CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Gender and Internal Orientalism in China

Louisa Schein

On a visit to the nearest city—Kaili—during my 1988 field year in southeast Guizhou, I encountered an unexpected ritual.¹ Or was it really so unexpected?

In 1986, a new six-story building had been constructed to supplement the mildewed older structure that used to house the city’s No. 1 Guest House. Kaili was, after all, the capital of the Miao and Dong Autonomous Prefecture of Southeast Guizhou province in China’s southwest, and its mountainous and scenic but barely arable terrain inhabited by several minority groups meant that its best hope for economic development was the promotion of tourism.² The new hotel complex was dubbed the Nationalities Guest House.³ Teenaged girls were recruited from the countryside to work as receptionists, waitresses, and chambermaids—and to stage culture. A representative sampling of different minorities, subgroups, and costume styles had been chosen and each employee was to wear her distinctive headdress at all times. Regular duties included not only the usual hotel drudgery but also an occasional pose in full costume for foreign travelers’ cameras, and performances of song and dance for visiting tour groups.

The ritual I witnessed on this particular day, however, was another variant of packaged ethnic performance. Kaili has also been promoted as a site for domestic meetings, and that day it was delegates to a regional conference of mayors that convened at the hotel. This group of largely male, urban conferees assembled in the open parking area to be greeted with a special form of local welcome. A glamorous set of exotic maidens, adorned in colorful garb, serenaded them with ethnic song. In an enactment of a local custom used to welcome guests from afar at the entrance to a village, delegates went through a line in which the young women popped local delica-
cies straight into their mouths and insisted they drink ritual welcome spirits out of the horns of bulls.4

At first glance this ritual seemed anomalous because it was neither a local village practice nor propelled by the simple commodification logic of international tourism.5 Yet it was part of a widespread phenomenon in the 1980s involving voracious domestic consumption of minority cultures. I challenge here the common assumption that China’s packaging and production of representations of minority ethnicity in recent years was solely a consequence of the state’s attempts to generate foreign currency by actively complying with Western (and other foreign) orientalist desires for the experience of a more plural and colorful China.6 Instead, coincident with this trend was also the rise of what I will call “internal orientalism.” This is a set of practices that occurs within China, and that, in this case, refers to the fascination of more cosmopolitan Chinese with “exotic” minority cultures in an array of polychromatic and titillating forms.7 As was the case with the Kaili mayors’ conference, these encounters were most commonly structured by a class-gender asymmetry in which minorities were represented chiefly by rural women, while Han observers appeared characteristically as male urban sophisticates. This article explores the ramifications of such uneven configurations as a means of gaining insight into China’s post-Mao social order.

THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY AND THE RISE OF INTERNAL ORIENTALISM

The decades after 1949 saw dramatic upheavals in both minority and Han Chinese identities. Han perspectives on non-Han peoples were paradoxically both oppositional and incorporative as the latter came to be partially constitutive of what was seen as the Chinese people. During the 1950s the state actively organized ethnicity by designating groups eligible for central and regional representation in government and for regional autonomy. Official recognition was given to fifty-five “minority nationalities,” including Tibetans and Mongolians, several Islamic groups, and a number of highland and lowland peoples scattered primarily across the southwestern provinces. My own research has focused on the Miao nationality, a highland agriculturalist group with a dense concentration in southeast Guizhou province.8

Altogether the so-called minority nationalities number 91.2 million persons, or only 8.1 percent of China’s total population of 1.13 billion (as of the 1990 census), but they are spread over 50 to 60 percent of China’s land area (Fei 1981, 25).9 While Han Chinese tend to be concentrated in the fertile plains and trading ports of central and coastal China, minorities occupy the strategic, resource-rich periphery to the north, south, and west. Yet despite their relatively small numbers and their spatial marginality, minorities have figured prominently in the areas of cultural policy and Chinese consciousness of self.

During the 1950s era of ethnic classification, minority cultures were meticulously researched and publicly celebrated as part of a policy of diversity within unity.10 This period was often recalled to me as a heyday of cultural pluralism, when a range of cultural difference was tolerated, even valued, on its own terms. However, from the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957–58) through the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), this policy of protecting heterogeneity was dramatically reversed with a call instead for cultural homogenization and the smashing of old ways (po sijiu). For both minorities and the Han, a more uniform socialist culture was gradually to supersede the local differences that had constituted China’s multifarious “traditions.” The legacy of this latter policy persisted throughout the 1980s, leaving many Chinese with a powerful yearning to recuperate what was lost during the ten “turbulent years.” This concern for preservation seems to have been enhanced, especially for urbanites, by the reform-era drive for “modernization” and opening to the West. Highly ambivalent, they at once hungered for the novelties, riches, and “freedoms” that they perceived as flowing through the open door and feared the permanent loss of what was seen as their essentially Chinese identity.11

The suppressions of the Cultural Revolution, then, combined with the perceived emptiness of imported culture from abroad, seem to have left a void at the core of Chinese ethnonationalism, leading individual and state culture producers to turn to minority cultures as reservoirs of still-extant authenticity.12 In what Ivy (1995) has described as “elegiac” style, this undertaking romanticized the primitive and the traditional, the distinctive and the colorful, at the same time that it essentialized and crystallized those features of the Other held to be intrinsic and tied to the past.

As Edward Said (1978) has pointed out, orientalism is productive, and what is produced are ideas and statements that constitute a hegemonic description of the object. Those represented are rendered mute while the culture of the producers of such ideas “gains in strength and identity” by contrasting with the Other as a “sort of surrogate and underground self” (3). Said’s discussion pertained, of course, to Western representations of the East, particularly to the Muslim “orient” with which his study was primarily concerned. This totalizing bifurcation of the globe into the categories of presenter-represented obscurities, as critics have begun to argue, the historical multiplicity of axes of domination, many of which, despite being non-European, were decidedly colonial and others of which were more broadly imperializing. Furthermore, it excludes the “West” as a potential object of essentialist representation, as Carrier (1992) has noted, stopping short at the conclusion that the “East” is mute and is therefore inherently
incapable of othering. Approaches such as these, as Robertson has put it, "both further privilege Euro-American intellectual and theoretical trends as universal and obfuscate and neutralize the histories and legacies of non-Western imperialisms and associated 'othering' practices" (1995, 973).

The alternative pursued in this chapter is to investigate practices of othering internal to the "East," an approach akin to Robertson's treatment of Japanese colonialism within Asia (1995) and to Harrell's treatment of "civiliizing projects" within China (1995a). This approach is distinct from another class of revamped "orientalisms," such as Heng and Devan (1992) on "internalized orientalism," Ong (1993) on "petty orientalism," Tang Xiaobing (1993) on "self-orientalization," and Chen Xiaomei (1995) on "occidentalism." These formulations stress the adoption of Western orientalist logics and premises for self-representation in the course of Asian processes of identity production—processes that are complicit, in their mimetic quality, with universalist modernizing ideologies (see Tang Xiaobing 1993). To retain the critical force of Said's original formulation, and to reference the global stage on which othering practices have been elaborated, I adopt the phrase "internal orientalism" to describe a relation between imaging and cultural-political domination that takes place interethnically within China. In this process, the "orientalist" agent of dominant representation is transposed to that sector of the Chinese elite that engages in domestic othering. In other words (Schein 1994, 1996a), my analysis also includes a vision of China as representer of the West.

For twentieth-century China, then, an internal Other (or Others), in the form of the non-Han peoples positioned at the geographic-cognitive periphery of the Chinese state, came to represent the hope for recovery of a self weakened and threatened at the center by the vicissitudes of the forgoing decades of radical change. In what appears to be a contradiction, minorities were represented by way of contrast at the same time that their customs were (selectively) appropriated and valorized as elements of Chinese culture. Fei Xiaotong, a well-known Han anthropologist, for instance, introduced a 1982 collection of minority poetry by suggesting, "Only when contrasted to the vigor and vitality of minority peoples, can one be shamed into a sense of self-realization of one's own dull and feeble character" (Fei quoted in Alley 1982, ii). This kind of statement epitomizes the sense of oppositional and yet complementary identities that Said described, but it appears to lack the kind of implicit derogation of attributes of the Other that so insidiously characterizes orientalist discourse. I argue that closer examination of the gendered content of representations of minorities reveals subtler messages underlying the purported praise of cultural difference that came to characterize the 1980s.

The remainder of this chapter explores two trajectories. One traces the prevalence and specific features of gendered images of minorities in terms of their ideological impact within Chinese mass culture. The other examines some of the particular sites of the production of such images and the socio-interactive dimensions of gender and ethnic relations that emerged in these contexts. This ethnographic approach constitutes my second modification of classical Saidian analysis. Rather than being limited to discourse and images, an anthropological method can also offer firsthand accounts of what happens at the actual sites of othering encounters—sites where difference is actively manufactured through interpersonal engagement. These instances not only result in discursive products that achieve wide circulation but also have palpable effects for the persons involved. Both of these phenomena, then—the currency of images of minorities in popular culture and the practices involved in the production of such representations—are assessed in light of their consequences for minorities, particularly minority women. My data are drawn primarily from my research on the Miao people. I concern myself mainly with the 1980s, that moment of acute flux in which the decisive close of the culturally flattening and xenophobic Cultural Revolution collided with the dramatic flinging open of the door to the outside effected by the policies of economic and cultural liberalization.

MINORITY WOMEN AND THE PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENCE

Predictably, the figure of the ethnic Other in post-Mao China was for the most part represented by a female. This was part of a recurrent constellation of features that merged femaleness with rural backwardness with relative youth (in the sense of lack of seniority) with non-Han cultures. This conflation invoked a resilient set of status relationships that, taken together, were unambiguous in their hierarchical ordering of Chinese society. As I have suggested, reading representations as texts tells us a great deal about the producers of such representations and little about those represented. Images of minority women in the 1980s appeared as contrapuntal to urban elite culture, their difference signifying both a longing for modernity and the nostalgia that that kind of "progress" so often inspires. An interpretation of these images reveals ways in which their creators positioned themselves not only in relation to minority cultures but also within Chinese society as a whole.

Not surprisingly, the oppositions of modern-backward, civilized-wild were strikingly revealed in the predictable association of the minority woman with nature. In mass media images, she frequently appeared communing with animals or nestled among trees and flowers. Around her, luscious fruits abounded for the picking. Waterfalls and streams framed carefree, laughing teenagers. Youth was stressed not only by the age of the women represented but also by their identity with the innocence of the natural.
One team that visited Xijiang was making a video documentary on atmospheric conditions and other natural phenomena in the region for a meteorology institute in another province. The “remote mountains and ancient forests” (shanshan laolin) of Xijiang and the surrounding area have long held interest for tourists and “scientists” alike. Not content, however, with nature per se, this team decided that a bevy of local maidens would be the perfect companionship for their work and the perfect ornamentation for their meteorology video. Networking the young Miao fellow who manned the Xijiang culture station, they hired four local teenaged girls to accompany them on an arduous climb to a mountain pass twelve hundred meters above the village and to be filmed along the way. The ostensible terms of employment were that the young women were to be filmic objects adorning the video product. The models were coached to look good — both attractive and ethnic. Although it was a dank, chilly day, and the mountain peaks were enveloped in thick mist, the models donned their best hair decorations and braved the steep muddy path in feminine plastic shoes with heels rather than the rubber-soled canvas shoes that peasants find most practical on slippery slopes. Intermittently along the climb, the filmmakers stopped at strategically chosen scenic spots and arranged the models with precision. The latter were then coached to perform such activities as washing in a stream or singing a Miao song as if they were unaware of the camera. The effect was to be of naturalness, the local women skillfully embedded into their wilderness environment.

Participant observation revealed another more subtle aspect of the job description of these young women. Joking and giggling characterized the mood of the climb, as the filmmakers took a somewhat transgressive pleasure in their ingenuousness. When they reached the top of the pass, the girls rested with their employers in the thick mist on an expansive level area before beginning their long descent home. The filmmakers were to continue on to a more distant cluster of villages nestled in the next valley. There, for a moment, an easy camaraderie seemed to dispel the asymmetry in their relationship. Then one of the filmmakers held out a handful of candy—a seldom-eaten luxury for peasants in this region—in what the girls took to be a gesture of gratitude and parting. But when they reached out to accept it, he snatched his hand back, demanding that they sing him one more Miao song.

In this example, minority women experienced a double objectification. On the one hand, they were arrayed among the massive trees and trickling brooks as part of the intriguing wilderness that drew urban visitors. On the other, they were treated as ethnic automatons, expected to produce folk culture at a moment’s notice for the reward of a mouthful of candy. This latter dynamic is of course ubiquitous in ethnic tourism worldwide. What I am examining here is in effect a pretourism moment in which peasants
were being socialized to commodify their culture, to regard it as a discrete medium of exchange. What happened in this case, however, was that the young women subtly resisted. They stalled, claiming embarrassment and eventually persuaded the filmmaker to give them the candy without a song. Acts such as these may be seen as strategies by which local people foiled attempts at dominant appropriation, insisting on themselves defining the contexts in which particular cultural practices were appropriate.

THE EROTICIZED OTHER: DANGER AND ALLURE

Although Chinese internal orientalism commonly represented minority women as colorful flowers among the natural flora and fauna, it just as often represented them as very human objects of erotic fascination. In many images their bodies appeared voluptuous, more extensively revealed than would be proper for a Han woman, and their expressions were unabashedly inviting. Accounts that bespoke their imagined availability abounded. In whispered lore as well as in bluntly scientific ethnographic reports, tales circulated about minority courtship practices, freedom of choice in marriage partners, and even sexual promiscuity.

Thus, the imaginings that surrounded minority women constituted a powerful attraction. Yet they were also attended by a kind of repressive fear and repulsion toward the implied baseness and breaches of morality that made these women so Other. It was not uncommon, upon mentioning to a Chinese urbanite one's interest in minorities, to be told in scandalized tones of confidentiality and admonition that, for example, the women "there" wear no tops, or that the unmarried young people are said to have socially sanctioned orgies. Routinely, tones of disapproval mixed with titillation characterized these whispered accounts.

In an insightful analysis, Norma Diamond (1988) has addressed the problem of the danger surrounding minority sexuality and marriage practices through an examination of allegations by the Han of Miao women's use of magic poisoning. Diamond suggests that the power attributed to Miao women to cause illness and even death through sorcery was a kind of projection of the fear held by Han Chinese of the perceived strength and relative freedom in Miao women's gender roles. This was profoundly threatening to the Confucian moral order and was compounded by the fact that, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, large numbers of male migrants and demobilized soldiers who had been sent to suppress Miao rebellions were dependent upon the Miao for marriage partners. The stories of poison potency constructed by the Han in this context continued into the 1980s. They epitomize the kind of mythmaking that may be generated by attempts to resolve a highly contradictory relationship in which the "Other" woman's attractiveness and sexual availability also constitute her danger.20

The 1980s, with its ostensible emphasis on diversity and tolerance, was a period filled with the excitement of breaking the taboos that had distanced the mysterious minority woman. She was brought in from the country to the city, domesticated, and made into an object of household consumption. She also became prime material for movies, television, and other forms of entertainment (Gladney 1994, 1995). One Han man, a Hunan native working as a musical director for the Guizhou Culture Bureau, conceived a "new" form of exhibition: a traveling display of words, photographs, and artifacts portraying Guizhou folk festivals accompanied by staged demonstrations—a kind of living museum. He traveled around the Guizhou countryside to recruit young people with particular talent. Once he had chosen some, he instructed them to bring with them not only their best local festival attire but also a song or dance that was typical of their locality. He then synthesized these "raw" materials into an artfully choreographed performance representing the songs, dances, and instruments of Guizhou folk life. Surrounded by tastefully mounted artifacts, the young people would do several acts a day, thrilling both foreign and domestic museum tourists who were accustomed to seeing only ancient culture frozen in objects. The exhibition traveled to major cities such as Beijing, Xi'an, Tianjin, and Shenzhen.

Although traveling minority performing troupes have been commonplace in China for decades, what was seen as novel in this one was that the performers were minimally trained peasants from the countryside, holding out the promise of authenticity and a kind of immediacy of contact whose resonances with the lure of virginity were less than subtle. The director was the constructor and mediator of these desires. Among the recruits were two teenaged girls from Xijiang. The director had traveled to Xijiang and fallen head over heels into the embrace of Miao "hospitality." At a meal prepared in his honor, the girls had proffered spirits to him with two hands and welcomed him with song. As he and the girls recounted it to me with great pleasure and affection, this treatment sent him into such reveries that he was inspired, that night in Xijiang, to compose two original songs. Their lyrics epitomize the conflation of the pastoral fantasy with romantic-sexual intimations. The first song was dense with evocative natural imagery:

I am a cloud in the sky; you are a spring in the mountain
I am mist in the forest; you are a lotus in the water
Xijiang, ah, Xijiang, would that I was a spring rain sprinkling upon your fertile fields
Xijiang, ah, Xijiang, would that I could become the morning dew to kiss your smiling face.

The second song went even further in linking nature imagery with that of romantic desire. It was a veritable catalog of the symbols most commonly
used to characterize Miao culture. Delivered as a courtship dialogue between a young man and a young woman, it bespoke a fascination with the kind of unrepressed passion that is seen by the Han as propelling legitimate Miao courtship practices. Through his virtually ecstatic lyrical creation, the director vicariously accessed the romance of companionate courtship so long tabooed among the Han.

My evocation of this sexual tension is, however, in no way meant to imply that the Xijiang girls were actual sexual playthings of their director or of other men they came into contact with in their work as traveling performers. On the contrary, they described their director as a fiercely protective father figure who cited their country naïveté as his reason for forbidding them to go out in the cities without “adult” accompaniment, and sheltered them from seeing many of the things they might otherwise have seen. He also maintained that they would be uncomfortable enduring the stares that their appearance, and particularly their hairstyles, would elicit from passersby on the street. On his part, this protective point to another aspect of the relationship, one in which he became the critical consciousness subsuming and conserving their difference and containing their allure. On their part, it reveals a powerful dilemma faced by minority women with cosmopolitan aspirations: their ability to reproduce their exotic difference was their ticket out of the village, but once in the metropolis they found great frustration that it was this difference that was the basis for their continued, enforced segregation.

The experiences of both the young women in the traveling show and those who sang and danced as part of their hotel employment reveal deep contradictions. State and dominant discourses constructed their cultural practices as what Kligman calls “cultural artifacts . . . [to which are] attributed only a historical referentiality” (1988, 259). Their valorization as constitutive of “national heritage” was also their derogation as backward and tied to the past. There are two problems with confining such cultural “traditions” to the category of living artifacts. First, doing so denies their present embeddedness in the lives of practitioners, who still see them as linked to social relations and imbued with local meanings. For minority peasants, rituals and customary dress are matters of everyday practice with their own significations, not simply vestiges of the past. Second, to cast such practitioners as “living guardians of a creative . . . cultural heritage” (260) is to freeze them in time, denying them the longings for modernity that have gripped the rest of the country. The prestige associated with symbols of modernity was no less significant in rural areas than it was in the cities, but rural and especially minority areas bore the double burden of questing to modernize while being suspended in time by the representations and implicit injunctions of urban culture.

MIAO WOMEN, AMBIVALENCE, AND THE REPRODUCTION OF DIFFERENCE

Miao women, especially when they traveled to urban centers dominated by ethnic Han and characterized by a kind of monocultural metropolitan homogeneity, experienced a strong ambivalence about the marking of their difference. Women told me of traveling to visit relatives now working in Guangzhou or Tianjin, and of the conflicts they underwent in deciding whether to put their hair up in characteristically Miao style. In each case, just out of habit, they twisted it atop their heads at first, but after enduring the curious and objectifying stares of urbanites on the street, they decided to take it down and braid it when they went out. The young women working in the Nationalities Guest House in Kaili told me that they would prefer to wear their hair down, living as they were in the city, but that they were required at work to comb it up as emblematic of their cultural distinctiveness. By contrast, when they were seen on the street after hours, they often groomed themselves to be indistinguishable from the Han urban residents in more Western clothing and hairstyles.

Depending on their situations, these dilemmas provoked two types of internal conflict among Miao women. For rural women traveling to cities for a short time, ambivalence derived from the feeling that dressing like the Han was like putting on a disguise, a kind of betrayal of self. For women working in cities, such as those in the hotels or the traveling performers, the ambivalence arose from their work that brought them to the cities and accustomed them to its ways but also required of them to maintain their otherwise as the basis for them having this work in the first place. Confronted with a larger society that lauded their difference even as it stigmatized it, the practices of Miao women in cities revealed a complex dialectic between collusion in and resistance to their representations as Others.

Urban public culture evoked in Miao women what Aihwa Ong (1988, 89) has characterized as “deep divisions, confusion, and unresolved tensions between tradition and modernity.” More recently, Virginia Cornue (1996) has documented this “confusion” as a central feature of women’s experience in post-Mao China. For minority women, the dilemmas are especially acute, for these women must negotiate not only fluid definitions of propriety in gender roles, morality, and sexuality but also the dissonances between urban Han and ethnic discourses scripting their identities.

Turning to rural sites, in what ways, then, did Miao women in the countryside come to terms with their imaging as quintessentially ethnic? The vast majority of these young women were peasant daughters living in rural settings perhaps more remote than those of most of the Han peasantry. Their interactions with Han Chinese were rare: Xijiang’s population was 99.5 per-
cent Miao and the population of the entire county was 82 percent Miao, with the Han and other minorities clustered mostly in the county seat and in a handful of spatially distinct villages. Many of the outlying villages were without electricity and, consequently, without television. Mail was delivered over the mountains on foot, and the rare newspaper or magazine that arrived was scarcely glanced at by young women because of their widespread illiteracy. Their choices to adorn their hair or wear ethnic clothing were governed by local norms that as a rule called for everyday dress of simple Miao style but did not necessarily disdain more Western-style clothing. Decisions about other practices were also influenced by local pressures to conform and were unconcerned with image management vis-à-vis the larger society. Thus, unlike in urban points of “contact,” in the countryside, Miao peasant women did not experience their actions as “minority” practices that defined them in relation to the Han.

It was only in the larger, more central villages, the sites of periodic markets or of important bus routes, that the heavier volume of traffic by Han and more cosmopolitan Miao brought a kind of self-consciousness to Miao young women. In Xijiang, a popular destination for domestic tourism, this kind of awareness was particularly intense. Young women knew that a handful of them would be chosen to pose for journalists’ cameras or to sing for folklorists’ tape recorders. Gossip circulated regarding who was picked and for what reasons. There was a range of responses to this display element of their lives. Many young women, professing shyness, eschewed cameras and other forms of scrutiny under all circumstances. Some confided indignation at being at the receiving end of such an exploitative gaze. Others reluctantly complied and were occasionally even persuaded to change into “better” clothes for photographs. A handful, however—those discussed above—routinely accepted remuneration in exchange for more formal labors in the creation of “authentic” images.

Some rural women had become so accustomed to this commodification of their bodies that they had alterations with visiting photographers. For example, three young male journalists from high-profile newspapers had requested their cooperation for group poses, in ethnic dress, that were laboriously staged. Background settings were calculatedly varied to portray, for instance, the characteristic open balcony of regional Miao architecture and alternately the cascading rice terraces of Miao mountain farms. The photographers called for frequent changes of positioning, for smiles, and for simulations of cheery interaction. When the models demanded pay before completing this trying photo shoot, the photographers balked, claiming that what they were producing was good publicity (suanchuan) for Xijiang. This, they argued, would have a larger effect, resulting in social and material benefits for the community. The models, impervious to arguments about the wider consequences of their cooperation, insisted, through their advocate in the culture station, on direct compensation. Ultimately, they prevailed.

The young women’s demands for payment revealed their resistance to the utilization of their bodies, their smiles, and their time in the service of an amorphous community principle. Likewise, they withheld themselves from the urban gaze until they were sure of remuneration. Although the end result was still the reproduction of orientalist representations, their insistence on payment may be seen as a counterorientalist practice in that it attempted to supplant a kind of colonialist cultural plundering with a more clear-cut market transaction.

Tacit forms of sabotage likewise revealed the subtlety of the relationship between reproduction and resistance. Young women hired for photo shoots would sometimes fail to show up at the appointed time, or simply not show up at all, thereby underscoring the value of their service. They dragged their feet in assuming required poses and refused to keep still, thus requiring photographers to use greater quantities of film to obtain the “perfect shot.” When posing, or particularly when asked to sing, they would burst into giggles midverse, holding their hands to their mouths and, piercing through the solemnity of the constructed moment, expose the artificiality of the context. Although by no means readable as resolutely volitional, these practices permit multiple, overlapping readings of their effects and their implicit meanings. They may be understood as attempts to personalize cultural production and to refuse to become interchangeable “ethnic automatons.” They may also constitute an implicit critique of the decontextualization of cultural forms that, to the young practitioners, were far more than fossilized artifacts. And, they had the potential to subvert an imposed labor discipline that might otherwise have effectively contained the excesses of their cultural otherness.

Lest these young women be viewed simply as cultural conservators, however, it should be stressed again that they also had an acute longing for “modernity” and attached considerable prestige to its trappings. This was clearly seen in their marriage strategies. Although subject to certain strictures of exogamy and to parental interventions, Miao young people had a considerable degree of latitude in choosing their partners. Since village exogamy was the norm, market days and annual festivals—when young people traveled out from their home villages—were the most common times for getting acquainted with potential partners. Miao young women participated actively in courtship practices such as improvised antiphonal singing between groups of boys and groups of girls at festivals, and in the more routine promenading with flashlights on Xijiang’s main road after nightfall.

But although market and festival might have appeared to provide for the unstructured mixing of all comers, young people from all over the region shared a finely honed understanding of a system that gauged different vil-
lages according to their desirability as places to live. Prized features included large size; proximity to a road and to long-distance bus routes; presence of a periodic market; availability of goods, electricity, and television; and so forth. All these features contributed to the relative ranking of villages as da difang (big—i.e., cosmopolitan—places) and xiao difang (small—i.e., stifling—places). Long-standing practices of patrilocality determined that young women would be the ones most concerned with these distinctions because it was they who would have to uproot themselves and become accustomed to living in a new place. Xijiang young women, for instance, usually said that they would never marry into an outlying village that was far from a road, but that they would consider marrying into a smaller village as long as it was along the bus route and closer than their natal village. Young women from small villages, on the other hand, wanted very much to find a partner who resided in an economic and social center like Xijiang. Moreover, even minority women in the remotest parts of China were not outside the nationwide system of valuation that attached superior status to urbanites and state-salaried workers (Potter 1983). Thus, as I have argued, status distinctions penetrated far into the rural hinterland and affected the hierarchical ranking even of remote villages.

MINORITY MEN AND SELF-OBJECTIFICATION

Rural Miao women, then, were at least as concerned with striving toward the social and economic “modernity,” so idealized in contemporary China, as they were with manufacturing their cultural distinctiveness. Where they engaged in the latter, it was often with specific instrumental intentions. But the marking of minority otherness, discussed above, was not only the consequence of the collusion between members of the dominant culture and the minority women whose images were consumed. Minority men also figured as key producers and consumers of difference. Their complicity in commodifying and objectifying “their” women as ethnic reminds us of the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity that always characterizes minority communities (Lowe 1991). The Miao and other groups are not uniform entities defined by a common identity; rather, they are internally crosscut by significant class, status, regional, and gender distinctions.

As mentioned before, the local culture station in Xijiang was staffed by a local Miao man, as was its parent organization in the county seat. These culture brokers were pivotal actors in the construction and presentation of local color for outsiders. When visitors to Xijiang wanted to organize a formal photo shoot or stage an ethnic event, it was usually to the local culture station that they directed their requests. In the course of these transactions the young culture worker in Xijiang, who had little education but some worldliness from having served in the People’s Liberation Army for four years, had been gradually socialized into the expectations of the dominant culture. When asked what skills his work entailed, he replied that he was good at finding the girls with looks (maoxiang) and figures (shencai). It was he who explained to visitors that if they wanted to photograph ethnic subjects, they ought to pay them to get dressed up. And it was he who collected the money and distributed it to the models when they were hired. The function of the culture station, as an organ of the state, was in effect to monetize relations of cultural exchange between villagers and outsiders. The agent of this commodification was, more often than not, in Xijiang and elsewhere, a minority man.

The participation of local people in cultural production about themselves should be understood, as Linda Layne (1989) has argued, as a “dialogic process.” She employs Bakhtin (1981) to examine the ways in which representations in dominant discourse are filled with local content, yielding a “more nuanced view of... simultaneous compliance and resistance” (Layne 1989, 34). It must be stressed that Miao elites not only facilitated Han consumption of their culture as embodied by their women but also engaged in a kind of ritualized objectification in which they themselves partook of reified representations of their own “traditions.” This was especially common among those who had left the countryside and — living among the majority, separated in space from their home villages—had begun to cultivate a kind of romantic nostalgia for essentialized versions of their forgotten culture. The chief symbol of this still-recoverable past was the richly adorned Miao girl, usually depicted in song. Their celebration of her as symbol has special significance because, in making her a symbol, they were claiming her as their own, as contrastive with the dominant culture rather than simply constitutive of it. The phenomenon confounds the uncritical application of Said’s orientalism paradigm in the Chinese-minority context, because it shows that (at least some) Miao were not mute objects of representation but rather were active subjects engaged in the molding of their own representation.

In 1988, members of the Miao intelligentsia in Guizhou convened the first annual meeting of the newly founded Miao Studies Association. The conference was characterized by a combination of intellectual production and cultural consumption. Election of officers, formal speeches, and presentation of academic papers took place alongside such events as a visit to a Miao festival in a nearby village, attendance at an ethnic performance in the evening, and banquets in which feasting, toasting, and Miao drinking songs were standard fare. Of relevance here, however, was the first event of the conference. When participants piled off buses or out of cars at the conference headquarters, they were greeted by elaborately garbed Miao young women who presented them with ritual spirits out of the horns of bulls—a ritual identical to that described for the non-Miao mayors at the beginning
of this essay, and one that had, significantly, become canonized via glossy tourist brochures promoting the region.

Minority intellectual practices such as these that effectively entrench status distinctions even as they purport to celebrate difference reproduce the hegemonic order that defines non-Han groups by their difference at the same time that it subsumes and appropriates such difference. Interpreted along the gender axis, the cultural politics become even more apparent, for if tradition is feminized, it is also automatically, but subtextually, devalued, since the feminine is recognized as an unequivocal signifier of subordinate status.

THE POWERS AND PERILS OF MODERNITY

My emphasis on the consumption of women in the above examples may seem overdrawn. In fact, minority men also regularly appeared in performances and images as objects of dominant consumption. However, minority women, as emblematic of the natural, the traditional, and the exotically titillating, were foregrounded in such representations, with men simply serving as a foil to highlight the women's distinctiveness and allure. This is particularly apparent in the plethora of images and accounts that dealt with minority courtship practices. In these representations the girl regularly appeared coy but sassy and inviting. The boy, often pictured gazing at her, functioned as a vehicle for the desire she provoked. In this way, minority men, in their intimate proximity to the desired object, focused and redirected the consumer's gaze from the indeterminate panorama of colorful culture to the body of the minority woman. However, what is important is not minority women as objects per se, but what they signified in the context of a profoundly ambivalent Chinese consciousness torn between the appeal of modernity and its threat of corruption. Following Lata Mani, I suggest that these women became the "site[s] on which tradition was debated and re-formulated" (1987, 153)—and in this case domesticated.

The presence of the minority woman as a colorful element in Chinese national culture was reassuring to cosmopolitan Chinese in two apparently contradictory senses. On the one hand, she was evidence of the uninterrupted existence of a well-preserved "traditional" culture in changing China. On the other hand, her intractable otherness, as Enloe (1989, 42) has pointed out for other contexts and Harrell (1995a) has detailed for the Chinese case, emphasizes the need for the civilizing practices of the "superior" Han. In everyday consciousness, these two ideologies may not be irreconcilable. One of the groups of art students that visited Xijiang achieved an apparent synthesis. During the day they searched out Miao authenticity to be captured in their representations; they painted, photographed, inter-

viewed, and otherwise documented "the past." But in the evening, they organized a party at the culture station to share a little of their imported Western culture with local youth. Cassettes of Chinese and Western pop music were rounded up, a dance floor was cleared in the one-room culture station, and the (mostly female) local guests were urged into coed dancing and entertained with performances of such novelties as Western break dancing. The urban visitors experienced no contradiction between their daytime and evening practices. On the contrary, the opportunity to act as envoys of (imported) "modern" culture further confirmed for them that they had come to a remote and backward place of difference where "archaic" cultural forms were dominant.

Practices such as these open a window onto a wide sea of cultural struggles that permeated Chinese public culture and resonated with larger global processes. The valorization of "modernity," thick with its connotations of First World prestige and an infinitude of material abundance, was not solely an elite project but rather an ideological complex that saturated Chinese society as it has the transnational arena. My charting of the representations of difference it incites departs from other analyses of the Chinese context (cf. Anagnost 1994; Gladney 1994) that portray the chief cultural struggle to be between discourses attached to the (usually post-Mao) state and local articulations or enactments of difference. Even those treatments that complicate the picture by detailing local deployments of modernizing and retrospective discourses still overprivilege the state through such formulations as "hegemony" (Chao 1996), "immanence" (Cheung 1996), or "interpellation" (Litzinger 1995). I am arguing instead for a vision of a dominant representational regime that crosses national boundaries and captures popular fancy with both the promises of the "modern" and the soothing comforts of reinvented tradition. The Chinese Party-state, as will be shown below, presented its own specific variant of this bifurcated imagery.

THE STATE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

Turning, finally, to official state imagings, one finds both echoes of and divergences from what was being produced in the more popular domain. At the core, the state situated itself as a locus of the civilizing mission and of a kind of paternalistic authority. Official policy stresses a horizontal relationship among the nationalities, each of which is formally recognized as having equal status in the Chinese polity. Representations of this type of "multiculturalism" constitute what Leong (1989, 76) calls "national image-management," which despite being primarily directed abroad also serves to indoctrinate local citizens into a consciousness of the prescribed social or-
der. To be sure, images of horizontal fraternity abounded in official culture, recalling the trope of classless solidarity purveyed during the Cultural Revolution, but significantly supplanting it (see Litzinger n.d.). Many publicly circulated images, however, upon close reading betrayed a more vertical vision of China's social order. A 1986 billboard promoting development in southeast Guizhou showed two minority women in full festival regalia standing on either side of a Han male, taller and clearly older, in urban worker's clothing. The conflation of minority with such categories as female, rural, and backward stressed the vanguard role of the Han urbanite on the road to "progress." A further interpretation is suggested by Ann Anagnost, who observes that the state, constituting itself as center, manipulates such contrasts in order to represent itself as a "modern, activist state opposed to all that is irrational, traditional and local" (Anagnost 1994, 229).

A society's self-representation as modern is often an assertion of what Laura Nader (1989) after Said (1978) refers to as "positional superiority" over those constructed as less modern. Such discourses are commonly premised on the assumption of an improved position of women in the society that is making claims to being more "advanced." In China, contemporary problems and reversals in the status of women may be glossed over by focusing attention on "Other" women putatively less civilized than the urban Han. As Nader puts it, "If progress is incremental then the place of women continuously improves, and evidence to the contrary is either minimized, or denied, or dealt with by turning the lens to the image of women in other cultures" (1989, 19). Ironically, the image of sexual promiscuity and fluidity of gender roles that was commonly used to characterize minorities was misrecognized as a mark of backwardness in an evolutionist Chinese framework that continued, despite itself, to assess "civilization" according to the fixity of Confucian gender and status hierarchies. As Anagnost points out, in the official regime of representation, that which was excluded from state-defined modernity (i.e., local tradition) was not "disappeared" but rather rendered hypervisible in order to highlight, by contrast, the civilized character of the state: "Out of these practices is constructed an 'otherness' against which the Party can exercise its legitimating activism" (1994, 231).

A 1984 poster introduced a generational element to emphasize this paternalistic role of the Party. Literally infantilized minority children, again in full festival regalia, some holding toys and some holding musical instruments, along with one or two Han, were shown playing gleefully with, holding the hands of, or even embracing a fatherly Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhu De. Both this image and the development billboard mentioned above invoked a Confucian vision of authority—the first employing the elder sibling—younger sibling relationship, the second conflating the father-child relation with that of the emperor-subject—to emphasize the ascendency of the Han state. The spectacle—from rosy-cheeked cherubs to ethnologically accurate costumery—was itself what enabled the Party to emerge in high relief, triumphant and progressive.

A final example illustrates the ubiquity of these messages. In 1980, new images began to be printed on the face of Chinese paper currency (renminbi). Industrial and agricultural scenes were replaced with two elaborately adorned heads of minority women (or occasionally men) on each of the small denominations. Passed daily from hand to hand, these diversely head-dressed, cheery tokens served to remind all Chinese of the multietnic makeup of the Chinese polity. The new one-hundred-yuan bill, however, told a superseding story. It pictured the solemn profiles—again—of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhu De. The flurry of bills barrassed the cash-user with a "cross-section" of China's peoples, but the progression from small to large denominations left no doubt as to the ultimate relations of authority.

CONCLUSION

In the representations of 1980s China, minority women were fraught with contradictions. They were both othered and incorporated, sources of contrast as well as identity. In popular consciousness they were objects of desire, but an ambivalent desire that was saturated with other meanings, particularly those concerning the tension between tradition and modernity. Their imaging betrayed the ascendency of the Party-as-patriarch over more egalitarian, horizontal visions of the Chinese social order. It was within this complex and highly charged ideological context that minority women and men colluded in reproducing their difference.

The data presented here suggest that, especially in the post-Mao period, it is possible, and indeed necessary, to talk about spheres of cultural production that may be characterized as nonstate, popular, or emerging in civil society. Although the state is, of course, a key agent in the manufacture of representations of minorities, it may be thought of as one sphere of production among others; the latter include the dominant Han intelligentsia, the minority elite, and local cultural practitioners. The interplay between these latter spheres and the extent to which their practices may be considered autonomous from or oppositional to state discourses remain to be clarified.

A second point, a corollary of the first, is that a dichotomy that would characterize the Han as representers and minorities as the represented is inaccurate. Although this relationship prevails in many of the encounters described here, minorities do also have a voice, however marginalized. In
that domain of dominant cultural production that was engaged in the cre-
ation of images of the non-Han (only one of many sectors that comprise the Chinese culture industry), many minority elites were operating, both reproducing their otherness and potentially contesting its essentialized quality. At the grass roots, as I have described elsewhere (Schein 1989, 1991), local individuals also strove to revive Miao culture and to control its presentation to outsiders. Minority self-representation, despite its frequent subsumption or appropriation by the mainstream, and despite its appearance of complicity, still constitutes a distinguishable voice and must be considered in its own right. Here, the analysis departs from Said's orientalism paradigm, in which the Other is silenced by a singular dominant discourse.

A third point—the resemblance of Chinese internal orientalism to that of Western colonialism—leaves unanswered the question of whether internal orientalist practices arose independently or were themselves imports, modes of representation that entered China as stowaways in the periods of more or less wholesale emulation of Western ways that have occurred since the late nineteenth century. Arguably, China has an indigenous history of othering “barbarian” or less “civilized” peoples that dates back many centuries (see Diamond 1988, 1995; and Dikötter 1992, for specific instances). Likewise, Western practices for marking alterity must be seen as historically specific (see de Certeau 1988, 209–43). But it is also likely that cultural intercourse between China and the West—including Chinese urbanites' avid consumption of Western arts, literature, and consumer goods, along with the advent of large-scale international tourism to China in the 1980s—has had a profound effect on Chinese styles of othering. Some of the influences may be a consequence of straightforward imitation, as in the case of artists inspired by the modernist primitivism of Gauguin (Luftin 1990, 33), and some may be the result of calculated attempts to create tourist products expressly suited to the consumer tastes of Western visitors. At any rate, the effect has been the emergence of a specifically Chinese approach to othering that is at the same time highly resonant with that of the West.

The production of difference may be informed by a logic not unique to Western orientalism. In China, the ostensibly celebratory spotlighting of minority women in all their fascinating particularity was also insistently oriental. The chain of signification that linked ethnic to female to rural to backward served, in effect, to encourage a derogated, subordinate positioning of minorities, women, and peasants in Chinese society. Moving into the early 1990s, harsh consequences in the form of economic marginalization began to suggest themselves (see Schein 1994, 1996a). Whether such orientalist representations constitute ratifications of new postcolonial forms of domination demands continual reexamination.

---

NOTES

This chapter was originally published in *Modern China* 23, no. 1 (January 1997): 69–98. Copyright 1997 by Sage Publications. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications. Author's Note: A version of this article was first presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans, December 2, 1990. Portions have appeared since then in my article “Multiple Alterities: The Contouring of Gender in Miao and Chinese Nationalisms,” in *Women Out of Place: The Gender of Agency and the Race of Nationality*, ed. Brackette F. Williams (New York: Routledge, 1996). I wish to express appreciation to the following people for providing references and comments on earlier drafts: Ann Anagnost, Tani Barlow, Susan Brownell, Kate Campbell, Stevan Harrell, Gail Kligman, Felicity Luftin, Aihwa Ong, Ara Wilson, and an anonymous reviewer for *Modern China*. The views expressed and any errors remain my responsibility.

1. Research was conducted in Xijiang zhen, Leishan county, Guizhou province, from January through December 1988, under the auspices of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad program, the Chinese State Education Commission, and the Guizhou Nationalities Institute. Shorter research trips in 1982, 1985, and 1986, under the joint sponsorship of the Central Nationalities Institute as well as the Yunnan, Guizhou, and Southwest Nationalities Institutes—were supported by a Samuel T. Arnold Fellowship, Brown University; a Humanities Institute Graduate Research Grant; a Department of Anthropology Robert H. Lowe Grant; and an Institute of East Asian Studies Travel Grant, University of California at Berkeley. I am grateful to all these organizations as well as to many local people, scholars, and levels of government within China for their support of my research.

2. Qiandongnan, or southeast Guizhou, was established as an autonomous prefecture in 1958 based on its dense population of minorities. As of 1986, Miao were the most populous ethnic group, constituting 37 percent of the prefecture population and 60 percent of Kaili's population. The Han comprised 35.5 percent of the prefecture population and the Dong followed, at 24 percent. The remaining 6 percent included Buyi, Shui, Zhuang, Yao, Yi, and several other nationalities (Qian-dongnan 1986, 1). For reasons of numbers as well as history, the region has come to be regarded as a locus of Miao identity and determinative of what is considered Miao culture, despite a great deal of variation among subgroups both within the region and scattered over the rest of China (cf. Diamond 1995; Cheung 1996). Thus, Qiandongnan is where people look to find the "typical" (diànxìng) Miao.

3. The term nationalities (mínzú) has several senses when used as an adjectival in proper names. When used for such work units as "nationalities institutes" (mínzú xuéyuàn) or "nationalities song and dance troupes" (mínzú gōngzuòyuàn), it denotes actual participation by members of various nationalities, including the Han. By popular connotation, however, it operates as a shorthand for the term shāozhōu mínzú (mi-
nority nationalities) and designates ethnicities other than the Han. In this case, it may have referred specifically to the fact that the guest house is in a minority area and may have been intended to play on tourists' presumed interest in this facet of
the exotic. It also may have indicated that the construction of the building was at least partially funded by the Nationalities Affairs Commission (Minzu shiwu weiyuanhui) as an extension of policy designed to develop minority areas. See Harrell (1996b) for a discussion of the term minzu.


6. I encountered this assumption not so much in print but in interactions with scholars and other observers of China who routinely associated the commodification of ethnic culture with the influx of international capital and the designs its advent inspired.

7. For a thorough and provocative exploration of the "semantic dimensions and political implications" of the exotic, see Foster (1982).

8. My use of the term Miao is not intended to reproduce the reification of the official category used by the state. The people who comprise the current officially defined Miao are internally diverse and are scattered across seven provinces within China as well as several Southeast Asian countries. A strong case for the consideration of such regional and "subgroup" heterogeneity has recently been made by Stevan Harrell (1990) in his study of three Yi communities in Sichuan. See also Cheung (1996) for an extended discussion of the identity politics and struggles engendered by the imposition of the state category.

9. In the 1982 census, minority nationalities represented 6.7 percent of China's population (Renmin ribao, 31 October 1990). The staggering increase in less than a decade, and the change in ratio vis-à-vis the Han, arises in part from the widespread voluntary reclassification by former Han who now wish, for various reasons too complex to explore here, to have official minority designations.

10. On this process, see Cheung (1996, 182–281), Diamond (1995), and Schein (1993, 20–100) on the Miao, and Gladney (1991), Harrell (1995a), and McKhann (1995) on other groups. For a treatment of official cultural production during this period and a comparison with the contemporary era, see Yau's 1989 discussion of the political and cultural uses of minority women in Chinese cinema since the 1950s.

11. An analysis of "cultural fever" (wenhua ren) and the rise in studies of Chinese culture in the decade after the Cultural Revolution, see Wang He (1986). For an overview of the Chinese search for "national character" since the turn of the century, see Wakeman (1991).

12. Karnooh (1982) has described a related dilemma for the elites of the Central European states created upon the dismantling of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. He suggests that they faced a crisis of national identity as they confronted their own tenuous grounding, first in imported Western institutions and nation-state ideologies and then in imported international Communism. They turned to the folklore of the peasantry as a basis for unification of these awkwardly multiethnic states that were hoping "to rediscover at the heart of the rural world the essence of [their] difference and the ultimate recourse elaborating national unity"

(100). Thus peasant creation was channeled to become a source of legitimacy for regimes caught in the contradictions of imported modernity. See also Ivy (1995) on Japanese notions of loss and the "nostalgic appeal to premodernity."


14. While what I am describing here is unquestionably a recent cultural trend, I am grateful to Bao Jiemin for pointing out that awareness of such things as minority cultures, preservation, and the tensions over identity should not be characterized as a widespread element of everyday popular consciousness in China. Rather, these concerns deeply informed certain domains of contemporary cultural production—both popular and official—and were arguably inseparable from the feverish cravings for modernity that were more dominant in everyday consciousness.

15. Rey Chow found a similar othering in the Chinese literature of the early twentieth century. She suggests that backwardness was projected onto more oppressed members of Chinese society—women, children, servants, and rural people—as a consequence of the impotence felt by Chinese literati vis-à-vis the modern West (1989, 153–54).

16. The use of the singular "minority woman" is in no way intended to obscure the unquestionable heterogeneity in and between minority populations. To be sure, there is no such thing as "the minority woman." Rather, the term is meant to highlight the ways in which the representational modes that I am discussing deftly gloss over such internal variation in their construction of a homogenized Other defined solely by contrast to the Han subject.

17. See Pollock (1987, 46) for a discussion of the association of fruit with women's breasts and genitals in Western commodity culture. This raises the question of whether these modes of representation were imports of or influenced by Western styles, or whether similar modes occurred independently within China.


19. The community of Xijiang, whose residents made it home for me for a year, was unusual for several reasons. Nestled in the remote mountains and commonly dubbed the "Thousand-Household Miao Village" (Qianjia Miao zhai), it has a population of over five thousand persons, 94 percent of whom are agriculturalists. In 1988 it was the administrative seat of Xijiang qzh, which exercised jurisdiction over almost seventy natural villages and consequently had a middle school, a government building, a small courthouse, and other state offices; it also was the site of a periodic market and the end of the line for the long-distance bus from the county seat. All this, combined with the high concentration of Miao in one locality, made Xijiang a popular destination for urban travelers. The more it was trafficked by tourists, the more its reputation as a locus of Miao cultural identity was assumed. Ironically, this led to Xijiang regularly being represented as a typical (dianxing) Miao village, despite its exceptional features. Beyond simple tourism, this "learning from the experience of real life" (tiany shenghuo), a common practice at least since Mao's Yan'an talks on art and literature in 1942 (Mao 1967, 84), and recently celebrated in the 1984 film Yellow Earth (Huang tudi), has in the post–Cultural Revolution era taken up even more than before the minority subject. This practice, under different names, may in
fact be similar to movements that occurred as early as the beginning of this century. Chang-tai Hung (1985) has documented the romanticism and "going to the people" (dào mín jiàn qù) movements among Chinese intellectuals occurred late in the second decade of the twentieth century and the 1920s. According to Hung, these movements, too, were characterized by the valorization of "rural innocence and primitivism," an interest in folklore, and a link with Chinese nationalism. 20. On the dangerous and transgressive eroticism of the Other woman, see also Schein (1996a).

21. See Adams (1996) for a provocative discussion of this dynamic in Tibet.

22. Chao found a similar move among Naxi intellectuals in Yunnan who strove to situate pristine culture in the mountains and among illiterate women "so that men and town-dwelling and lowland Naxi could be comparatively associated with civilization" (1998, 254).

23. In an extremely sophisticated reading of the 1987 cinematic event Red Sorghum, Yuejin Wang suggests that the film "and many other culturally specific texts do not reflect the appearances of a culture; they mirror what the actual cultural landscape lacks. They reflect fantasies and imagined memories—that which society expels" (1999, 53). Wang's conclusions are highly resonant with those I propose here for Chinese cultural production on minority women.

24. For a more global treatment of modernity in specific relation to the development of ethnic tourism in Guizhou, see Oakes (1995).

25. I am indebted to Judith Farquhar for this reference and for stressing this point.

REFERENCES


