page the user enjoyed. Some of these pages may contain

52 See Keogh, supra note 25, at 151.
53 Nelson, supra note 21, at 90-94.
54 Casey, supra note 33, at 134-36.
55 See id. The Windows operating system may also save detailed snapshots of how a computer was used in its “swap files,” also known as “page files.” See Ball, supra note 28, at 29. Stephenson, supra note 31, at 101-02.
56 Ball, supra note 27, at 30.
57 See id. at 31.
58 See Dan Gookin, Word for Dummies Ch. 2 (2003).
very specific information; for example, the web page that reports on the
fruits of an Internet search engine query generally will include the actual
search terms the user entered.\textsuperscript{59} Users can also “bookmark” special pages
they expect to revisit often; the bookmark reflects the user’s knowledge of
the page and interest in returning to its contents. Browsers can also store
passwords needed to access password-protected sites. Users may use this
feature to save them the trouble of entering in passwords manually, but it
also means that stored passwords can be recovered if the computer is
seized and analyzed.\textsuperscript{60}

The greater and more permanent storage practices of computers
compared to homes prompt an important legal question: how can the
Fourth Amendment’s rules limit and regulate the scope of computer
searches? The Fourth Amendment was created to abolish general warrants
and require searches to be narrow. Can the rules that limit physical
searches also apply to computer searches, or are new rules needed?

\textbf{D. The Retrieval Mechanism}

The fourth and final difference between home searches and computer
searches concerns the techniques for finding evidence and the environment
in which the search occurs. Physical searches occur in a defined physical
space. Once the police have searched the space for the item sought, the
search is done, and the police can leave. The police only look where the
evidence might be found; if they are looking for a stolen car, for example,
they won’t look inside a suitcase to find it.\textsuperscript{61} Computer searches are
different. The search ordinarily is performed in the government’s lab, and
the forensic analyst can use a wide variety of techniques to identify the
evidence sought from the mountain of data stored in the device. No one

technique is perfect; each one has strengths and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{62} Further, the
data sought can be located anywhere, hidden in various places, or
encrypted.

The realities of computer forensic analysis dictate that there is no set
amount of time that it takes an analyst to analyze a computer for evidence.
According to Mark Pollitt, former Director of the FBI’s Regional
Computer Forensic Laboratory Program, analysis takes as much time as

\textsuperscript{59} For example, if a user enters a search for “assassinate” & “how to dispose of the body” into the popular Google engine, the URL for Google’s report will be:
\url{http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%22assassinate+%22+%22+how+to+dispose+of+a+body%22&btnG=Google+Search}

\textsuperscript{60} See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001) (recovering passphrase via a sniffing device then used to decrypt passkey on computer).

\textsuperscript{61} See United States v. Ross, 56 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).

\textsuperscript{62} Interview with Mark Pollitt, August 1, 2005.
the analyst has to give it. If the case is unusually important or the nature of the evidence sought dictates that a great deal or a specific type of evidence is needed, the analyst may spend several weeks or even months analyzing a single hard drive. If the case is less important or the nature of the case permits the government to make its case more easily, the investigator may spend only a few hours. For an analyst, determining which approach to take usually requires both consultation with the warrant and consultation with the case agent. The forensic analyst ordinarily needs to know what kinds of searches the warrant will permit as matter of law, but also what type and amount of evidence is needed as a practical matter to prove the government’s case in court.

In contrast to physical searches, digital evidence searches generally occur both at a “logical” or “virtual” level and also at a more difficult “physical” level. In most cases, the process is considerably more labor intensive and thorough than equivalent physical searches of a home. Consider a search for a picture file believed to be evidence of crime. An examiner might begin the search by conducting a “logical search” through the hard drive for files with extensions known to be used for image files, such as “.jpg.” A “logical search” refers to a search through the virtual file structure set up by the operating system; the search will look through the files that the Master File Table has designated as files accessible to users of the computer. The forensic analyst could direct his software to consult the Master File Table for any files with the extension .jpg, and then either list these files or automatically present “thumbnail” images of those files for viewing. Forensic software will generally allow the latter to be done easily through a simple command. For example, the current version of the EnCase forensic software has a feature called “Gallery View.” If an analyst selects a hard drive or folder to be analyzed and then clicks the “Gallery” button, the software will look for all files ending with a picture file extension and will present a thumbnail of those files automatically to the user.

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63 Interview with Mark Pollitt, August 1, 2005.
64 Id.
65 Id. For example, in a child pornography case, the analyst may only need only to find a certain number of images. While it would be possible to spend weeks finding every single recoverable image stored in the hard drive, it would not advance the readily proven case.
66 “JPG” refers to “Joint Photographic Experts Group,” a common compression algorithm that allows computers to store pictures files in a relatively small amount of space.
67 See Keogh, supra note 25, at 144-46.
69 See id.
This sounds easy, but ordinarily will not suffice. It is easy to change the extension of a file. To hide a picture, a user might take a file saved with a “.jpg” extension and resave it as a file with an extension common to a different kind of file such as “.doc” or “.wpd.” A search for picture files based on the logical file extensions will no longer locate the file. To find the picture file, the analyst will have to conduct a search at a physical level instead of a logical level. This means that the search technique must look at all of the information stored on the physical hard drive, not just the information registered by the operating system and included in its file structure. The distinction between physical searches and logical searches is a fundamental one in computer forensics: while a logical search is based on the file systems present on the hard drive as presented by the operating system, a physical search identifies and recovers data across the entire physical drive without regard to the file system.

Software can search for image files at a physical level by searching for file headers characteristic of known types of picture files. A file header is a segment of data that informs the operating system about the associated file; in the case of a picture file, the file header would contain data indicating that the file is a photograph of a particular type and dimension. The file header remains unchanged regardless of the extension a user might place on the file, allowing a physical level search to uncover picture files that a logical level search would not locate. In addition, file header characteristics can be located in slack space or in partially deleted files; a skilled analyst can then attempt to reconstruct the file and recover the associated picture. The process can be tremendously time-consuming, however. Searching an entire hard drive for elements of file headers can take weeks, and it is easy for an analyst to overlook elements.

Analysts can also search for specific picture files by using the one way hash function mentioned earlier. For example, the common hash values of many known illegal images of child pornography have been collected into a single database by the National Drug Intelligence Center. In cases involving child pornography, for example, an investigator can run hashes of the individual files stored on the computer and see if any match the hashes of the known images of child pornography. If there is a match between the hash of a known file in the database and a file located in the

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70 Nelson, supra note 21, at 488-93.
71 See id. at 493-95.
73 Nelson, supra note 21, at 493.
74 See id. at 493-517.
75 Nelson, supra note 21, at 237.
computer, the analyst can be confident that he has identified a particular image without actually viewing it. Once a picture file has been located, the analyst can record information retained by the operating system about the file, such as the MAC times and the folder in which it was found.

A search for text files would occur in ways roughly similar to a search for image files. The basic idea is to use any known characteristics of the file to search for data on the hard drive that matches those characteristics, and to conduct the search both at the logical level and at the physical level.\(^77\) Exact search protocols are difficult to settle \textit{ex ante}; good forensic analysis is an art more than a science. If investigators are looking for a particular type of file believed to be stored in a particular location or generated by a particular program, the analyst might begin by looking first at that location or program. More broadly, the analyst might begin by running a search through known files for a particular word or phrase associated with the file or information sought. After conducting a logical search, the next step might be to try a physical search for that same string of text. The physical search would look not just in assigned files, but more broadly throughout the entire hard drive. Searches also can be run with a predetermined allowed error rate to account for misspellings and abbreviations. For example, if an analyst is looking for information on “bookmaking,” a search for that exact text would miss any appearance of “boookmaking” or “bkmaking.” If the error rate is set at 50%, however, the software will note any word that contains 5 or more of the 10 letters in “bookmaking.”\(^78\)

Analysts can also locate specific known program applications and files by running hashes of files stored on the drive or in a region of the drive and comparing those hashes to hashes of known files. The National Drug Intelligence Center has calculated common hash values of nearly every known application and operating system file.\(^79\) All of those hash values have been collected into a database known as Hashkeeper,\(^80\) and many forensic analysts will have collected their own databases of hashes known to be associated with specific types of files. In a computer hacking

\(^77\) Nelson, \textit{supra} note 21, at 380-385.
\(^78\) This example is taken from Nelson, \textit{supra} note 21, at 384-85. Many computer forensics programs have special tools to simplify the search in specific contexts. For example, EnCase has a feature that tabulates the MAC times of all of the files on a hard drive (or folder) and presents them in a histogram format. This tool allows an analyst to focus on files that were created, modified, or accessed on a particular day or during a particular time period. Assuming that this data has not been manipulated, the feature also allows an analyst to see a snapshot of the time periods in which the computer was heavily used. The software arranges the files by date, greatly simplifying the work of the analyst.
\(^79\) Nelson, \textit{supra} note 7, at 237.
\(^80\) See id.
case, for example, an analyst might compare the hashes of the files found on the computer to the hashes of known hacker tools. A match would reveal the presence of the hacker tools on the suspect’s computer without requiring the analyst to look through files on the hard drive one by one. Once a particular text file has been located, the analyst can record information retained by the operating about the file, such as the MAC times and the folder in which it was found.

Once again, it is not always this easy. Files can be encrypted, scrambling them into ciphertext. Encrypted files cannot be read at all; they will seem like mere gibberish to the forensics tools, and cannot provide evidence for law enforcement. To be useful to law enforcement, the forensic analyst must attempt to decrypt the encrypted files or part of the hard drive. This can be done in different ways, depending on how the files are encrypted. In general, however, the analyst must attempt to either locate or guess the encryption “key” (usually a long string of numbers) to decrypt the encrypted files, or else find the “passkey” (usually a password) that can first decrypt the key and then allow the files to be decrypted. In some cases, the key or passkey may be located somewhere in the hard drive; the forensic analyst must go searching through the hard drive for it. In other cases, the analyst must try to guess the key using special software. Sometimes this will work, allowing the files to be decrypted. In other cases the analyst will be unable to decrypt the encrypted files and no evidence will be obtained. The process of attempting to find a key or guess the key can take weeks, and often is not successful.

The variability of computer searches compared to physical searches raises difficult questions about the rules that should govern computer searches and seizures. Generally it is more difficult to plan a computer search ex ante; the search procedures are more contingent than procedures for physical searches, and are more of an art than a science. The process can require a very time-consuming and invasive search. The question is, should these dynamics impact the rules that courts use to review the scope of computer searches -- and if so, how?

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DATA ACQUISITION

The computer forensics process can be broken down into two basic steps: the data acquisition phase and the data reduction phase. In the data

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82 See id.
acquisition phase, a government investigator obtains access to the computer and collects the information to be searched. For example, a police officer might see a defendant’s computer, walk over to it, look through a few files, and then decide to turn off the computer and image the hard drive in preparation for a search. In the data extraction stage, the investigator begins with an image of the hard drive and attempts to locate particular evidence on the computer. To borrow a physical metaphor, data acquisition refers to collecting the hay, and data reduction refers to looking through the haystack for the needle.

This section considers how the Fourth Amendment applies to the data acquisition stage of the computer forensics process. The legal framework depends on our answers to the threshold questions of Fourth Amendment law: whether or when a “search” or “seizure” has occurred. The precise meaning of searches and seizures in the context of digital evidence defines the regulatory regime of the data acquisition stage. For example, when can a police officer look through files? When can he image the computer? And once the computer is imaged, does the Fourth Amendment apply to the image as it did to the original? The answers lie in the working definitions of searches and seizures. If no search or seizure occurs, then the government’s conduct cannot violate the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable (and therefore unconstitutional) unless a warrant has been obtained or the facts fit within a narrow exception to the warrant requirement. Conduct that triggers a search or seizure must be carefully justified and becomes closely regulated, while conduct that does not constitute a search or seizure remains unregulated.

So what does it mean to “search” computer data, and when is computer data “seized”? This section proposes what I call an “exposure-based approach” to understanding digital searches and seizures. A search of data stored on a hard drive should be held to occur whenever that data or information about that data is exposed to human observation. Any retrieval of information stored on a computer hard drive, no matter how minor, should be considered a distinct Fourth Amendment search. Merely copying data should itself not be deemed a seizure; at the same time, the interference with the computer that accompanies the copying process may be. In addition, copies of files should be treated the same as originals. This approach focuses judicial attention on justifying the retrieval of evidence from computer storage devices. The exposure-based approach deemphasizes the hard drive as physical property, and also deemphasizes many of the technical details of what computers do ‘behind the scenes.’ It treats hard drives as virtual warehouses of information, and keys the doctrine to justifying the retrieval of individual pieces of information from the warehouse to zones of human observation.
Broadly speaking, the exposure-based approach can be understood as an update to Fourth Amendment rules that uncovers and refashions the role of the Fourth Amendment in a new setting. By replacing physical notions of entering spaces with virtual notions of retrieving data and exposing it to human observation, my proposal provides a window for understanding existing Fourth Amendment law. It suggests that while existing law is largely keyed to property concepts, and is often explained as a means of protecting privacy, we can better understand Fourth Amendment law as an effort to regulate government information retrieval. Existing doctrine does not so much protect privacy as it regulates retrieval of information; the law requires a warrant or special circumstances where the government seeks to retrieve information about people from their private spaces such as homes and private property. While the law has traditionally relied heavily on property concepts, the reliance on property is a contingent product of physical architecture. The challenge of applying the Fourth Amendment in the new factual setting of computers is to find new mechanisms that restore this role in a virtual world.

A. What is a Computer “Search”? And How to Measure Its Scope?

In Fourth Amendment law, the occurrence of a “search” flips the on/off switch of constitutional protection. As soon as a search occurs, the government’s conduct must be justified by a warrant or an exception. If the search is not justified, any evidence uncovered will be suppressed. In addition, once a space has been searched, generally it can be examined again without limits on the government’s conduct. The initial search eliminates the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, allowing future searches within the zone of the initial search. As a result, the meaning of search and the zone of initial searches are the building blocks for understanding how the Fourth Amendment applies to computers.

The Supreme Court has defined a search as government action that violates a suspect’s “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy. In the context of physical spaces, searches generally refer to intrusions into those spaces. A house is searched when a government agent enters it; a package is searched when a government agent opens it. The basic

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86 See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel & Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure in A Nutshell 60 (5th Ed. 1993); Solove, supra note 10.
framework posits that people ordinarily have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes and packages, and the act of breaking the seal between public spaces and the private home or package triggers a search. In physical space, physical entry into the home is the most common (although not exclusive\(^{91}\)) means of breaking down the barrier between public and private; it exposes the inside of the home to observation that is impossible from outside. In the argot of Fourth Amendment doctrine, entry into the home or opening sealed packages violates the individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,”\(^{92}\) constituting a Fourth Amendment search.

This basic framework provides an obvious starting point for understanding how the Fourth Amendment should apply to computers. The first step should be to compare computers to homes and sealed containers. Indeed, a consensus exists that a defendant ordinarily will have a reasonable expectation of privacy on the contents of his personal hard drive.\(^{93}\) A suspect's hard drive is his private property, and a defendant should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hard drive just as well as any other property.\(^{94}\) Unusual circumstances may lead to a different result,\(^{95}\) but the basic starting point for applying the Fourth Amendment to a computer hard drive is clear and uncontroversial: the Fourth Amendment applies to the contents of a computer hard drive just as it does to any other property.

Several early courts have reached this result by analogizing a computer to a container. “Containers” are a well-defined category within Fourth Amendment law: the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to develop a set of rules that apply equally to all containers, protecting “a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim” the same as “the sophisticated executive with

\(^{91}\) See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (holding that use of a thermal imaging device from outside the home constitutes a search of the home because it permits an observer to observe details about the inside the home previously unknowable without physical entry).


\(^{94}\) United States v. Blas, 1990 W.L 265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990) (“[A]n individual has the same expectation of privacy in a pager, computer, or other electronic data storage and retrieval device as in a closed container.”).

\(^{95}\) United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 1993) (ruling that a defendant does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of stolen computers).
the locked attaché case." The foundational premise of the container cases is that that opening up the container constitutes a search of its contents; if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a container, opening the container and seeing the contents violates that reasonable expectation of privacy. Applying this to computer storage devices, courts have held that accessing the contents of a computer or other electronic storage device “searches” the device.

This is a good start. Accessing information from a computer breaks down the seal of public and private much like entering a home or opening a package. At the same time, this general (and likely uncontroversial) point leaves two difficult and important questions open. First, if the general process of accessing information on a computer can constitute a search, exactly what step actually does so? We learned in the first section of this article that computers retrieve data from a hard drive by reading data from the drive and then sending it to the computer’s central processing unit; this data can then be processed and outputted to the monitor. At what stage does the search occur: Is it the copying of the data that occurs when the hard drive heads read the data from the drive, or is it the visual appearance of the data on the user’s screen? Is a search triggered when the analyst sees the data, when the data is collected by the computer, or at some other point? Second, when a user retrieves data from a hard drive, how much of the hard drive has now been searched? What is the zone or scope of the search? This is an essential question because if particular government action constitutes a search of a given zone, then it does not need any additional justification to examine and analyze anything within that zone. The zone defines how much a search of A allows a subsequent search of B. I will begin with the first question, and then turn to the second question.

1) At What Stage Does A “Search” Occur?

Part I of this article explained how the retrieving of information from a computer hard drive follows different steps. First, a magnet is passed over the section of the computer hard drive that contains the relevant data, inducing a current in a wire that carries the signal away. When this happens, a copy of the data is generated and is directed to the computer’s central processing unit. The copy may be stored in various types of memory temporarily, and may be copied to another storage device, and is ultimately processed by the software running on the computer. What a

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97 Id. at
98 See sources in note 73, supra.
99 See Part I, supra.
100 See notes [] to [], supra.
user sees is the output of the software, which in most cases packages the information in an easy to use format. For example, what a user may experience as simply “clicking on a link” and “opening a picture file” looks quite different at a technical level; information is read, assembled, and then the software and operating system assembles it in a way that can be presented as a picture. 101 The many stages involved in the retrieval of information presents an important question: Which ones count as a search? Does a “search” of data occur when a copy of the data is generated for the computer to use as input? When the computer processes the data? When the computer outputs the data to a monitor or printer? Or when a human being actually sees the output? If a forensic analyst performs a series of operations on a hard drive; copying, collecting, and processing that data, but never actually seeing it, has that data been “searched”? 

The best answer is that a search occurs when information from or about the data is exposed to possible human observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than when the data is copied by the hard drive or processed by the computer. I will label this the “exposure-based approach” to interpreting Fourth Amendment searches. A range of arguments support it. First, focusing on the exposure of data most accurately transfers our physical world notions of searching to the context of computers. Entering a house is a search in physical space because it exposes to human observation the otherwise-hidden inside of the house. 102 In the computer context, there is no need to focus the “search” inquiry on physical action like entry; the law can look directly to the exposure. The approach focuses doctrinal attention on the key question from the perspective of individuals and the police alike – whether and when a person’s information will be kept private or exposed and shared with the police. A computer is akin to a virtual warehouse of private information, and the exposure-based approach allows the courts to monitor and require justification for each retrieval of information from the warehouse. It imposes the Fourth Amendment as a barrier to the retrieval of information from non-observable form to observable form.

The exposure approach also reinforces the traditional Fourth Amendment concern with the scope of searches. 103 Defining searches as data exposure provides a simple and intuitive yardstick for measuring the scope of a search. A broad search is one that exposes more information; a narrow search exposes less. Other approaches de-link the measured scope from the actual level of intrusiveness of the government conduct. For example, imagine a search occurred whenever information was copied

101 See id.
102 Cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-39 (use of a thermal imaging device that reveals the equivalent of what one would observe inside a home constitutes a search).
103 See notes [] to [], infra.
from the hard drive, even if that data was never exposed to a user. Under this definition, a broad search could occur that exposed little information, and a narrow search could occur that proved quite invasive. For example, a text query that searches only for the word “naked5yrold” anywhere on a hard drive may be comprehensive at a physical level – the entire hard drive must be scanned – but its invasion of privacy is fairly small. In contrast, obtaining a copy of a target’s diary from a known position on the hard drive may be narrow at a physical level but amount to a tremendous invasion of privacy. Treating the former as troubling but the latter as trivial makes little sense. A definition of search that focuses on the exposure of information in human-observable form best tracks the traditional Fourth Amendment concerns with the scope of searches.

The exposure approach also proves much easier to administer than the alternatives. It is far easier to humans to control and understand exposure than the technical functioning of a computer. Machines can be programmed in different ways to perform different tasks behind the scenes. For the most part, users are blissfully unaware of these details. A rule hinging on them would be hard to apply ex ante, and also difficult to judge ex post. Analysts would need to be aware of exactly when a hard drive was reading from particular places on a hard drive, and judges would need to understand these highly technical and contingent details as well. Many cases could require the consultation of technical experts to try to reconstruct exactly which bits from the hard drive were copied, and which ones were processed, even if they were captured for only a nanosecond and no record of them has been retained. The common law principle of “de minimis non curat lex” – the law does not concern itself with trifles – seems an appropriate response to such an abstract claim.104

Although the Supreme Court has touched on the issue only tangentially, existing precedents appear to support the basic contours of the exposure-based approach. The most important case is United States v. Karo.105 The defendant in Karo received what he thought were cans of ether to extract cocaine as part of a narcotics conspiracy. Unbeknownst to Karo, the police were investigating him and had replaced the ether in one of the cans with a radio transmitter that emitted a signal allowing the police to track its location. The Court of Appeals had held that transferring the transmitter to Karo was a Fourth Amendment search because the transmitter had the potential to reveal invasive information. The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the key question was whether the use of the technology actually conveyed information to the police:

104 Cf. Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.1982) (Posner, J.) (noting that de minimis non curat lex applies to constitutional torts).
[w]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A holding to that effect would mean that a policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of picking up conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the microphone were not turned on. It is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.\(^{106}\)

This information-focused approach is echoed by *Kyllo v. United States*,\(^{107}\) where a thermal imaging device was used to pick up infrared radiation emitted from the surface of a home. Because infrared radiation varies as a function of surface temperature, measuring it can be used to create a thermal image of the surface of a solid. The Court held that the “hi-tech measurement of emanations from a house” to determine the temperature of the wall was a search.\(^{108}\) Notably, however, every object emits infrared radiation. The radiation is everywhere; it’s just that the wavelength of the radiation cannot be detected by human eyes and must be detected using a machine.\(^{109}\) For *Kyllo* to make sense, it must be the transformation of the existing signal into a form that communicates information to a person that constitutes the search. What made the conduct a search in *Kyllo* was not the existence of the radiation signal in the air, but the output of the thermal image machine and what it exposed to human observation. Applying *Karo* and *Kyllo* to computers strongly suggests that a search occurs when digital information is exposed to human observation, not when it is copied from the hard drive.\(^{110}\)

2) The Zone of a Computer Search: Physical Box, Virtual File, Or Exposed Data?

Having identified the moment the search occurs, we can now consider how broadly the search extends. When particular data from a particular hard drive is accessed, exactly what has been searched? The zone of a search determines how broadly or how narrowly particular government action eliminates privacy protection elsewhere in a space. This inquiry is often overlooked in the case of physical searches, for two reasons. First, the zone of a physical search is intuitive; it correlates neatly

\(^{106}\) *Id.* at 712 (citations and internal quotations omitted)


\(^{108}\) *Id.* at 33. n.4.


\(^{110}\) See also Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment addresses misuse of power, not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct”).
with what is hidden and what is exposed. As we will see, however, intuitions obvious in the physical world can lose their clarity in the context of computers. Second, the precise zone of a search is critical only when the government’s authority to conduct a search extends to one zone but not others. If the government’s authority to search covers multiple spaces—such as the case of a search warrant, which ordinarily permits searching all of the zones in the place to be searched that can fit the evidence described in the warrant—the precise boundaries of the zone don’t matter. If the authority to search is zone-specific, however, the zone will define the permissible scope of the search.

An example involving a physical search helps explain the stakes. Imagine that the police enter a house to look for drugs. Inside the house, they wander around various rooms. In one room, they find a suitcase and rip it open, revealing drugs. It is clear that the entry of the house was a search; a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. But importantly, merely entering the home does not constitute a legal “search” of everything inside it. The zone of the search is limited. If the police had legal cause to enter the home, that cause would entitle the police to wander around and observe whatever in the house was in plain view.\(^{111}\) The zone of the search in the physical world would not entitle the police to open closed containers such as the suitcase, however. Under existing law, the opening of a closed container inside the house constitutes a separate search.\(^{112}\) The zone of the initial search includes open areas of the home, but does not extend to the observation of other property in the home not exposed to observation.

How do these principles apply to searches of computer data? Three basic options exist; the zone could be defined by the physical storage device, the contents of a virtual file, or the exposed data. If the zone is the physical storage device, looking at data on a hard drive renders the entire storage device searched. If the zone is a file, then that file is searched but the rest of the computer is unsearched. Finally, if the zone is data itself, then exposure of data leaves all unexposed information unsearched.

Existing case law reflects both virtual file and physical device approaches to resolving the zone of a computer search. A good example of a virtual file approach is the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in \textit{United States v. Carey}.\(^{113}\) In \textit{Carey}, a forensic analyst was conducting a search through a computer hard drive for evidence of drug sales. When he discovered an image of child pornography, the investigator abandoned the original search.

\(^{112}\) United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978) (search of a footlocker in a room).
\(^{113}\) 172 F.3d 1268, 1273-75 (10\(^{th}\) Cir. 1999).
and began looking for other images of child pornography. He subsequently opened a string of additional files containing child pornography. The court held that the first discovered image was admissible, but the subsequent opened files were beyond the scope of the warrant. The search for child pornography was valid, but the additional opening of unrelated files on the computer were additional searches. The clear import is that the relevant unit of search, at least in a case of digital images, is an individual file. If you analogize a computer hard drive to a suitcase, each file is like its own zippered pocket in the suitcase. In a sense, a computer is a container that stores thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete files.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Runyan offers an example of the alternative physical device approach. The defendant in Runyan had separated from his wife, and in a search of his property she found images of child pornography stored on several ZIP disks and floppy diskettes. She then turned over the disks to the police, and the police conducted comprehensive analyses of the disks without a warrant that yielded many more images of child pornography beyond what the wife had seen. There was no record of what particular files the wife had observed, but the Fifth Circuit concluded it did not matter: having legally accessed a few files under the private search doctrine, she had “searched” the disks. The container was the physical hard drive, and a search of some files on the container left the container open to further inspection. According to the Fifth Circuit, any additional analysis of the disks merely “expanded” the prior search. The fact that the police had opened different files did not matter, as the zone of the search was defined by the physical hard drive.

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114 See id.
115 See id. at 1274.
116 For a similar approach, see United States v. Barth, 26 F.Supp2d. 929, 935 (W.D. Tex 1998).
117 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
118 See id. at 455
119 See id. at
120 Id. at 464.
121 For a similar example, see United States v. Slalina, 283 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2002). Interestingly, a very similar issue came up before the Supreme Court in the context of a film contained on a video reel in Walters v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). In Walters, boxes containing reels of obscene films were sent to the wrong address. The recipients at the wrong address opened the boxes, noted that the labels were pornographic, and attempted to view portions of the film by holding it up to the light. They then contacted the FBI, and the FBI viewed the entire films on a projector. The question before the Court was whether by viewing part of the film, the recipients had “searched” the entire film. No majority view emerged. Four Justices said yes, viewing the film as the physical box, see id. at []
Which is better: the virtual file approach of *Carey*, or the physical storage device approach of *Runyan*? In my view, the virtual file approach is clearly preferable. Computers are searched to collect information that they contain. When assessing how the Fourth Amendment applies to the collection of information, courts should focus on that information rather than the physical storage device that just happens to contain it. Using the physical box as the common denominator of a computer search would also lead to unpredictable, unstable, and even disturbing results. The amount of storage that can fit in a single physical box is increasing exponentially over time. As computers contain more and more information, it will become increasingly awkward, if not bizarre, to say that a second search through the contents of the computer simply examine the contents of the physical box in a more comprehensive manner than before. A single physical storage device can store the private files of thousands of different users. It would be quite odd if looking at one file on a server meant that the entire server had been searched, and that the police could then analyze everything on the server, perhaps belonging to thousands of different people, without any restriction. This all the more true in a networked world. The rise of computer networks will make the physical box of computers matter less and less. A single box may contain the files of thousands of people; on the other hand, a single file may be stored on several networked physical boxes. Some computer storage devices may not be stored in any boxes at all. Over time, it should become increasingly clear that the Fourth Amendment should track the information, not the physical box.

Having rejected the physical box as the common denominator, the next question is a subtle one not directly implicated in existing cases: is the proper denominator the virtual file or the exposed data? Existing cases tend to ignore this question because the cases mostly involve possession of digital images of child pornography, where the contraband image is both the exposed data and the file contents. The distinction between files and data collapses in this context. In other cases, however, the distinction will prove tremendously important. Imagine that an officer is executing a search warrant and comes across a computer that is up and running with the first page of a 100-page document on the screen. The officer wants to view the other 99 pages of the document to see if it reveals evidence of criminal activity. Let’s imagine, however, that for some reason the officer cannot justify a “search” of the computer. Can the officer take the mouse and scroll down to read the rest of the 100 page file without conducting a

(Blackmun, J., dissenting); two Justices said no, viewing the film as the information it contained, *see id.* at [] (opinion of Stevens, J.); and three Justices either did not resolve the case on that ground or did not explain their rationale, *see id.* at [] (opinion of White, J.), [] (opinion of Marshall, J.).
search, or does publishing the rest of the document on the screen search that information?

I think the better answer is to use the common denominator of the exposed information. The scope of a computer search should be whatever information appears on the output device, whether a screen, printer, or something else. Under this approach, scrolling down a word processing file to see parts of the file that were previously hidden is a distinct search of the rest of the file. This approach works best for several reasons. First, it fits nicely with the exposure theory of searches. Once again, what matters is exposure to human observation. Second, virtual files are not robust concepts. Files are contingent creations assembled by operating systems and software. Third, much information stored on a computer does not appear in a file. If the law is keyed to files, how can it apply to information not stored in a file? Fourth, an analyst who takes a mouse, clicks, and pulls down the file to see parts of the file not previously exposed has done nothing different than another analyst who double clicks on a second file to open it. In both cases, the analyst is exposing information not previously exposed. Both should be treated as searches.

Notably, in most cases an exposure standard would not block police officers from viewing the entirety of large computer files. As noted earlier, authority to search often includes the authority to search multiple zones. Officers searching a house pursuant to a warrant don’t need to get a new warrant every time they open a new box or cabinet; opening the box or cabinet is a new search, but one justified by the warrant. Under the exposure standard, the same rule would apply to observing unexposed portions of large computer files. The exposure approach would matter only in the relatively rare case when the officer has legitimately viewed part of the file but has no authority to conduct a new search through the rest of it. It would ensure that viewing the remainder of the file is treated as a distinct search.

B) What is A Computer “Seizure”? And How to Treat Copies of Data?

The next question concerns the meaning of computer “seizures.” According to the Supreme Court, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” In the case of physical property, a seizure occurs when that property is taken away, or, in the case of a package or letter, when the course of delivery of that package or letter is meaningfully interrupted. But what does it mean to seize computer data? In particular, does copying computer constitute a seizure? And relatedly, how

122 See Part I.
if at all should the rules that apply to the analysis of copies differ from the rules that apply to analysis of originals? My view is that the best answer, both from the standpoint of legal precedent and functional concerns, is that courts should apply the same definition of seizure for computer files that they have applied for physical property. Computer data is “seized” from someone only when that person can no longer access it. Copying a file may be a search, but it is not a seizure. However, this does not mean that the government can analyze copies of data without restriction. Rather, the Fourth Amendment rules that apply to searches of copies should be the same as the rules that apply to originals. Once again, what matters is the exposure of the data.

1). Precedents on Seizing Information

Under existing law, copying a computer file should not constitute a seizure. The strongest case is Arizona v. Hicks. In Hicks, a police officer was searching an apartment under exigent circumstances when he came across an expensive stereo system. He suspected that the stereo system was stolen, and wrote down the serial numbers of some of the stereo components. A quick call to headquarters confirmed a match between the serial numbers of the components in the apartment and the serial numbers of stereo components stolen during an armed robbery. The Supreme Court agreed that copying the serial numbers did not “seize” them:

We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by which respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not "meaningfully interfere" with respondent's possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore did not amount to a seizure.

Although reproducing the data generated a copy of it, generating a copy of the data did not seize anything.

Lower courts have agreed with this approach in cases involving photocopies and photographs. In United States v. Thomas, a package sent via UPS ripped open during sorting, and revealed obscene magazines inside it. UPS employees called the FBI, and an FBI agent made photocopies of the magazine pages before resealing the package. The package was then given back to UPS, although it was not delivered

126 Id. at 324. (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985)).
127 United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1980).
because apparently the address was improper. The FBI agents then requested a warrant to seize the package, and attached the photocopies of the magazine pages to the affidavit. Thomas challenged the FBI’s conduct, claiming that photocopying the magazines seized them. The Tenth Circuit disagreed: “The materials herein remained in UPS’s possession and their delivery was unaffected since they were undeliverable. The materials were searched but not seized.”

Similarly, in Bills v. Aseltine, an officer took 231 pictures of the home where a warrant was being executed. The homeowner sued the officers, alleging that taking the pictures had seized images of their home in a way not permitted by the warrant. The Sixth Circuit relied on Arizona v. Hicks and rejected the claim, concluding that “the recording of visual images of a scene by means of photography does not amount to a seizure because it does not ‘meaningfully interfere’ with any possessory interest.”

One district court has applied this rationale to the copying of computer files, albeit as an alternative holding in an unpublished opinion. In United States v. Gorshkov, FBI agents accessed the Internet account of a suspect and downloaded his files without obtaining a warrant. Relying again on Hicks, the district court concluded that this was not a seizure “because it did not interfere with Defendant’s or anyone else’s possessory interest in the data. The data remained intact and unaltered. It remained accessible to Defendant and any co-conspirators or partners with whom he had shared access.”

Some authorities construing Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure point in the opposite direction of Hicks and its progeny. Rule 41 is the rule governing search warrants; it grants federal authorities the power to obtain a search warrant to “search for and seize” evidence. In a series of cases in the 1970s and 1980s, courts considered whether Rule 41 authorizes search warrants to obtain information, specifically in the context of installing pen register devices and performing

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128 Id. at 789.
129 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992)
130 See id. at 707. (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324 ).
132 Id. Another district court rejected the idea that making a bitstream copy of target’s hard drive was a seizure of the entire hard drive, although the opinion is too cryptic to make much of the court’s conclusion. See United States v. Triumph Capital Storage, 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that generating a bitstream copy “does not mean that [the forensic analyst] seized the entire hard drive,” but not stating what it does mean).
133 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(a).
“sneak and peek” searches. \(^{134}\) Courts construed the Rule 41 power broadly, rejecting claims that such surveillance was impermissible because it did not “seize” anything. In rejecting those claims, they implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) indicated that recording information “seized” it. \(^{135}\) The tight relationship between the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 suggests that these cases provide at least some authority for the view that copying computer files should be treated as a “seizure.” At the same time, the context of these cases weakens their value. The greater power to enter a private space and remove property suggests a lesser power to enter a private space and merely observe; it would be odd if the police could do the former but not the latter. Courts may have construed “seizure” broadly in the Rule 41 context to avoid this odd result. At least as a matter of precedent, Hicks and its progeny seem to outweigh the Rule 41 cases for interpreting seizures of information.

2) A Pragmatic Case for Retaining the Existing Definition of Seizures

Should courts adhere to Hicks in a world of digital evidence that can be easily copied without taking anything away? The computer forensics process generally requires the creation of a digital image, an exact duplicate of the suspect’s computer. Does the creation of an image constitute a seizure? Susan Brenner and Barbara Fredicksen have argued that copying computer data should be viewed as a seizure; they reason that seizures regulate taking away information, and the fact that computer can generate copies without removing the original should not change that focus. \(^{136}\) Sticking with Hicks does raise a scary scenario. What if the police go around making copies of everyone’s computer files, and hold them until they want to peek inside? Under a strict reading of Hicks, this may seem permissible. If we take privacy seriously, we should be deeply troubled by a set of rules that permits the police to collect all of our information from our private computers without any cause whatsoever.

\(^{134}\) See, e.g., United States v. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (pen register); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (sneak and peek warrant)

\(^{135}\) See, e.g., New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 170 (holding that Rule 41 “is broad enough to encompass a ‘search’ designed to ascertain the use which is being made of a telephone suspected of being employed as a means of facilitating a criminal venture and the ‘seizure’ of evidence which the ‘search’ of the telephone produces.”); Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1455 (holding that the purpose of a “sneak and peek” warrant “was ‘to seize’ intangible, not tangible, property. The intangible property to be ‘seized’ was information regarding the status” of the place to be searched.”)

In my view, the solution to this question emerges from a consideration of two points. The first point is that there is room in existing doctrine for regulating the imaging process even if copying is not a seizure under *Hicks*. First, some kind of search will usually (although not always) precede copying. The government must be in a position to access files in order to copy them, and getting to that position generally will require a Fourth Amendment search. The police cannot simply break into someone’s house to access their computer; entering the home will be a search that ordinarily requires a warrant. Second, copying data from a computer usually requires commandeering the computer, disabling access to and use of the computer for a period of time. Imaging an entire computer hard drive usually takes a matter of hours.\footnote{Interview with Mark Pollitt, August 1, 2005.} During this period, the computer ordinarily is “seized” even if no actual copying occurs.\footnote{See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (blocking defendant from entering his house while the police obtain a warrant to search it is a temporary seizure); see also Brenner & Fredericksen, supra note 132, at 113.}

This is not a complete answer, of course. What if the police can copy data from a hard drive without disabling it? Imagine the police have a tool that an officer can insert into an input/output port on the back of a computer that retrieves particular files without disabling the computer. Assume that the device does not interfere with the computer’s operation in a measurable way. Has a search or seizure occurred? Under current law, the answer remains surprisingly unclear. Manipulating a person’s private property generally constitutes a search or seizure; the property owner enjoys a right to exclude others from the property that the Fourth Amendment generally respects.\footnote{Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).} Generating an image requires connecting to the machine and controlling the target computer’s CPU.\footnote{Interview with Mark Pollitt, August 1, 2005.} At the same time, it is unclear whether this is sufficient to trigger a search or seizure under existing Fourth Amendment law. Although the analogy is not exact, circuit courts have struggled to decide whether inserting a key into a lock attached to property owned by the defendant constitutes a search.\footnote{In these cases, the police have a key in their possession, and attempt to determine if the key is associated with a particular lock to determine ownership of the lock or key. The police insert the key in the lock and turn it just a bit to see if the key will open the lock, but do not open the lock itself.} Some circuits have said yes,\footnote{See United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1772 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.); United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 813 F.2d 1353 1358 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990).} while others have held or...
In light of this uncertainty, it seems that courts would also struggle to determine the constitutional implications of inserting a connector into an input/output port. There is room in existing doctrine for either result. One suspects that if courts need to find that such conduct constitutes a search to prevent government copying of computer files without a warrant, they will.

However courts resolve this puzzle – if they ever do – there are practical reasons to follow Hicks in the context of digital evidence. While departing from Hicks offers the promise of clear limits on the government’s power to image personal hard drives without a warrant, it inadvertently creates a series of other problems. First, the resulting rule is overbroad. Every computer file is a copy; the act of accessing data from a hard drive necessarily generates a copy of that data, even if only for internal purposes. If copying is a seizure, then use of a computer would seem to require constant seizing. There may seem to be an intuitive difference between generating a copy of data incidentally as a byproduct of how computers work and generating a copy for the purpose of generating a bitstream image, but it is difficult to turn that intuition into a legal rule.

As a result, a broad definition of seizure would encompass not only making a copy for government use, but also simply using the computer at any time. A broad definition of seizure in the context of digital evidence also creates difficult questions concerning the permissible duration of the seizure. Existing Fourth Amendment doctrines often factor in the duration of a seizure when determining whether that seizure was constitutionally reasonable.

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143 See United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990) (“We conclude that this course of investigation did not constitute a search, or at least, not an unreasonable search protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440, 443-45 (6th Cir.1984).

144 For example, successfully copying data could be a search to the extent it confirms the existence of that data on the defendant’s machine.

145 One approach might make the mens rea the key question. Perhaps the intentional creation of a copy is different from the incidental creation of a copy. Cf. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment addresses misuse of power, not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct”). At the same time, this seems to rub up against the general aversion to motive-based standards in Fourth Amendment law. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (“Not only have we never held . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”) (citing cases).

146 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 596, 709 (1983) (“Although we have recognized the reasonableness of seizures longer than . . . momentary ones . . . the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion” and therefore constitutionally reasonable).
the seizure reflects how long the owner has been deprived of his property. But if generating a copy constitutes a seizure, what is the time period during which the data is seized? Until the data is erased, perhaps? This would be a difficult rule: as explained earlier, deleting files normally does not mean they are actually destroyed.\textsuperscript{147}

Finally, departing from Hicks requires defining the precise line where Hicks ends and the new rule begins. This isn’t a dealbreaking objection. If courts must create a doctrinal distinction given the differences between physical evidence and digital evidence, then so be it. At the same time, it is not obvious where the line between the Hicks definition and a broader one should be drawn, and the difficulty of drawing that line counsels against a doctrinal structure that requires doing so. If copying a computer file constitutes a seizure, what about photocopying, or writing down information on paper? While courts could answer such questions, the benefit of doing so is somewhat difficult to see: it may not make much difference in the end whether the courts follow Hicks or conclude that copying data seizes it. Courts that follow Hicks can regulate the imaging process by focusing on interference with the actual machine, achieving the same regulatory goal without forcing courts to resolve such puzzling doctrinal questions. The simpler approach is to follow Hicks.

3) Copies Versus Originals

The next question is how the Fourth Amendment should apply to the forensic analysis of government-generated copies. There are two obvious choices: courts can treat searches of copies just like searches of originals, or else treat copies merely as data stored on government-owned property. Under the former approach, the restrictions on searching original carry over to searching the copy; under the latter, the government can search the copy without restriction. I contend that the best choice is to treat copies as originals. Courts should apply identical rules regardless of whether the data analyzed is the original version seized or a government-generated copy. This is an important point given that forensics analysts generally make a bitstream copy of files and analyze the copy instead of the original.\textsuperscript{148} Under my approach, courts should find that the making of a bitstream copy is not an independent “seizure,” but that the rules for analyzing the copy on the government’s physical hard drive are no different from the rules for analyzing the original.

Existing precedents touching on this question are surprisingly difficult to find. A few cases have applied the Fourth Amendment to handcopied and photocopied documents, but their relevance is uncertain.

\textsuperscript{147} See notes [] to [], infra.

\textsuperscript{148} See notes [] to [], infra.
For example, early Fourth Amendment opinions by Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand forbade government use of copied documents when the originals had been illegally seized. While these cases may be read as extending the same protections to copies as originals, it is probably fairer to view them as antecedents to the modern fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. More recently, several federal appellate cases involve motions to return photocopies of seized documents brought under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These cases mostly involve the exercise of equitable powers to return property, however, and not the Fourth Amendment. A possible exception is *Vaughn v. Baldwin,* in which the Sixth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment did not permit the government to photocopy and retain seized documents after the owner of the documents withdrew his consent to having government agents seize and then search the originals. The reasoning of *Vaughn* is cursory and unclear, however, rendering it of little help.

The Fourth Amendment rules governing searches of copies may be unclear because copying has long required human exposure and involvement. When copying entails human observation, it will usually be clear that examining copied information does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Recall *Arizona v. Hicks,* in which a police officer copied serial numbers from stolen audio equipment. Having just recorded the information himself by hand, it seems obvious that the officer can look again at the piece of paper without violating the Fourth Amendment. Computer-to-computer copying is different. The data remains hidden; copies are generated without exposing the information to human observation. The question is, does this make a difference? Should we treat the software that generates the copy like a person who “sees” the original, eliminating Fourth Amendment protection? Or is the absence of human exposure a critical difference?

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149 See *Silverthorne Lumber v. United States,* 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
152 See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(g). For examples of such cases, see *Mason v. Pulliam,* 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); *Sovereign News Co. v. United States,* 690 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982).
153 950 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1991).
154 Judge Nelson’s opinion focused on the government’s decision to wait for months before copying the documents, and then its refusal to return the documents after consent was revoked. Judge Nelson found this conduct “unreasonable” and therefore unconstitutional. See id. at 333-24. This sheds little light on whether looking through the copies would be a search.
155 See notes [[]] to [], infra.
While existing law does not provide an answer, existing practice may do so. Generating and analyzing bitstream copies is a routine part of the forensics process, but no court has ever analyzed searches of copies as different from searches of seizures. In the handful of cases where the courts noted that the analysis of a computer hard drive was performed on a copy, courts analyzed the permissibility of the search of the copy without suggesting it made any difference. From a practical perspective, this is the best approach. All data is a copy. Computer hard drives work by generating copies; accessing a file on a hard drive actually generates a copy of the file to be sent to the computer’s brain for processing. More broadly, computers work by copying and recopying information from one place to another. From a technical perspective, it usually makes no sense to speak of having an “original” set of data. Given this, it would be troublesome and artificial to treat copies as different from originals.

Treating copies as originals also fits nicely with the exposure rule for searches and the Hicks rule for seizures. Once again, the key is access to data. It should not matter if data is copied, transferred, or otherwise manipulated. What matters is that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in data on his hard drive at one point, and that data was not abandoned or exposed to others. When a forensic analyst performs the necessary steps to evaluate a hard drive, the exposure of the information from the hard drive to an output device such as a monitor counts as a search regardless of whether the information was most recently stored as a copy or a more direct original.

C) Overview of the Data Acquisition Phase

The normative approach to interpreting “searches” and “seizures” developed in this section settles the basic legal framework governing the data acquisition phase of the computer forensics process. First, a warrant is normally required to search a computer. Second, the forensic analyst can make a bitstream copy of the computer without needing an additional warrant or cause; generating the bitstream copy will be a temporary seizure while the copy is made, but is not otherwise a search or seizure of all of the computer’s contents. The analysis of the bitstream copy is then governed by the same rules as the original. If a private party has conducted a private search that exposed several files, the police can search


157 See notes [ ] to [ ], supra.

158 See notes [ ] to [ ], supra.

159 See notes [ ] to [ ], supra.
the original or the bitstream copy and retrieve the specific parts of those files that the private person viewed. However, the exposure of some files on the hard drive does not eliminate all protection on the computer. Only specific information that has been exposed to private observation during the private search can be accessed without a warrant. If the police wish to view additional materials stored on the computer, they must obtain a valid warrant.

This approach effectively updates the traditional Fourth Amendment restrictions on searches and seizures for a world of digital evidence. To be sure, it is not the only approach that the courts could take. The switch from physical evidence to digital evidence presents a complex series of rule choices, and as I have noted there are benefits and potential drawbacks to different choices. At the same time, the structure offered in this section offers one promising approach. It tweaks the enter-and-retrieve dynamic of traditional search and seizure law by focusing on the expose of data to human observation, whether from the original storage device or a bitstream copy.

### III. The Fourth Amendment and Data Reduction

The exposure-based approach to searches and seizures settles the rules that govern the acquisition phase of the computer forensics process. This section turns to the subsequent data reduction stage. At this phase, investigators search through an image of the defendant’s computer for specific evidence related to a crime. In most of these cases, the police will have obtained a search warrant authorizing the search. The question is, what steps can the police take to find the evidence named in the warrant? What kind of search pursuant to a warrant is a “reasonable” search, and what kind of search is “unreasonable”? What rules should regulate *ex ante* what steps the police can take, and what rules should regulate *ex post* the admissibility of the files they discover?

The broad challenge is finding a way to regulate the invasiveness of computer warrant searches. The framers of the Fourth Amendment included a particularity requirement to disallow general searches; all warrants must describe *ex ante* the particular place to be searched and the particular person or things to be seized. In the physical world, this requirement imposes a serious restriction on police conduct, as it regulates where in the physical world the police can go and what physical property they can seize. The police can only go a particular place, can only search

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160 See notes [] to [], *supra*.
161 See U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
for particular property, and can only look in spaces large enough that the property may be located in that space.\textsuperscript{162}

These rules offer less protection against invasive computer searches, however, and today’s diminished protections are likely to shrink even more as technology advances. For a range of reasons, computer technologies may allow specific warrants in theory to become general warrants in practice. Computers tend to play an ever greater role in our lives as computer technologies advance, meaning that they are likely to record and store increasingly complete pictures of our daily experience. At the same time, the particularity requirement does less and less as the storage capacity of computer devices gets greater and greater.\textsuperscript{163} Even if the property described in the warrant is a very specific file or type of information, locating that information may require a broad search for technical reasons. These changes mean that as time passes, rules created to prevent general searches for physical evidence may result in the equivalent of general searches for digital evidence. Probable cause to seize and search a computer will justify an extremely invasive search that uncovers a tremendous amount of information beyond the scope of the warrant.

There are two basic strategies for regulating and narrowing the invasiveness of computer searches to restore the function of preexisting rules for the new environment: \textit{ex ante} restrictions and \textit{ex post} restrictions. The \textit{ex ante} strategy seeks to regulate computer searches by requiring warrants to articulate the precise steps that forensic analysts can take when they conduct the forensic process. According to this approach, computer warrants should state not just where the search will occur, and for what, but also how the search will occur. Requiring the warrant to articulate the approved search protocol can limit executive discretion and avoid general warrants. The \textit{ex post} strategy relies instead on standards of review of the forensics process after evidence is found. Under this approach, the courts review the search process at the suppression stage after evidence has been found and the government seeks its introduction at trial.

This Section addresses both approaches. It begins by explaining why the environment of digital evidence raises special concerns that searches specific in theory will become general searches in practice. It then

\textsuperscript{162} Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)(“By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. Thus, the scope of a lawful search is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.”)

\textsuperscript{163} See Kerr, \textit{Digital Evidence}, supra note [], at 302-03 (“Given how much information can be stored in a small computer hard drive, the particularity requirement no longer serves the function in electronic evidence cases that it serves in physical evidence cases. Whatever remaining function it serves diminishes every year.”).
contends that \textit{ex ante} restrictions are an inappropriate response to this problem given the highly contingent and unpredictable nature of the forensics process. The better approach is to reform rules regulating the admissibility of evidence \textit{ex post}. Although uncertainty about the direction of technological change counsels caution, the best option ultimately may be to reconfigure the plain view doctrine for digital searches. Computer hard drives store a tremendous amount of private information that can be exposed in even a targeted search. If everything comes into plain view, the plain view exception threatens to swallow the rule. Narrowing or even eliminating the plain view exception may eventually be needed to ensure that warrants to search computers do not become the functional equivalent of general warrants.

\textit{A) Reasonableness and Physical Evidence Collection}

Everyone has had the experience of looking for one thing and finding another instead. Maybe you were looking for your keys and came across some old papers. Maybe you were looking for the old papers and came across a special photograph. In either case, a search designed to locate item $A$ instead led to item $B$. The same dynamic happens frequently in law enforcement searches, albeit with more serious legal consequences. A police officer looking for evidence $A$ often comes across evidence $B$. Perhaps an officer looking through a suspect’s pocket for a driver’s license instead finds drugs. Or perhaps an officer looking inside a car for drugs instead comes across a gun. In some cases, the discovery of the latter evidence is inadvertent. In others, the officer’s conduct is a pretext search for the former designed to discover the latter.

One important and difficult question in Fourth Amendment law is whether and when the law should allow the police to use evidence $B$ discovered in a valid search for evidence $A$. The problem is difficult because no clear and coherent dividing line separates cases where use of the extra evidence simply helps the police fight crime from cases where use of the extra evidence encourages abusive law enforcement practices. On one hand, permitting the police to use the additional evidence can give the police a very valuable tool in many cases. The police are tasked with gathering evidence to fight crime and protect public safety. Allowing the police to use all the evidence they come across during a valid search allows them to protect public safety even better, and at little to no added risk to privacy; after all, the police have already conducted the valid search.\footnote{164 See Horton v. California} Denying the police the use of powerful evidence if they come across it
legitimately during a search seems to punish the police for good police work and good fortune.\textsuperscript{165}

On the other hand, permitting the use of the additional evidence can encourage discriminatory and inefficient law enforcement practices. If the police know that they can use legal authority to search for \( A \) as a way of looking for \( B \), they may embark on pretext searches and fishing expeditions.\textsuperscript{166} When combined with the remarkable breadth of many low-level offenses,\textsuperscript{167} the ability to engage in pretext searches may permit the police to target unpopular or politically powerless persons or groups for sustained scrutiny. Evidence that a particular person has committed a low level offense may be easy to obtain, giving the police tremendous power to execute invasive searches upon the target of their choosing. This discriminatory and inefficient practice was just the kind of misuse of government power the Fourth Amendment was created to stop. Indeed, while courts generally will not scrutinize subjective intent to assess the validity of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures,\textsuperscript{168} the fear that legal rules may enable pretext or general searches still remains a key principle driving Fourth Amendment doctrine.\textsuperscript{169}

The legal rule that balances these two competing concerns is the “plain view” doctrine. The plain view doctrine permits the police to seize evidence discovered during a valid search if the incriminating nature of the item to be seized, sufficient to create probable cause that the item constitutes evidence,\textsuperscript{170} is immediately apparent.\textsuperscript{171} The broad scope of the doctrine reflects a judgment call that the dynamics of physical evidence collection make the risk of pretext and dragnet searches relatively low. \textit{Horton v. California}\textsuperscript{172} provides a good illustration. In \textit{Horton}, the Supreme Court held that the plain view exception justifies a search even if

\textsuperscript{165} See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (noting “the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk--to themselves or to preservation of the evidence--of going to obtain a warrant” when evidence is discovered in plain view).


\textsuperscript{169} See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (rejecting subjective intent test for plain view but recognizing that the possibility of officers using plain view to execute pretext searches is a legitimate Fourth Amendment concern).

\textsuperscript{170} 171

\textsuperscript{172} 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
the officer had a subjective intent to execute a pretextual search.\footnote{Id. at 138-39.} This rule was permissible because other aspects of physical evidence collection already served to thwart general searches. First, “[s]crupulous adherence” to the requirement that the police particularly describe the place to be searched and thing to be seized made it unlikely that police would use the plain view exception as a means to conduct general searches.\footnote{Horton, 496 U.S. at 139-40 (arguing that the interest in “prevent[ing] the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”, and that “[s]crupulous adherence to these requirements serves the interests in limiting the area and duration of the search that the inadvertence requirement inadequately protects.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).} Second, the scope of warrantless searches was limited by the fact that police could only look in places and containers large enough to contain the physical evidence sought.\footnote{Id. at 140-41 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)).} Both reasons were rooted in the dynamics of physical evidence collection.

2) Reasonableness and Digital Evidence Collection

The facts of the computer forensics process present a very different dynamic, with a significantly higher risk of general searches. This is true for several reasons. First, the virtual nature of digital evidence weakens or eliminates the two traditional limits on searches and seizures identified in \textit{Horton}. In the case of searches with warrants, digital evidence diminishes the regulatory effect of the particularity requirement.\footnote{See Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note [], at 302-03 (“Given how much information can be stored in a small computer hard drive, the particularity requirement no longer serves the function in electronic evidence cases that it serves in physical evidence cases. Whatever remaining function it serves diminishes every year.”).} The particularity requirement reflects a physical concern: the thinking is that the law can limit searches by limiting where in the physical world the police search and naming the object of the search. Search for data on a hard drive upsets these assumptions. A warrant to seize a computer hard drive is sufficiently particular under existing standards – the computer itself is small – but an entire virtual world of information may be stored inside it. And as time passes, this virtual world gets only larger; the storage capacity of new computer hard drives has tended to double every two years.\footnote{See Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note [], at 302.} In the case of warrantless searches, digital evidence can be located anywhere. The police can no longer rule out particular places based on the physical dimensions of the evidence sought.
Second, computers appear to be playing an ever greater role in our lives, and recording a growing proportion of it. In the 1980s, computers were used primarily as glorified typewriters. Today they are postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating services, movie theaters, daily planners, shopping malls, personal secretaries, virtual diaries, and much more. As computers become involved in more aspects of our daily lives, they record more and more diverse information. Each new software application means a new aspect of our lives that our computers monitor and record. As Part I demonstrated, much of this goes on behind-the-scenes; users often do not realize how much information is being generated and saved. But all of the recorded information is available to the forensic analyst. As our computers do more and more, we may eventually approach a world in which most details of our lives are recorded and stored in perpetuity in our computers. Every minute and every keystroke may end up stored inside our machines in a way that can be reconstructed later by a forensic analyst with perfect accuracy.

Third, computer searches tend to be unusually invasive. A search for one type of digital evidence often reveals a tremendous amount of other evidence: a great deal comes into plain view. Of course, this is true to some extent with many searches, and especially searches of homes. Few searches feature any type of surgical precision. At the same time, computers are somewhat different because computer searches typically occur off-site, in the government’s lab, on a government machine. The time pressures inherent in on-site physical searches no longer exists. While physical searches may take a few hours, computer searches can take much longer. Forensics investigators can spend as much time as they need to comb the entire computer for evidence, and they can come back to the search many times over a period of months. Further, searching a space once is no longer enough; evidence can be hidden in many different ways, meaning that repeated analysis may uncover digital evidence that prior techniques had missed.

To some extent, the invasiveness of computer searches in the future will depend on the uncertain development of forensic technology. Computer forensics programs evolve every year, and their features change on a regular basis. Computer searches may be invasive today, but it’s possible that they won’t be in the future. We can imagine the possibility that someday a computer forensics tool will exist that efficiently searches a computer hard drive, returning only the evidence sought. This hypothetical “Perfect Tool” will magically locate evidence described in a warrant; the analyst will enter in the terms described in the warrant, and the tool will find just that evidence and nothing else. Alternatively, perhaps Perfect Tool will not exist in the future. Perhaps instead there will only be “General Tool,” a program that that always reveals everything
incriminating stored inside a computer when any kind of search is conducted. It is too early to know for sure whether the future will bring Perfect Tool, General Tool, or some mix of the two – and yet our concerns about the risks of pretext and dragnet searches depend at least in part on which future unfolds.

Despite this uncertainty, it seems likely that computer searches will continue to be very invasive in the future. Perfect Tool sounds wonderful in theory, but is likely impossible in practice; new technologies always produce countertechnologies designed to thwart them. Police and sophisticated wrongdoers inevitably play a cat-and-mouse game between suspects trying to hide evidence and forensic analysts trying to find it. This dynamic makes unlikely that it will ever be possible to rule out a particular search completely. If Perfect Tool were invented, hackers would quickly devise a counterstrategy to disable it. The counterstrategy would impair Perfect Tool’s ability to locate the evidence named in the warrant, requiring investigators to use something more like General Tool to locate it. Even a very rare use of such counterstrategies would trigger a legitimate law enforcement need for General Tool in many cases; investigators generally will not know ex ante whether the computer’s owner took countermeasures to thwart government searches. In this environment, Perfect Tool may not be possible. It therefore seems likely that tools closer to General Tool than Perfect Tool will be the norm in the future. While tools that offer the promise of Perfect Tool may be used, a need will always exist for something more like General Tool.

For all of these reasons, the balance struck by exiting law may need to be rethought in the future for the case of digital evidence. Many computers will contain a wealth of evidence of even low-level crimes, and probable cause to believe a person engaged in even just a minor offense may justify an exhaustive search of their hard drives that will expose many of their most secret doings to government observation. The existing plain view exception remains rooted in the contingent dynamics of physical evidence collection, indicating a need for rethinking the doctrine given the very different dynamics of digital evidence. The overall goal should remain the same: the law should attempt to balance the threat of general searches against the public benefit of recovering additional evidence. The question is, what rules can best serve that balance in the context of the computer forensics process?

B) Ex Ante Restrictions for Computer Warrants

178 Cf. United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, n.8 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that investigators cannot rely on file names to limit searches for computer files because they do not know if the computer owner attempted to hide his files by changing the file names.)
One response to the new dynamics of the computer forensics process would be to require computer warrants to articulate *ex ante* the steps that the analyst must follow when searching the computer. The Supreme Court has rejected this approach for physical searches. While warrants must establish probable cause and particularly name the property to be seized and the place to be searched, the Supreme Court has rejected the position that they must include “a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed.”\(^{179}\) “On the contrary,” the Supreme Court has stressed, “it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant” subject to *ex post* review for reasonableness.\(^{180}\) Judicial review of searches pursuant to a warrant is imposed *ex post*, not *ex ante*.

In the last decade, however, a handful of courts and commentators have argued that computer warrants merit a “special approach”\(^{181}\) that requires the government to articulate the search strategy that forensics specialists will follow during searches of computer hard drive.\(^{182}\) The thinking behind these proposals is that requiring a judge to pre-approve the specific steps undertaken during the forensics process can limit its scope.\(^{183}\) The initial allure is clear. If articulating a search protocol can limit the search that occurs, the resulting search is more likely to be narrow and particular. Unfortunately, however, it turns out that the *ex ante* strategy is deeply flawed. It wrongly assumes that prosecutors and magistrate judges have the knowledge needed to articulate search strategies before the search begins. The forensic process is too contingent and unpredictable to allow *ex ante* rules, however. Legal regulation of computer searches should be imposed *ex post*, not *ex ante*, just like regulation of physical searches.

1) *Computers and the “Special Approach”*

The idea of articulating a search strategy in a computer search warrant is sometimes said to derive from a Ninth Circuit Case from 1982, *United States v. Tamura*.\(^{184}\) In *Tamura*, the government seized boxes of documents and took them offsite for review. The documents contained some documents that were evidence of crime commingled with many

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\(^{179}\) Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 (1979). In Dalia, the government obtained a warrant to conduct bugging surveillance, and the police executed the warrant by covertly entering the place to install the bug. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court rejected the idea that the warrant had to state *ex ante* that it permitted covert entry.

\(^{180}\) Id.

\(^{181}\) United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1999).

\(^{182}\) See notes 131 to 142, infra.

\(^{183}\) See notes 132 to 141, infra.

\(^{184}\) 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
innocuous documents, and the government seized all the documents
because it would have been infeasible to search through all the boxes on
the site. Judge Betty Fletcher’s opinion approved the seizure but offered a
“suggestion” for how the government could “generally avoid fourth
amendment rights” in cases involving commingled documents: get prior
permission to seize all of the documents and conduct an offsite search
before actually doing so, so that “wholesale removal” is “monitored by the
judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate.” In other words, judges
should sign off on the wholesale seizure of documents so that overbroad
seizures occur only if they are justified by practical concerns.186

In an influential 1994 law review article, Raphael Winick took this
idea and added an important twist.187 Winick noted that computers used in
criminal activity will contain a great deal of innocent material commingled
with criminal evidence, and urged courts to apply “the Tamura rule” to
computers. So far, so good. The rub is that Winick’s vision of the
Tamura rule was quite different than anything in Tamura itself. While
Tamura merely required judicial approval of the wholesale seizure,
Winick’s version of the Tamura rule required courts to articulate specific
search protocols explaining exactly how the officers could search seized
hard drives whenever tightly focused searches were not possible. Winick
proposed the “basic principle . . . that before a wide-ranging exploratory
search is conducted, the magistrate should require the investigators to
provide an outline of the methods that they will use to sort through the
information.”189 Although framed as merely an application of Tamura,
Winick’s approach in fact urged a considerable shift in how courts regulate
Fourth Amendment searches. The particularity requirement of the warrant
clause requires the warrant to say where the search will occur, and for
what, but has not been interpreted to require the warrant to specify how
the search will be executed.190

185 Id. at 596.
186 Id.
187 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8
188 See id. at 106.
189 See id. at 106-108.
190 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 (1979) (“[It is generally left to
the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed
with the performance of a search authorized by warrant”). Nor does Winick’s
approach involve the same set of Fourth Amendment concerns at issue in Tamura:
while Tamura centered around the seizure of innocuous materials commingled with
incriminating ones, Winick’s version is concerned with minimizing the amount of
incriminating material outside the warrant that may be uncovered during a
comprehensive search.
Despite the questionable provenance of the Winick approach, the Tenth Circuit relied on it in important dicta in *United States v. Carey.* In *Carey*, an officer searching a computer pursuant to a warrant for evidence relating to narcotics came across images of child pornography. He abandoned the search for the evidence named in the warrant and began to search for additional images of child pornography. The *Carey* court concluded that the search for additional images was improper, and cited Winick and *Tamura* in support of a recommended “special approach” to avoid discovering evidence outside the scope of the warrant in computer searches: “Where officers come across relevant documents so intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the site,” the Court advised, “the officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate of the conditions and limitations on a further search through the documents.” The Tenth Circuit reemphasized this point a year later in a similar case, *United States v. Campos.*

Interest in including search protocols in warrants was heightened by the publication of the Justice Department’s 2001 manual, *Searching and Seizing Computer and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations.* The DOJ Manual suggested that it may be a “good practice” in some cases for affidavits to explain the search techniques used to search a computer pursuant to a warrant. The DOJ Manual noted that “the Fourth Amendment does not generally require such an approach,” but pointed to *Carey* and *Campos* as a sign that at least the Tenth Circuit preferred it. The combination of the DOJ Manual and *Carey* has led to a surge of recent litigation on the use of search protocols to cabin the scope of searches. In several cases, defendants have argued that the failure to articulate a search strategy renders the search warrant overbroad and therefore invalid.

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191 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). See notes [] to [], supra.
192 Id. at 1275 n.27.
193 Id. at 1275. See also *United States v. Hunter*, 13 F.Supp.2d 574, 584 (D.Vt.1998) (“To withstand an overbreadth challenge, the search warrant itself, or materials incorporated by reference, must have specified the purpose for which the computers were seized and delineated the limits of their subsequent search.”)
194 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Carey*, 172 F.3d at 1275).
195 In the interests of full disclosure, I should acknowledge that I wrote this manual when I was a DOJ lawyer, under the direction of a number of other attorneys at the Justice Department.
196 DOJ Manual, supra note 6, at Ch. 2, Part C, Subpart 3 (“When agents have a factual basis for believing that they can locate the evidence using a specific set of techniques, the affidavit should explain the techniques that the agents plan to use to distinguish incriminating documents from commingled documents.”).
197 Id.
These arguments have been met with mixed results, and outcomes appear to hinge in large part on the sense of individual judges as to how easy it is to search a computer hard drive for evidence. For example, in *United States v. Hill*, the defendant in a child pornography case argued that the warrant’s failure to articulate a search strategy rendered the warrant invalid. Judge Kozinski, sitting by designation, rejected the argument on the ground that it was impossible to know *ex ante* where a file might be located or how it might be found. Judges with greater confidence in their ability to recognize and require proper *ex ante* restrictions on computer forensic analysis have reached different results. In one recent case, a magistrate judge in Chicago simply refused to issue a warrant to search a computer for evidence of tax evasion without a search protocol. Investigators had probable cause to believe that the defendant kept evidence of her tax evasion crimes on her computer stored in her apartment. The magistrate judge refused to issue a warrant without a search protocol settled beforehand, however. The Court justified this on four grounds: first, that computer search and seizures start with seizures, then allow searches; second, computers generally have intermingled documents; third, computers can store a tremendous amount of information; and fourth, computer technology allow the government to conduct a highly targeted search if it chooses to do so.

2) *Rejecting Ex Ante Restrictions for Computer Warrants*

With this history and doctrine in mind, the normative question is ready to be answered: What should courts do with the search protocol requirement? The answer hinges on an important practical point: The computer forensics process is contingent, factbound, and quite unpredictable. Before an analyst starts analyzing a storage device, he normally will have little idea what operating system the computer is running; what software is on it; how that software was used; what else is on the hard drive; or whether the target took steps to hide, misname, or otherwise disguise files. Perhaps the defendant took no efforts to hide

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199 *Id.* at 1090-91.
201 *Id.* at 962-63.
202 *See id.* at 959.
202 *Id.* at 959-60. *See also* United States v. Maali, 346 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (upholding search despite lack of search protocols, on ground that “[w]hile it may be preferable and advisable to set forth a computer search strategy in a warrant affidavit, failure to do so does not render computer search provisions unduly broad.”); United States v. Barbuto, 2001 WL 670930 (D.Utah April 12, 2001) (suppressing evidence sue to the absence of a search protocol).
incriminating files; perhaps he changed file extensions, altered file headers, encrypted files, or took other steps to thwart the forensics process.

Nor will investigators necessarily know what forensic tool the particular analyst may choose to use when the analyst performs his search. Having all of this information is critical to knowing how the search can be executed in the most targeted way, however. Different forensic tools have different features, and different features mean that tasks that may be easy using one program may be hard using another. It is difficult to know what the particular search requires and what tools are the best to find the evidence without first taking a look at the files on the hard drive. In a sense, the forensics process is a bit like surgery: the doctor may not know how best to proceed until he opens up the patient and takes a look. The ability to target information described in a warrant is highly contingent on a number of factors that are difficult or even impossible to predict ex ante.203

In light of these difficulties, judges approving warrants are poorly equipped to evaluate whether a particular search protocol is the best and most targeted way of locating evidence stored on a hard drive. Given the contingency of the process, even a skilled forensic expert cannot predict exactly what techniques are going to be necessary to find the information sought by the warrant. Most judges are not skilled computer forensic experts, of course. Like most lawyers, they tend to have only a vague sense of the technical details of how computers work. While Winick and the Carey court are right that many search techniques exist to target computer searches, they fail to realize that the details of what technique is the best to use in a specific case usually cannot be determined until the search occurs. Powerful search techniques exist, but whether they will work in a particular case depends on circumstances difficult to predict beforehand. Plus, warrant applications are ex parte; a judge must try to judge whether the search protocol is appropriate based only on the government’s presentation of the empirical picture. It is generally impossible to know ahead of time what techniques are needed, and judges in ex parte proceedings are particularly unlikely to grasp the difficulties.

A requirement that courts approve search strategies ex ante therefore serves little purpose. The Tamura decision attempted to ensure that a judge approved overbroad seizures before or shortly after they occurred; the idea was that a judge could make the call as to whether an offsite search was required. That’s a sensible rule: the Fourth Amendment

203 See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that agents executing a search for computer files cannot be “required to accept as accurate any file name or suffix and [to] limit [their] search accordingly” because criminals may “intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously named directories”).
prohibits unreasonable seizures, and seizing beyond the scope of probable cause may be reasonable if justified by practical concerns but not reasonable otherwise. Judges can review this step \textit{ex ante} because it occurs only once, when the property is removed from the location of the search. Judges cannot exercise the same \textit{ex ante} control over the forensics process, however. Analyzing a computer is a continuous process that can involve the performing of hundreds or even thousands of individual commands and steps. Judges cannot oversee them all. To perform that job competently, judges would need to stand alongside the forensics expert and approve each and every step as the situation evolved and the practical picture changed. The decision tree that an analyst might use to decide what steps to take is simply too long and complex for a judge to approve \textit{ex ante}. To some extent, this is the rules versus standards debate: standards are judged \textit{ex post} in a fact-specific way, while rules are applied \textit{ex ante} with less fact-specificity.\footnote{See generally Pierre J. Schlag, \textit{Rules and Standards}, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Louis Kaplow, \textit{Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis}, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Problems with Rules}, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 956-57 (1995).} The computer forensics process calls for \textit{ex post} standards, not \textit{ex ante} rules.

Search protocols may be useful in specific circumstances. For example, searches of computers that may contain privileged documents present special concerns. Investigators may specify a search protocol to explain how the investigators will handle privileged documents.\footnote{See, \textit{e.g.}, United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1997) (search protocol for search to avoid privileged files); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998) (same).} Similarly, searches of third party computers such as large computer servers raise unusual problems.\footnote{See, \textit{e.g.}, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding the Secret Service liable under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Privacy Protection Act for seizing computer servers and taking them offsite pursuant to a valid warrant).} Such searches typically occur onsite, rather than offsite, and the search protocol attached to the warrant can explain to the server owner how the search will unfold.\footnote{This practice is followed in light of \textit{Steve Jackson Games, supra}.} The search protocol can be given to the server owner onsite to ensure him that the search will be narrow.\footnote{See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (noting that a valid warrant “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).} In general, however, review of search strategies should be performed \textit{ex post}, not \textit{ex ante}. 

206 See, \textit{e.g.}, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding the Secret Service liable under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Privacy Protection Act for seizing computer servers and taking them offsite pursuant to a valid warrant).
207 This practice is followed in light of \textit{Steve Jackson Games, supra}.
208 See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (noting that a valid warrant “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
C) Rethinking the Plain View Doctrine

If ex ante search protocols cannot provide effective tools for neutralizing dragnet searches, what can? This section argues that the best way to neutralize dragnet searches is to rethink the plain view exception in the context of digital evidence. The dynamics of computer searches upset the basic assumptions underlying the plain view doctrine. More and more evidence comes into plain view, use of evidence beyond the warrant no longer requires a “seizure” of that evidence, and the particularity requirement no longer functions effectively as a check on dragnet searches. In this new factual environment, a tightening of the plain view doctrine may be needed to ensure that computer warrants that are narrow in theory do not become broad in practice.

This section discusses three possible ways of tightening the plain view doctrine for digital evidence searches. The first approach would narrow the plain view exception based on the circumstances of the search, such as the analyst’s subjective intent or the tool used. The second approach would narrow plain view based on the nature of the evidence discovered, permitting the use of some kinds of evidence and blocking other types. Both of these proposals seem promising at first, but prove quite difficult to apply in practice. The third proposal is more draconian: it would abolish the plain view exception entirely. The rule would allow forensic analysts to take necessary steps to locate evidence stored on a hard drive, but at the cost that evidence discovered beyond the warrant cannot be used against the defendant absent an application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Ending plain view for digital searches is not an ideal solution, and may not be necessary today. But it may eventually prove to best the best way to restore the function of the Fourth Amendment in a world of digital evidence.209

209 For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that courts will take a somewhat holistic view of the role of plain view in the context of computer searches. Technically speaking, the plain view doctrine is a limitation on the government’s right to seize evidence. It regulates seizures, not searches. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 134 (“If ‘plain view’ justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather than by searches.”). Obtaining copies of computer files does not seize anything under Hicks, however. Because the police can obtain copies without seizing anything, it seems that the plain view doctrine technically does not regulate government use of discovered digital evidence. While this seems to true as a technical matter, it turns out that no court that has applied the plain view exception to digital evidence has recognized or even acknowledged it. For my purposes, I will assume this existing judicial practice continues. To the extent that courts do recognize this technical point, it seems to point only more strongly for doctrinal reform.
1) Approaches That Focus on the Circumstances of the Search

While there are many ways of narrowing the traditional plain view exception, one approach would be to factor in the circumstances of the search. For example, some might want to would overturn Horton and restore the inadvertence requirement, placing the emphasis on the analyst’s subjective intent. Others might want to regulate the particular tools during the forensic search, such as by requiring the police to use particularly sophisticated or advanced forensic tools. Still others might want to permit plain view evidence when the specific forensic step that uncovered the evidence was “reasonable,” but not if the step was unreasonable. All of these proposals have surface appeal, but on deeper reflection prove unpromising.

Two courts already have refashioned the plain view exception so that it focuses on the analyst’s subjective intent in the context of computer searches. In United States v. Carey and United States v. Gray, forensic analysts looking for one kind of information came across digital images of child pornography. In Carey, the analyst stopped looking for drug evidence and began to look exclusively for child pornography; in Gray, the analyst continued to look for evidence of computer hacking and just happened to come across more child pornography. In both cases, the courts followed the subjective intent of the officer to stay within or look beyond the scope of the warrant. Where the officer tried to look for evidence described by the warrant, the discovered images could be used; where the officers ignore the warrant, the images were suppressed.

The subjective approach followed by the Carey and Gray courts offers one significant advantage over the existing objective test: it turns the emphasis from a question judges are poorly equipped to answer (the reasonableness of a particular forensic step) to a question judges are better equipped to answer (witness credibility). Judges are familiar with physical world searches; they can understand how searches occur and what steps agents might take. Armed with this knowledge, judges can use objective tests to distinguish steps that are consistent with a search for evidence from steps that are characteristic of general searches. Judges have little sense of how to distinguish a reasonable forensics process from an unreasonable one, however. The technical details are too contingent and fluid. In this environment, a subjective test may serve as a second-best proxy for the

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210 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
212 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275.
214 See id. (permitting use of files when the law enforcement agent “never abandoned his original search”).
215 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275.
objective test. While judges may be poorly equipped to assess whether in fact an analyst’s steps are consistent with a targeted search, they will be better equipped to tell whether the analyst was at least attempting to conduct a good faith targeted search.

The subjective approach has a critical weakness, however. An officer’s subjective intent may be difficult to know. Even if the officer testifies on the issue, it is difficult for a defense attorney to challenge such claims on cross-examination. This is particularly problematic in the computer context because government agencies can set policies that mandate very thorough forensic investigations. For example, the FBI has generally trained its forensic analysts to conduct highly comprehensive examinations; the default practice is to leave no digital stone unturned. This policy can created “General Tool” through practice instead of technology. When every step taken by an analyst is a question of routine policy, it becomes difficult to exclude evidence on the ground that the analyst was attempting to circumvent the warrant. This may have been the problem with United States v. Gray: in that case, the agent testified that he kept searching for evidence named in the warrant after repeatedly coming across other evidence because he was simply following FBI forensic policies. The existence of otherwise-laudable standardized practices makes the subjective intent approach much less helpful in practice than it first seems in theory.

The next option is for the law to require the use of certain tools instead of others. If the police can conduct a search using either Perfect Tool or General Tool, for example, perhaps the law should require use of Perfect Tool. The problem with this approach is that it does not provide an obvious judicially manageable standard for the courts to apply. Dozens of different forensic programs exist, each with their own strength and weaknesses, and each with their different costs. The tools morph quickly over time, as do the latest techniques in hiding data, making ex ante guidance difficult to provide. Which tool would be the best in any situation depends on how the officer was trained, how the tool was used, what techniques might be used to try to thwart investigators, and what other tools were available at that particular time. Competing considerations such as cost and ease of use would also make it difficult for a court to impose the requirement that particular tools should be used at any particular time.

Finally, it remains difficult to know for sure when a

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216 Interview with Mark Pollitt, former Director of the FBI's Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program, August 1, 2005.
217 Id.
218 Cf. id. at 529 n. 8 (“[A]s computer technology changes so rapidly, it would be unreasonable to require the FBI to know of, and use, only the most advanced computer searching techniques. ”).
particular tool is needed. An investigator who uses Perfect Tool on a computer but comes up empty will never know whether General Tool might have uncovered something Perfect Tool did not. Given the many competing considerations and difficult choices among cost, ease of use, and effectiveness, direct regulation of the tools used in the forensics process presents an unmanageable challenge for courts.

Another possibility would hinge admissibility of plain view evidence on whether the particular forensic step that led to the evidence was reasonable or unreasonable given the government’s needs, the privacy violation, and the relevant legal authority. If the government’s search was reasonable, then the plain view evidence can be admitted; if it was not, it will be excluded. Such a case-by-case approach is an interesting option, but may be difficult for a court to apply. First, for reasons explored earlier, it may be difficult for courts to identify exactly when a particular step is reasonable or unreasonable. Second, this standard would require courts to apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in an unusual context in which the causal connection among steps is unclear. For example, imagine that an analyst performs an examination in 100 steps, and that step 100 produces evidence of an unrelated crime that is beyond the scope of the warrant. Assume that step 100 is constitutionally reasonable in isolation, but that steps 98, 95, 74, and 51 are not. To determine whether the evidence is admissible, the court would presumably need to find out the causal relationship between the earlier steps and step 100 to determine if the fruits of the latter are fruits of the poisonous tree. While such questions arise in the case of physical searches, judges understand the causal relationships of physical searches. The computer forensic process is much more of a complex technical art, and a contingent and highly fluid one at that. Applying the fruits doctrine may be much more complicated.

2) Approaches that Focus on the Evidence Obtained

Another approach that has considerable surface appeal would hinge admissibility of evidence on the type of evidence obtained and its usefulness in other prosecutions. Perhaps the plain view doctrine should permit the use of evidence for serious crimes, or only terrorist offenses, but not allow evidence to be used for low-level offenses. Professor Stuntz has

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220 See notes [] to [], supra.

made a suggestion along these lines in his recent essay.²²² Stuntz suggests that one way to regulate secret surveillance practices such as delayed notice warrants and Internet searches would be to give the government the power to conduct the search, but then would “limit the range of crimes the government can prove by evidence discovered through that tactic.”²²³

Applied to the computer forensics process, the rule might be that the government can use evidence discovered in plain view only in specific types of prosecutions. Perhaps they can be used only in terrorism cases, or perhaps only in terrorism cases, homicide cases, and child pornography cases. At its best, this approach would let the government use the evidence when the law enforcement need is a compelling one, and yet block government use for low level crimes when the government may be using the evidence merely to harass individuals.²²⁴

This is a possible approach, but also a problematic one. First, it is quite difficult to draw an ex ante line between compelling cases and low-level cases. We tend to know the difference when we see it, but it is surprisingly hard to draw the distinction using a legal rule. Say we are most worried about terrorism cases, and the rule is that the government can only use plain view evidence in terrorism cases. This prompts a difficult question: What is a “terrorism” case? There is no federal crime of “terrorism.” Instead, the U.S. code contains a number of criminal offenses that may be used in terrorism-related situations.²²⁵ Is any case that involves any one of these crimes a terrorism case? Can any evidence offered to prove any of these crimes justify the introduction of plain view evidence, even if not particularly probative? Given that some of these statutes are worded quite broadly, does this mean that the government can use plain view evidence simply by raising one of the terrorism crimes as one of several charges in a multi-count indictment, even if the crime does not seem to be terrorism-related at an intuitive level?

Second, any rule that hinges governmental power on the type of offense creates a strong incentive for Congress to expand that category over time, watering down the protection. If plain view evidence is admissible only in terrorism cases, for example, Congress will have an incentive to broaden the category of terrorism crimes. This dynamic has occurred in the context of the Wiretap Act, which requires the government to prove that it is investigating one of a number of specific federal crimes before the FBI can wiretap a telephone.²²⁶ The list began as a narrow list

²²³ Id. at 2184.
²²⁴ See id.
²²⁵ See id.
in 1968, when the Wiretap Act was passed. Over time it has expanded dramatically, and now includes essentially every federal felony offense that is prosecuted with any regularity.\textsuperscript{227} Why? Because there are always going to be some instances involving any time of crime in which use of the evidence would be beneficial. All it takes is one compelling case involving a crime not on the list for Congress to expand the category to include all cases of the crime on the list.

Finally, settling on a list of specific types of crimes that qualify for admissible plain view evidence proves quite difficult. It is hard enough to come up with a single rule that best balances law enforcement concerns against fears of pretextual or abusive investigations for all crimes. Coming up with different rules for different sets of crimes is exponentially more complicated. Consider the case of child pornography offenses. On one hand, fears that possession of child pornography images is linked to actual child molestation might make child pornography crimes a prime candidate for the list of offenses that allow the introduction of plain view evidence. On the other hand, child pornography offenses are the most commonly prosecuted and most easily proved type of digital evidence crimes; given the current state of law and technology, concerns about pretext searches may be most justified in the case of a government agent obtaining a warrant for a low-level crime in an effort to see if he can find any child pornography on the suspect’s computer.\textsuperscript{228} The right balance to strike isn’t clear; over time it may change; and there may be a different answer for different types of child pornography offenses.\textsuperscript{229} Courts seem poorly

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\textsuperscript{227} See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze [].

\textsuperscript{228} In a thoughtful student note, David Ziff makes an argument that might impose such a rule without a need for legal reform. See David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Executions of Computer Searches Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 841 (2005). Ziff contends that the fact that the incriminating nature of discovered evidence must be “immediately apparent” to fall within the plain view exception limits the plain view doctrine in computer searches. See id. at 869. The incriminating nature of image files such as child pornography images is immediately apparent; the incriminating nature of text-based files such as a letter would be less immediately obvious. As a practical matter, this would end up permitting child pornography images to be used as plain view evidence in every case, but would make it less likely that other types of evidence would be so used.

One difficulty with Ziff’s argument is that computer searches generally occur off-site pursuant to repeated searches on the government’s imaged copy, rather than on-site in a single search. In the former environment, data may be viewed many times by several people over a long period of time. It is unclear whether the “immediately apparent” requirement would apply to the first discovery of the data, or also to subsequent discoveries. If the latter, the requirement may have less significance in the context of digital evidence. Second, a number of courts have construed the “immediately apparent” requirement less strictly than Ziff expects.
suited to draw such lines, and legislative line-drawing seems destined to result in a broadening over time. While these objections do not rule out such a tailored approach, they provide reason to approach it with considerable caution.

3) Abolishing the Plain View Exception?

This brings us to the simplest but also most draconian approach: the plain view exception could be abolished for digital evidence searches. Courts could apply a very simple rule, suppressing all evidence beyond the scope of a warrant – or, in the case of warrantless searches, evidence unrelated to the justification for the search – unless the traditional independent source or inevitably discovery doctrine removes the taint.

This approach would permit forensic investigators to conduct whatever searches they deemed necessary, and to use General Tool or its equivalent however they liked, with the caveat that only evidence within the scope of the warrant normally could be used in court. Dragnet searches would be neutralized by ensuring that only evidence within the scope of proper authority could be used. Statutory privacy rules resembling the non-disclosure rule for grand jury testimony would presumably be needed to supplement this protection; such rules could ensure that evidence beyond the scope of a warrant is not only never used in court, but also never disclosed.

It is too early for courts or Congress to impose such a rule. Many of the characteristic dynamics of computer searches identified in this article are trends gradually becoming more significant with time. A decade ago, courts could simply and accurately analogize computers to other closed containers; today, the analogy seems a stretch; a decade from now, it will probably seem obviously flawed. Given the present state of technology, eliminating the plain view exception would be too severe. As time passes, however, I expect that to change. Decades from now, I predict, abolishing

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230 See Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note [], at 857-87.
231 See notes [] to [], infra.
232 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6(e).
233 Cf. Stuntz, supra note [], at 2184.
the plain view exception will become an increasingly sound doctrinal response to the new dynamics of digital evidence collection and retrieval.

In time, abolishing the plain view exception may best reflect the competing needs of privacy and law enforcement in light of the new reality of computers and the digital forensics process. Forensic analysis is an art, not a science; the process is contingent, technical, and difficult to reduce to rules. Abolishing the plain view exception would respect law enforcement interests by granting the police every power needed to identify and locate evidence within the scope of a warrant given the particular context-sensitive needs of the investigation. Forensics experts could take whatever steps they believe are necessary to recover the named evidence. At the same time, the approach protects privacy interests by barring the disclosure of any evidence beyond the scope of a valid warrant in most cases. It is an imperfect answer, to be sure, but may be the optimal rule. While forensic practices may be invasive by technological necessity, a total suppression rule for evidence beyond the scope of a warrant both removes any incentive for broad searches and neutralizes the effect of broad searches that occur. It regulates invasive practices by imposing use restrictions ex post rather than attempting to control searches ex ante,234 offering a long-term second-best approach to regulating the computer forensics process. It would allow the police to conduct whatever search they need to conduct (to ensure recovery) and then limit use (to deter abuses).

Notably, ending plain view would not mean that all evidence beyond the scope of warrant need be immune from use for all time. For one thing, the independent source and inevitable discovery rules would still apply to allow evidence to be used when the government could justify access to the evidence for independent reasons unrelated to the initial broad computer search.235 Under these closely related doctrines, evidence can be used and even admitted in court when the government can show that it had some independent source for the same information or that it would have discovered the same evidence through other means.236 These doctrines would ensure that the police are not placed in a worse situation by finding evidence pursuant to a broad search, but that neither are they in a better position. For example, if the police searched a computer for tax fraud, and then came across child pornography, whether the police would be able to

234 Cf. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries And Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under The Fourth Amendment, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 49, 75 (1995) ("Use restrictions accommodate the government's interest in obtaining information with individuals' interest in confining disclosure of private information as much as possible").


236 See Murray, 487 U.S. at 536-41.
use the child pornography in a separate prosecution would hinge on whether they could show that they would have come across the evidence absent the unrelated investigation.

CONCLUSION

The new dynamics of computer search and seizure teach important lessons about the Fourth Amendment. For most of its first two centuries, the Fourth Amendment was used almost exclusively to regulate government searches of homes and packages. The mechanisms of home and container searches directed Fourth Amendment doctrine to focus primarily on the entrance to the space and containers. In a world of physical barriers, action that broke down those physical barriers became the focus of judicial attention. The world of digital search and seizure shows that these choices are contingent on the architecture of physical searches. As computer searches and seizure become more common in the future, we will begin to see 20th Century Fourth Amendment doctrine as a contingent set of rules that achieves the foundational goals of Fourth Amendment law given the dynamics of searching physical property. Those physical rules will be matched by a set of rules for digital searches and seizures that attempt to achieve the same purpose in a very different factual context.

Of course, this doesn’t mean we should start from scratch. Many common principles will and should emerge. For example, the digital rules I recommend share a number of common themes with the physical rules: the exposure approach to searches offers a virtual version of the physical search approach. The two share a common definition of seizure, and both reject _ex ante_ restrictions in warrants. At the same time, the shift to digital evidence should be accompanied by an openness to rethinking other doctrines and addressing new questions, such as the scope of computer searches, the rules for searching copies, and the plain view doctrine, so as to update existing rules to reflect the environment of digital evidence.

_Katz v. United States_ famously attempted to bring Fourth Amendment law into the world of new technologies by introducing the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. The new world of computer search and seizure sheds new light – and new skepticism – on _Katz’s_ privacy-based focus. The concept of privacy doesn’t quite capture the purpose of Fourth Amendment rules, it suggests; privacy is best seen as an important byproduct of Fourth Amendment rules, not its goal. The perspective of computer search and seizure suggests that the deeper role of Fourth Amendment doctrine is regulating the information flow between individuals and the state. In a sense, the digital world of computer data is a particularly pure platform for the Fourth Amendment to operate: it offers an environment of pure data, and considers how the courts can limit and
regulate law enforcement access to that data given the practical dynamics of how the data can be retrieved. Privacy results when the rules restrict access or use of that information, but the broader question is one of regulating government access to information. The dynamics of criminal investigations in physical space offer one set of answers to this question. The dynamics of investigations involving digital evidence offer another, however, and courts should be open to rethinking the physical rules for digital searches to achieve the broader purposes of the Fourth Amendment.