A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race

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In the contemporary world the term ‘race’ is used widely both in American popular culture and in a variety of academic disciplines, and its meanings evolve in different ways in response to the pressures in each. This chapter brings philosophical analysis to bear on the debate among geneticists, humanists, and social scientists over the meaning of the term ‘race’ in a genomic age—a debate that extends beyond our immediate disciplines and into the public domain. What are the genuine disagreements and what are only apparent disagreements due to the use of different vocabularies? Why does it matter which of the positions we accept? What sort of evidence is relevant to adjudicating the claims? How should we go about resolving the controversy? In answering these questions, I develop a realist, social constructionist account of race. I recommend this as an account that does justice to the meanings of ‘race’ in many ordinary contexts and also as an account that serves widely shared antiracist goals.

I argue that in debates over the meaning of ‘race’ in a genomic age we are better served by shifting from the metaphysical/scientific question, Is race real? to the political question, What concept of race should we employ in order to achieve the antiracist goals we share? To answer this question, I contend that we must also look at the semantics of the term ‘race’ in public—specifically nonscientific—discourse, for this popular notion of race is what we use to frame our identities and political commitments. My argument is based on a view of language as a collective social practice rather than a set of terms stipulated by an authority. On this view, the issue is not whether groups of people—experts in a particular field or folk in a neighborhood—are entitled to use the term ‘race’ for the divisions in which they are interested. Of course they are: there are no “language police,” and people can appropriate and transform language for their own purposes. Similarly, what ‘race’ means outside of the stipulated meaning operative in the biology lab is not up to the biologist. Just as there is no “language police” to judge that the biologist is wrong to use the term ‘race’ in a particular way, likewise there is no “language police” or even “language legislature” to determine what a term will mean in public discourse. Language evolves in complicated and subtle ways. Thus, I argue that anyone using the term ‘race’ in public life should be aware of its ordinary meanings; and if we want to change or refine the concept of race, we should be aware of where we are starting from as well as the normative basis for where we want to go.

Race Eliminativism, Race Constructionism, and Race Naturalism

Questions of what the term ‘race’ means and whether race is real have become tied up with different political goals and strategies for achieving them. Race eliminativists maintain that talk of races is no better than talk of witches or ghosts, and in order to achieve racial justice we should stop participating in a fiction that underwrites racism (Appiah, 1996; Zack, 2002). Race constructionists argue that races are real, but that they are social rather than natural groups; on the constructionist view, racial justice requires us to recognize the mechanisms of racial formation so that we can undo their damage (Omi and Winant, 1994; Mills, 1997; Haslanger, 2000). Present-day race naturalists agree with the eliminativists and constructionists that races are not what they were once thought to be—they are not groups with a common racial essence that explains a broad range of psychological and moral features of the group’s members—but they disagree with both other views in maintaining that the human species can be divided on the basis of natural (biological, genetic, physical) features into a small set of groups that correspond to the ordinary racial divisions (Kitcher, 1999; Andreason, 2000; Rosenberg et al., 2002; Mountain & Risch, 2004), and that this natural division is socially and politically important for the purposes of achieving racial justice, for example, by enabling us to address racially divergent medical needs (Risch, Burchard, Ziv, & Tang, 2002; cf. Lee, Mountain, & Koenig, 2001).

Although the choice between these approaches to race may seem to some as “just semantics” (in the pejorative sense), the debate plays a role in framing and evaluating social policy. For example, consider the FDA approval of BiDil, a drug to treat heart failure, for Black* patients. Eliminativists, naturalists, and constructionists will have very different approaches to this decision. For example, if, as the eliminativist argues, race is not real, then the approval of BiDil for Blacks is as (un)justified as the approval of BiDil for witches. The category Black, on the eliminativist view, is a fiction projected onto the world, and the FDA has done social harm by reinforcing
the illusion that the category is scientifically grounded. In contrast, a race naturalist could support the FDA’s action—or if not in the particular case of Bidi, in a similar sort of case—arguing that racial categories map biological categories that may have significant health consequences and should not be ignored in developing new medicines. On the naturalist’s view, it is as politically important for the FDA to address the biological implications of race differences as it is to address the biological implications of any other genetic differences that have medical implications; in fact, to ignore the real differences between the races would be a form of injustice. The constructionist would disagree with the naturalist that there are natural differences between the races that warrant different medical treatment, but could allow that the social differences race makes must be taken into account in deciding a course of treatment or the approval of a drug. Although disagreeing with the eliminativist’s rejection of race, the constructionist would be sympathetic with the eliminativist’s worry that the FDA has reinforced a pernicious belief in the natural basis for racial categories. But how should we adjudicate these different positions?

**Natural and Social Kinds**

Some are tempted to view the debate between eliminativists, constructionists, and naturalists as (primarily) a metaphysical/scientific debate about the reality of race. On this construal, the question is whether races are natural kinds. Eliminativists and naturalists agree that races, if they exist, are natural kinds. Naturalists hold that races are a natural division of human beings, i.e., a division which rests entirely on natural properties of things; eliminativists deny it. Constructionists reject the claim that races are natural kinds, i.e., they allow that races are kinds, but hold that the division rests at least partly on social properties (being viewed and treated in a certain way, functioning in a certain social role, etc.) of the things in question. This requires understanding social kinds as just as fully real as natural kinds (see table 3.1). There are semantic issues: What does ‘race’ mean? Is it part of the meaning of ‘race’ that races are natural kinds? There are scientific/metaphysical issues: Is race real? Do races exist? And there are moral/political issues: How should we, as a nation, address the problem of racial injustice?

Following Aristotle, the term “kind” is sometimes used to capture the classification of objects in terms of their essence. On this view, objects—genuine objects as opposed to heaps or weird scattered bits and parts of things—are distinctive because they have an essence. The rose bush in my garden is an object because of its rose-essence; the scattering of petals, leaves, dirt, pebbles, gum wrappers, and fertilizer under it is not an object because it has no essence. The essence of the individual is (roughly) that set of properties without which the object cannot exist and which serves in some important way in explanations of the object’s characteristic behavior.

Are races Aristotelian kinds? Traditional racialists would probably think they are (Appiah, 1993, chap. 2): Whites and Blacks have different natures that explain their characteristic behaviors, and this nature is essential to who they are. However, this view is not credible at this point in time. It would be implausible to claim that an individual could not have existed as a member of a different race. In fact, people can travel from the United States to Brazil and function socially as a member of a different race; and features as superficial as skin color, hair texture, and eye shape are clearly not essential (they, too, can be changed with chemicals and surgery). If one thinks that one has one’s entire genetic makeup necessarily (something with even a slight difference from your genetic makeup wouldn’t be you), then there might be a case to be made for the claim that one could not have been a member of a different race. But essences are supposed to be rich explanatory resources for explaining the characteristic behavior of the individual, and there is no support for the idea that there are racial essences of this sort.

Locke has a different account of kinds than Aristotle. For Locke, kinds are highly unified, but not by virtue of the essences of their members. So, e.g., red things constitute a kind (their unity consists in their all being red), even though redness is seldom an essential property of the things that have it. On a Lockean view, the main contrast to consider is between “real” kinds and “nominal” kinds. Real kinds are those types unified by properties that play a fundamental role in the causal structure of the world and, ideally, in our explanations. Nominal kinds are types unified by properties that happen to be useful or interesting to us. Whether there are real kinds corresponding to (and underlying) the nominal kinds we pick out is an open question. On this view concepts or properties (and, contra Aristotle, not individuals) have essences.

Are races Lockean kinds? Can we give necessary and sufficient conditions for being a member of a particular race? This question actually opens a long debate between realists and nominalists that (fortunately!) we don’t need to get into about whether one can ever give necessary and sufficient
conditions for membership in a kind. If our goal is to do justice to our pretheoretical judgments about membership in a given race, then there are reasons to doubt whether races are definable in the sense required. However, if we stipulate a definition, either as a nominal essence to pick out a group of things we are interested in, or in postulating explanatory categories as part of a theoretical project, then the definition will give the Lockean essence of the kind.

Note that on both the Lockean and Aristotelian accounts, kinds or types may be either social or natural. Types are natural if the properties that constitute their unity are natural, and social if the properties are social. It is notoriously difficult to characterize the distinction between natural and social properties (and relations), but for our purposes we could take natural properties of things to be those studied by the natural sciences and the social properties to be those studied by the social sciences. So the set of quarks is a natural type; the set of adoptive families is a social type. Plausibly, there is some degree of unity in the members of a race, e.g., one could list a cluster of physical, historical, and sociological properties associated with each race such that members of the race share a weighted subset of those properties. If for a category to be real is just for it to pick out a set with some loose connection amongst the members, then there is a sense in which, on any non-empty construal of race, races are real. It takes very little to be an objective type in this sense.

Can “Facts” Settle the Matter?

Some may find it tempting to respond that to resolve this issue, we just need to look at the facts: either there are races or there aren’t; either races are social or they aren’t. One significant problem with this approach is that we can determine whether there “really are” races only if the term ‘race’ has a specified meaning; and what it means—at least for the purposes at hand—is part of the question. Consider a different example. Suppose we ask, What percentage of the U.S. population is on welfare? Well, it depends on what you mean by ‘welfare.’ Do we include only those who receive TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the successor to “welfare as we know it”)? Or do we include those who receive social security benefits? What about “corporate welfare” in the form of tax breaks? We ask, Is race real? Well, it depends on what you mean by ‘race.’

This is not to say that the controversy will dissipate if we only would make clear our stipulated definitions. If I maintain that 99% of the U.S. population is on welfare, then presumably I am using a non-mainstream definition of ‘welfare.’ For me to justify my claim it would not be sufficient to say that given my meanings, I’ve uttered a truth, if my meaning of ‘welfare’ is idiosyncratic and beside the point. But it may be that what I say is true and especially useful in the context of the debate in which I engage. In such a case the task of justification would be to show that my definition of ‘welfare’ better tracks what is important for the purposes at hand (Anderson, 1995).

The reason why the facts don’t settle the issue is that simply establishing that there is a fact of the matter about something doesn’t establish that it is a significant or relevant fact for the purposes at hand. Suppose I say that I’m going to use the term ‘White’ for all and only those who have blonde hair. Whites, then, are a natural kind. Turn now to the public context in which we are discussing, say, affirmative action. If I argue that non-Whites should be given preferential treatment because of historical injustice, my claim sounds familiar, but the category I am using is not the most apt for considering the justice of affirmative action. The fact that ‘White,’ as I defined the term, captures a real kind, even combined with the truth that (some) non-Whites have been treated unjustly, does not usefully further the debate because I have chosen categories for addressing the problem that are ill-suited to the task (see Anderson, 1995). Truth alone does not set us free; there are too many irrelevant and misleading truths. The choice of truths must—at the very least—be insightful and judicious.

Lessons from Philosophy of Language

So it would seem that the next step in our inquiry should be to adjudicate what the term ‘race’ means. As I mentioned before, there need not be only one meaning for the term. But for the purposes of engaging in discussion concerning matters of biological research on race, it would be useful to have a shared understanding of race. And to achieve this, we should have a sense of what the folk concept of race is. This is not because I believe that we should honor the folk concept as the true meaning, but because in any context where communication is fraught, it is useful to understand the competing meanings at issue. If there is a socially dominant understanding of race, then even if we want to recommend a change in the concept, we should know what it is.

This suggests that we must not simply resolve semantical disagreements in order to make headway in the debate. We must look more closely at our purposes and how we might achieve them: should we as biologists, social scientists, scholars, citizens, and as people who care about social justice frame our dialogue—our narratives of explanation, justification, and justice—in terms of race? And if so, then what concept of race should we employ? These questions can be broken down further:
Is there currently a single or dominant public meaning (or folk concept) of ‘race’? If so, what is it (or what are the contenders)?

In the quest for social justice, e.g., in debating health policy, do we need the concept of race? For what purposes? If so, can we make do with the folk concept or should we modify the concept?

If the folk concept of race is not an adequate tool to help achieve social justice (if, perhaps, it is even a barrier), then how should we proceed?

In what follows, I will suggest that an answer to the first question, in particular, is not straightforward; and yet if we are going to speak meaningfully in a public context, then we need to recognize the force and implications of our words in that context. In science it is commonplace to define or redefine terms in whatever way suits the theory at hand (e.g., ‘atom,’ ‘mass,’ ‘energy,’ ‘cell,’), without much concern with the ordinary meanings these terms have or the political import of stipulating new meanings. But semantic authority cannot be granted to the biologist in considering a term like ‘race’ that plays such a major role in our self-understandings and political life.

In undertaking conceptual analysis of, say, ‘Fness’ (in our case, ‘Fness’ might be ‘Blackness,’ ‘Whiteness,’ ‘Asianness,’ or the broader category, ‘race’), it is typically assumed that it is enough to ask competent users of English under what conditions someone is F. After all, if competent speakers know the meaning of their terms, then all that is needed is linguistic competence to analyze them. However, this stance is not plausible if one takes into account arguments in philosophy of language over the past 30 years that call into question the assumption that competent users of a term have full knowledge of what the term means. This assumption in particular is challenged by the tradition of semantic externalism. Externalists maintain that the content of what we think and mean is determined not simply by what we think or intend, but at least in part by facts about our social and natural environment. For example, one can be competent in using the term ‘water’ without knowing that water is H2O; one can use the term ‘elm’ meaningfully even if one cannot tell the difference between a beech and an elm. When I say, ‘Elm trees are deciduous’ I say something meaningful and true, even though I couldn’t identify an elm or give any clear description of one. The externalist holds that these sorts of cases point to two features of language that the traditional picture ignored: reference magnetism and the division of linguistic labor. These ideas can be expressed very roughly as follows:

Reference magnetism (Putnam, 1973, 1975; Kripke, 1980): type-terms (such as general nouns) pick out a type, whether or not we can state the essence of the type, by virtue of the fact that their meaning is determined by a selection of paradigms together with an implicit extension of one’s reference to things of the same type as the paradigms. For example, the marketing department and the R&D department of a toy manufacturer have a meeting. R&D has produced a new “squishy, stretchy substance that can transform into almost anything,” and they present a sample. The marketing director points to it and says, “Let’s call the stuff ‘Foam.’” Bingo. ‘Foam’ now refers to a whole kind of stuff, some of which has not yet been produced, and the ingredients of which are totally mysterious. Which stuff? Presumably, ‘foam’ refers to the most unified objective type of which the sample is a paradigm instance. This example is artificial, but the phenomenon of reference magnetism is ubiquitous.

Division of linguistic labor (Putnam, 1975, Burge, 1979): the meaning of a term used by a speaker is determined at least in part by the linguistic usage in his or her community, including, if necessary, expert usage. For example, before the invention of chemistry, people used the term ‘water’ to refer to H2O because the kind H2O was a “reference magnet” for their term. However, in cases where one cannot even produce a paradigm, e.g., when I can’t tell the difference between a beech and an elm, my use of the term ‘elm’ gets its meaning not from my paradigms, but from the linguistic labor of others in my community, including botanists. The division of linguistic labor may also play an important role if I have idiosyncratic paradigms. The idea is that what I mean in using a term such as ‘elm’ or ‘arthritis’ is not just a matter of what is in my head, but is determined by a process that involves others in my language community.

Most commonly, externalist analyses have been employed to provide naturalistic accounts of knowledge, mind, etc.; these seek to discover the natural (non-social) kind within which the selected paradigms fall. But it is possible to pursue an externalist approach within a social domain as long as one allows that there are social kinds or types, such as ‘democracy’ and ‘genocide,’ or ethical terms such as ‘responsibility’ and ‘autonomy.’

Of course, an externalist analysis of a social term cannot be done in a mechanical way and may require sophisticated social theory both to select the paradigms and analyze their commonality. It may take sophisticated social theory to determine what ‘parent’ or ‘Black’ means. In an externalist project, intuitions about the conditions for applying the concept should be considered secondary to what the cases in fact have in common: as we learn more about the paradigms, we learn more about our concepts.
Is Race a Fiction?

If we are externalists about meaning, which is the approach I am recommending, then the eliminativist about race is in a very weak position. We can all confidently identify members of different races. Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X, Toni Morrison, Oprah Winfrey, W.E.B. DuBois, Kofi Annan, Thabo Mbeki (insert here your choice of various friends and relatives) are Black. George Bush, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, Bertrand Russell, Vincent Van Gogh (insert here your choice of various friends and relatives) are White. Similar lists can be constructed for Asians, Latino/as, and other groups usually considered races. But if this is the case, then the terms ‘Black’ and ‘White’ pick out the best fitting and most unified objective type of which the members of the list are paradigmatics—even if I can’t describe the type or my beliefs about what the paradigmatics have in common are false. What that type is is not yet clear. But given how weak the constraints on an objective type are, undoubtedly there is one. The term ‘race’ then, picks out the more generic type or category of which ‘Black,’ ‘White,’ etc. are subtypes.

I believe that these considerations about meaning show that eliminativism is the wrong approach to understand the public or folk meaning of ‘race.’ It is compatible with this that we should work to change the public meaning of ‘race’ in keeping with the eliminativist strategy so that it becomes clear that the racial terms are vacuous. In other words, eliminativism may still be a goal for which to aim. But as things stand now, race is something we see in the faces and bodies of others; we are surrounded by cases that function to us as paradigmatics and ground our meanings. The eliminativist’s suggestion that ‘our’ concept of race is vacuous is not supported by the observation that we tend to think of races as natural kinds because the meaning of ‘race’ isn’t determined simply by what we think races are. So the eliminativist project needs to be rethought.

Race as a Social Kind

Recent work in race genetics and biology leads me to believe that there are no very unified natural types that are good candidates for the reference of race terms, where the reference of these terms is fixed by generally acceptable paradigmatics of each race (see Feldman and Lewontin, this volume; Bolnick, this volume). What “we” in public discourse call race is not a natural or genetic category. Rather, the ordinary term ‘race’ picks out a social type, i.e., the objective type that attracts our reference is unified by social features rather than natural ones. Let me sketch one suggestion along these lines.

Feminists define ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as genders rather than sexes (male and female). The slogan for understanding gender is this: gender is the social meaning of sex. It is a virtue, I believe, of this account of gender that, depending on context, one’s sex may have a very different meaning and it may position one in very different kinds of hierarchies. The variation will clearly occur from culture to culture (and subculture to subculture); so, e.g., to be a Chinese woman of the 1790s, a Brazilian woman of the 1890s, or an American woman of the 1990s may involve very different social relations and very different kinds of oppression. Yet on the analysis suggested, these groups count as women insofar as their subordinate positions are marked and justified by reference to (female) sex.

With this strategy of defining gender in mind, let’s consider whether it will help in giving some content to the social category of race. The feminist approach recommends this: don’t look for an analysis that assumes that the category’s meaning is always and everywhere the same; rather, consider how members of the group are socially positioned and what physical markers serve as a supposed basis for such treatment.

I use the term ‘color’ to refer to the (contextually variable) physical markers of race, just as the term ‘sex’ refers to the (contextually variable) physical markers of gender. “Color” is more than just skin tone: racial markers may include eye, nose, and lip shape, hair texture, physique, etc. Virtually any cluster of physical traits that are assumed to be inherited from those who occupy a specific geographical region or regions can count as “color.” (Although the term ‘people of color’ is used to refer to non-Whites, the markers of “Whiteness” also count as “color.”) Borrowing the slogan used before, we can say then that race is the social meaning of the “colored,” i.e., geographically marked, body (see fig. 3-1).

To develop this briefly, consider the following account. A group is racialized (in context C) if and only if (by definition) its members are (or would be) socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.) (in C), and the group is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region.

In other words, races are those groups demarcated by the geographical associations accompanying perceived body type when those associations take on evaluative significance concerning how members of the group should be viewed and treated. Given this definition, we can say that S is of the White (Black, Asian, etc.) race (in C) if and only if (by definition) Whites (Blacks, Asians, etc.) are a racialized group (in C) and S is a member.

Note that on this view, whether a group is racialized, and so how and whether an individual is raced, will depend on context. For example, Blacks, Whites, Asians, and Native Americans are currently racialized in the United States.
Social position:  

Gender  

Race  

Anatomy or Phenotype:  

Sex  

“Color”

FIGURE 3.1 Meanings given to the body generate social positions, which, in turn, produce new interpretations of (and sometimes modifications of) the body.

States insofar as these are all groups defined in terms of physical features associated with places of origin and membership in the group functions as a basis for evaluation. However, some groups are not currently racialized in the United States but have been so in the past and possibly could be again (and in other contexts are), e.g., the Italians, the Germans, the Irish.

I offer the constructionist analysis of ‘race’ just sketched as one that captures our ordinary use of the term. The social constructionist analysis of race presents the strongest conceptual framework and consensus point for cross-disciplinary and public discussions around race and genetics research. I believe it also provides important resources in politically addressing the problem of racial injustice; specifically, it gives us a way of capturing those groups that have suffered injustice due to assumptions about “color.” These are groups that matter if we are going to achieve social justice. Moreover, we already use racial terms in ways that seem to track these groups (or groups very close to them). So by adopting the constructionist account we can proceed politically without recommending a semantic revolution as well.

Conclusion

I have argued that the debate between eliminativists, constructionists, and naturalists about race should be understood as not simply about whether races are real or whether they are natural kinds, but about how we should understand race and employ racial concepts in our public discourse. I have argued that the debate cannot be settled simply by considering “the facts” of genetics, but requires close attention to the language of ‘race’ and ‘kind’ as well as contemporary racial politics. With this reframing of the question, I have argued that our ordinary concept of race is of a social kind and for a particular analysis of race that highlights social hierarchy. Given the history of racial injustice and the need to address this history, it is important for us to attend publicly to those who have suffered from what we might call color hierarchy. Since we have reason to track racial injustice, and since the naturalist and eliminativist accounts do not come close to matching our ordinary term for ‘race,’ constructionism about race is currently the best candidate of the three views considered. My conclusions are qualified, however. I do not argue that my account of race captures the meaning of ‘race’ (or what we should mean by ‘race’) for all time and in all contexts; it would be foolhardy for anyone to attempt that. More specifically, it would reveal a misunderstanding of how language, as a collective social practice, works.

NOTES

1. In this chapter, I follow the philosopher’s convention of distinguishing between use of an expression and mention of it. When a word is mentioned, i.e., when the subject matter is the word or term and not what the word or term usually means, it is enclosed in single quotes. ‘Race’ in single quotes refers to the word itself; without the quotes it has the conventional meaning. Double quotes are used for quotation of another’s text or as scare quotes. Scare quotes indicate that the author is distancing himself or herself from the choice of term and is relying on a known, potentially problematic, usage.

2. Note that the term ‘race’ did not originate as a biological term but plausibly has religious/metaphysical origins (Stocking, 1994).

3. I sometimes frame the question as whether race is real as opposed to whether races exist because sometimes the debate is muddled by those who want to allow that races exist (e.g., “in the head” or “in society”) but that they aren’t real. As I see it, if races exist only in the head, then they don’t exist (just as people may believe in unicorns, but this is not to say that they exist); and if races exist in society, then they do exist, since social categories are real. But to avoid potential disagreements over what it means to say that something exists, I’ve framed the question instead as whether races are real.

4. In this chapter, upper case is used for names of races, i.e., Black and White; lower case is used for color terms.

5. It is a controversial issue as to what counts as a “social fact” and in what sense the social is “constructed.” In my discussion I assume very roughly that social facts are “interpersonal” facts or facts that supervene on such facts. So, simplifying considerably, I am Deb’s friend is a social fact because it supervenes on a certain base set of interpersonal actions and attitudes. Others, such as John Searle (1995), have much higher demands on what counts as a social fact, including controversial “we-intentions,” assignment of function, and the generation of constitutive rules. These elements are more plausibly required in creating institutional facts or conventional facts (his standard example is the social constitution of money); it is too demanding to capture much of ordinary, informal social life. E.g., we can have coordinated intentions without them being “we-intentions”; things can have a social function even if they aren’t assigned it; and social kind membership isn’t always governed by rules. Searle’s analysis is not well-suited to the project of analyzing gender and race, which are the heart and soul (so to speak) of ordinary, informal social life.

6. This analysis is part of a larger project aiming to identify sites of structural subordination; other projects, such as those undertaking to define a basis for racial or
Ethnic identity (McPherson and Shelby, 2004) or those offering reconstructions of the notion of race (Goodey-Williams, 1998; Alcoff, 2000), are not incompatible with this.

7. On this I am deeply indebted to Stevens (1999, chap. 4) and Omi and Winant (1994, esp. pp. 53-61). I develop this definition more fully in Haslanger, 2000. Note that if this definition is adequate, then races are not only objective types but are Lockeian (social) kinds.

8. As in the case of gender, I recommend that we view membership in a racial/ethnic group in terms of how one is viewed and treated regularly and for the most part in the context in question; one could distinguish being a member of a given race from functioning as one in terms of the degree of entrenchment in the racialized social position.

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