Music and Spirituality

1. “Insofar as we are at all, we are already in a relatedness to what gives food for thought,” Martin Heidegger writes in *What is Called Thinking* (Heidegger 1968, 36).

2. In discussing Velasquez’s painting *Las Meninas*, Michel Foucault is very explicit about the relation of language and (nonlinguistic) art forms. This relation is infinite, Foucault writes. It is not that words are imperfect or that they prove insuperably inadequate. No, it is just that neither can be reduced to the other’s terms. To name and frame art works is merely an artifice; it gives us a finger to point with. Foucault pleads for an open relation of language to art, one that takes their incompatibility as a starting-point for speech instead of as an obstacle to be avoided (Foucault 1970, 9–10).

3. “A new form of redundancy. AND . . . AND . . . AND . . . There has always been a struggle in language between the verb *être* (to be) and the conjunction *et* (and) between *est* and *et* (is and and [which in French are identical in pronunciation–Trans.]). It is only in appearance that these two terms are in accord and combine, for the first acts in language as a constant and forms the diatonic scale of language, while the second places everything in variation, constituting the lines of a generalized chromatism. From one to the other, everything shifts . . . AND is less a conjunction than the atypical expression of all of the possible conjunctions it places in continuous variation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 98–99).

4. In some sense, John Zorn’s composition *Hermeticum Sacrum* can be regarded as the counterpart of *Black Angels*, as it is built around that other “holy” number, the six. Perhaps *Hermeticum Sacrum* can claim more rightfully the sobriquet “Devil-Music.”

5. Even Crumb denies having any deep interests in the supernatural. For him, references to the occult and other symbolism are just a part of our culture and history (Gillespie 1986, 25).

6. In *The Differend*, Jean-François Lyotard warns: “don’t confuse necessity with obligation. If there is a **must** (**il faut**), it is not a **You ought to** (**vous devez**)” (1988, 80).

7. This is one of the two inscriptions the score bears, meaning “in times of war.”

8. Becoming is the externality and exteriorization of relations, the accident that destructures the essential form and decenters the substantial subject. “If the sound block has a becoming-animal as its content, then the animal simultaneously becomes, in sonority, something else, something absolute, night, day, joy—certainly not a generality or a simplification, but a haeccty, this death, that night. Music takes as its content a becoming-animal; but in that becoming-animal the horse, for example, takes as its expression soft kettledrum beats, winged like hooves from heaven or hell; and the birds find expression in gruppeti, appoggiaturas, staccato notes that transform them into so many souls” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 304).

9. “Music is a deterritorialization of the voice, which becomes less and less tied to language . . . Voice and instrument are carried on the same plane in a relation that is sometimes one of confrontation, sometimes one of compensation, sometimes one of exchange and complementarity . . . a becoming-molecular in which the voice itself is
instrumentalized—where the instruments speak no less than the voice, and the voice plays no less than the instrument” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 96, 302–7).

10. Stanzas six and seven from the poem “The Lost Bells” by Frances E. W. Harper.

11. If I would like to bring this interpretation to a head, I could point at the fact that the 7 is mentioned first in “Devil-Music,” while the 13 is in front in “God-Music.” In the Sufi tradition it is sometimes suggested that it is in fact Iblis (Satan) who is most faithful to Allah. When Allah summons the angels to prostrate themselves before Adam because he “knows the names,” Iblis refuses, worshipping Adam (the image of the divine) rather than the divine itself. Iblis acts out of pure love and can be considered the guardian of the divine throne, the creature most intimate with the creator. One approaches the coincidentia oppositorum, either a simultaneous presence of contradictions or a violent oscillation between them (Idel and McGinn 1999, 98–99).

12. Starting from numerological connotations, the chanting of the numerals 1 through 7 (in Hungarian) in “Devil-Music” imply a certain connection with the Good.

13. In this respect, the introduction of the Dies Irae theme in Black Angels differs from the quotations Hector Berlioz uses in the fifth and final part of his Symphonie Fantastique, entitled “Dream of a Sabbath’s Night.” In the latter, the Dies Irae gradually turns into the “Ronde du Sabbat,” the circle dance of the witches, whereas Crumb seems to oppose the Latin sequence to an uncontrolled and whirling dance.

14. The Dies Irae is an integral part of the requiem, the Latin death mass. It can be questioned, however, whether the Dies Irae is befitting of the intention of the requiem, which starts as follows: “Requiem aeternam dona eis, Domine, et lux perpetua luceat eis” (“May eternal peace be upon them, Lord, and may the eternal light shine upon them”). This is in rather sharp contrast with the purport of the Dies Irae. Perhaps this is why the last lines of the Dies Irae were later added by another author. Offended by the use of the first person singular in the composition, this unknown writer added the prayer, “Pie Jesu Domine, dona eis requiem,” in order to commemorate all the souls that have died and to nonetheless wish them eternal rest.

15. The thoughts expressed in this paragraph are based primarily on Georges Bataille’s works. However, much inspiration was also derived from a book by Laurens ten Kate, De lege plaats [The Empty Space].

16. Thus, for Bataille, evil is not the breach of the rules or the norms; that would imply that evil is only a derivative of them, that the rule would be preexistent with regard to the infringement. No, with the rule the infringement is given.

17. Heidegger doesn’t completely reject the technological view on beings, but he refuses to consider it as the only possible relation towards things. Besides, technology knows its own “nearness” to things. One could for instance say that through the role coincidence, art, and play have within ICT, pure control is broken.

18. In What is Called Thinking, Heidegger writes: “pure thanks is rather that we simply think—think what is really and solely given, what is there to be thought” (Heidegger 1968, 143).

19. Heidegger calls preconceptions that indeed refer to a phenomenon but simultaneously keep a distance and stay extraneous “formal indications” [formale Anzeigen].
The phenomenon is granted some freedom, lest its explication is already ontically or ontologically decided beforehand and prematurely.

20. In *What is Called Thinking*, Heidegger writes: “‘using’ does not mean the mere utilizing, using up, exploiting. Utilization is only the degenerate and debauched form of use. When we handle a thing, for example, our hand must fit itself to the thing. Use implies fitting response. Proper use does not debase what is being used—on the contrary, use is determined and defined by leaving the used thing in its essential nature . . . ‘To use’ means, first, to let a thing be what it is and how it is. To let it be this way requires that the used thing be cared for in its essential nature—we do so by responding to the demands which the used thing makes manifest in the given instance” (Heidegger 1968, 187, 191).

21. “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry,” Heidegger writes (Heidegger 2002, 44). However, by this Heidegger doesn’t mean that all art forms are subordinate to linguistic arts. He understands poetry as a place on the thither side of fixed meanings. In discussing the poetry of Georg Trakl, Heidegger comes to the idea that the musical always already permeates poetry.

22. Projective language (poetry) has to be understood here as both speaking and thinking.

23. “Writing about music” inclines towards an assault upon music, forcing music to say what the preestablished categories and theories want it to say. “Writing around music” takes into account that music is never reducible to linguistic concepts, that language should speak about music only with the greatest reserve and openness. “Writing around music” has no clear methods, is not trying to be complete, and does not deny the existence of gaps and uncertainties.

24. Heidegger seems to be on the way to reverse the relation language-music. Language appears as a lively and polysemic texture that asks for a description in musical terms. Derrida’s deconstruction of the sign, an undermining of every guarantee of sense and reference, points in the same direction.

25. Deleuze and Guattari write, “The problem of writing: in order to designate something exactly, anexact expressions are utterly unavoidable. Not at all because it is a necessary step, or because one can only advance by approximations: anexactitude is in no way an approximation; on the contrary, it is the exact passage of that which is under way” (1987, 20).

26. *Death and the Maiden* is probably inspired by a text by Matthias Claudius, a dialogue between Death and a girl he has come to collect. Death’s response to the girl’s passionate plea to spare her is, “I am a friend, and do not come to punish—you will sleep sweetly in my arms.” What strikes me here is the reassurance that follows after an expression of fear to enter unknown places: Death asks the girl to just give up, to surrender, but without removing her insecurity.

27. “By placing all its components in continuous variation, music itself becomes a super-linear system, a rhizome instead of a tree, and enters the service of a virtual cosmic continuum of which even holes, silences, ruptures, and breaks are a part” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 95).

28. “We do not need to suppress tonality; we need to turn it loose . . . slipping through its net instead of breaking with it,” Deleuze and Guattari write (1987, 350).
29. I borrow this idea on the prefix *hyper* from Dutch philosopher Henk Oosterling.

30. In *Une pensée finie*, Jean-Luc Nancy distinguishes between “l’écrit” and “l’excrit.” The two are not opposed, but in the “l’écrit” (a writing, an inscription), the “l’excrit” always resonates as an unanticipatable and uncontrollable rest. “L’excrit” escapes any articulatable meaning in a text (any recognition, affirmation, understanding) but nevertheless cannot do without it. “Cri” and “l’excrit” go together (Nancy 1990, 55–64).

31. I am referring here to a metaphysics of presence as described by Jacques Derrida.

32. Program notes in CD booklet.

33. “The character of the *pharmakos* has been compared to a scapegoat. The *evil* and the *outside*, the expulsion of the evil, its exclusion out of the body (and out) of the city—these are the two major senses of the character and of the ritual” (Derrida 1981, 130). The pharmakos is charged with everything that is bad in a given period, that is, everything that resisted signifying signs.

34. “We hardly have logical spaces for asking if our linguistic means are genuinely at the service of the inexhaustible complexity of reality or whether, on the contrary, they are used to suppress and distort,” Gemma Corradi Fiumara writes in *The Other Side of Language* (1990, 181).

35. “What have I come to mean by surrender as of now? Seminally I mean by it cognitive love: whatever other meanings it may have flown from it. Among them are total involvement, suspension of received notions, pertinence of everything, identification, and risk of being hurt. To surrender means to take as fully, to meet as immediately as possible whatever the occasion may be. It means not to select, not to believe that one can know quickly what one’s experience means, hence what is to be understood and acted on: thus it means not to suppose that one can do justice to the experience with one’s received notions, with one’s received feeling and thinking, even with the received *structure* of that feeling and thinking: it means to meet, whatever it be, as much as possible in its originariness, its itself-ness” (Wolff 1976, 20).

36. Stanzas 13 and 14 from “The Lost Bells.”

37. In *The Wisdom of Insecurity*, Alan W. Watts describes the unknown as the real present in which we live, the unknown in the midst of coming into being. Therefore, the unknown cannot be avoided and nothing can be ultimately fixed: "to define is to isolate, to separate some complex of forms from the stream of life . . . Because it is the use and nature of words and thoughts to be fixed, definite, isolated, it is extremely hard to describe the most important characteristic of life—its movement and fluidity . . . Part of man’s frustration is that he has become accustomed to expect language and thought to offer explanations which they cannot give. To want life to be ‘intelligible’ in this sense is to want it to be something other than life . . . If we want to keep the old language, still using terms as ‘spiritual’ and ‘material,’ the spiritual must mean ‘the indefinable,’ that which, because it is living, must ever escape the framework of any fixed form” (Watts 1951, 46–48, 71).

38. Two remarks should be made here. First, St. Augustine already recognized some demonic power in music, experiencing that it always already escapes the frames of discursive language. Second, by pointing toward a prethematic space and preestablished
identities, I seem to be approaching Lyotard’s ideas on postmodernism. The way he understands postmodernism is that instance of instability “prior” to the concretization of rules. Each event has an undirected trajectory within an infinite flux of data or a multiplicity of contexts until it is linked to a grand narrative, that is, until it is included in categories and submitted to preestablished frameworks. Much in the same way as Lyotard reaches the conclusion that an event (art) is postmodern before it is modern, I would say that music discloses a spiritual trace before it is included in musicological or music theoretical grand narratives.

39. The possibility of spirituality can only be kept through the possibility of repetition, mechanization, automation—an alliance with exactly those technologies that humiliate spirituality. Derrida’s logic starts from the idea that the spiritual necessarily has to appear in the form of “something” that immediately alienates it from its spiritual dimension.

40. The idea of paraspirituality is grafted onto Taylor’s reflections on the “para/sacred” and I paraphrase his thoughts to make them productive for music.

41. Bataille generally describes the profane world as the order of utility, instrumentality, or finality. For the human being who tries to make the surrounding world subservient to his use, to live means first of all to survive. In order to survive, he must submit the world to his needs. The point, however, is that by doing this, Man submits himself to the order of use and usefulness. By reducing existence to the order of utility and finality, Man indirectly submits himself to that which he tried to submit in the first place. According to Bataille, the use Man makes of his surroundings (goods as well as fellow men) doesn’t do justice to this; actually, use is misuse! The spiritual refers to the borderlines of the order of utility (ten Kate 1994, 436–37).

42. The meaning of spirituality is not “a divine origin” or “founded in God’s will”; here, spirituality, first of all, opposes a desire that is economically based and structured.

43. The three letters g, o, and d become an empty space; everybody can use them. There is no fixed owner of this “name,” neither in the form of a person nor an idea (ten Kate 1994, 517).

44. According to Nancy (following Antoine Bonnet), timbre can be called “the real” of music. At the same time (and perhaps because of this) it resists, unlike other musical parameters, any notation, both in a score and in language (Nancy 2002, 76–82).

45. “That matter appears to escape determination by concepts because it is rigorously (and not exactly) singular: its quality depends perhaps on a constellation of conceivable parameters, but this constellation, the one which takes place now, cannot be anticipated, foreseen” (Lyotard 1991, 155).

REFERENCES


