have it. In view of all this, how could (we expect) there to be any conformity with the truth? Thus, renown results from hidden causes and does not conform (to reality). Things that result from hidden causes are what we express by the word "luck," as has been established.

[36] Taxation and the reason for low and high (tax revenues).

It should be known that at the beginning of the dynasty, taxation yields a large revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from large assessments.

The reason for this is that when the dynasty follows the ways (sunan) of the religion, it imposes only such taxes as are stipulated by the religious law, such as charity taxes, the land tax, and the poll tax. They mean small assessments, because, as everyone knows, the charity tax on property is low. The same applies to the charity tax on grain and cattle, and also to the poll tax, the land tax, and all other taxes required by the religious law. They have fixed limits that cannot be overstepped.

When the dynasty follows the ways of group feeling and (political) superiority, it necessarily has at first a desert attitude, as has been mentioned before. The desert attitude requires kindness, reverence, humility, respect for the property of other people, and disinclination to appropriate it, except in rare instances. Therefore, the individual imposts and assessments, which together constitute the tax revenue, are low. When tax assessments and imposts upon the subjects are low, the latter have the energy and desire to do things. Cultural enterprises grow and increase, because the low taxes

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649 That is, on holdings of gold and silver and goods.
650 This would seem to be in contradiction with what was said earlier about the capacity of "the Arabs." Cf. 1:302 ff., above. However, to Ibn Khaldūn "desert attitude" rather signifies the good side of nomadism. Cf. also p. 122, below.
bring satisfaction. When cultural enterprises grow, the number of individual imposts and assessments mounts. In consequence, the tax revenue, which is the sum total of (the individual assessments), increases.

When the dynasty continues in power and their rulers follow each other in succession, they become sophisticated. The Bedouin attitude and simplicity lose their significance and the Bedouin qualities of moderation and restraint disappear. Royal authority with its tyranny, and sedentary culture that stimulates sophistication, make their appearance. The people of the dynasty then acquire qualities of character related to cleverness. Their customs and needs become more varied because of the prosperity and luxury in which they are immersed. As a result, the individual imposts and assessments upon the subjects, agricultural laborers, farmers, and all the other taxpayers, increase. Every individual impost and assessment is greatly increased, in order to obtain a higher tax revenue. Customs duties are placed upon articles of commerce and (levied) at the city gates, as we shall mention later.\(^\text{651}\) Then, gradual increases in the amount of the assessments succeed each other regularly, in correspondence with the gradual increase in the luxury customs and many needs of the dynasty and the spending required in connection with them. Eventually, the taxes will weigh heavily upon the subjects and overburden them. Heavy taxes become an obligation and tradition, because the increases took place gradually, and no one knows specifically who increased them or levied them. They lie upon the subjects like an obligation and tradition.

The assessments increase beyond the limits of equity. The result is that the interest of the subjects in cultural enterprises disappears, since when they compare expenditures and taxes with their income and gain and see the little profit they make, they lose all hope. Therefore, many of them refrain from all cultural activity. The result is that the total ta

\(^{651}\) In the following section.
revenue goes down, as (the number of) the individual assessments goes down. Often, when the decrease is noticed, the amounts of individual imposts are increased. This is considered a means of compensating for the decrease. Finally, individual imposts and assessments reach their limit. It would be of no avail to increase them further. The costs of all cultural enterprise are now too high, the taxes are too heavy, and the profits anticipated fail to materialize. Thus, the total revenue continues to decrease, while the amounts of individual imposts and assessments continue to increase, because it is believed that such an increase will compensate (for the drop in revenue) in the end. Finally, civilization is destroyed, because the incentive for cultural activity is gone. It is the dynasty that suffers from the situation, because it (is the dynasty that) profits from cultural activity.

If (the reader) understands this, he will realize that the strongest incentive for cultural activity is to lower as much as possible the amounts of individual imposts levied upon persons capable of undertaking cultural enterprises. In this manner, such persons will be psychologically disposed to undertake them, because they can be confident of making a profit from them.

God owns all things.

In the later (years) of dynasties, customs duties are levied.

It should be known that at the beginning, dynasties maintain the Bedouin attitude, as we have stated. Therefore, they have few needs, since luxury and the habits that go with it do not (yet) exist. Expenses and expenditures are small. At that time, revenue from taxes pays for much more than the necessary expenditures, and there is a large surplus.

The dynasty, then, soon starts to adopt the luxury and luxury customs of sedentary culture, and follows the course that had been taken by previous dynasties. The result is that

\^[37\] In the later (years) of dynasties, customs duties are levied.

\[^{89}\] Cf. p. 89, above.

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the expenses of the people of the dynasty grow. Especially do the expenses of the ruler mount excessively, on account of his expenditures for his entourage and the great number of allowances he has to grant. The (available) revenue from taxes cannot pay for all that. Therefore, the dynasty must increase its revenues, because the militia needs (ever) larger allowances and the ruler needs (ever) more money to meet his expenditures. At first, the amounts of individual imposts and assessments are increased, as we have stated. Then, as expenses and needs increase under the influence of the gradual growth of luxury customs and additional allowances for the militia, the dynasty is affected by senility. Its people are too weak to collect the taxes from the provinces and remote areas. Thus, the revenue from taxes decreases, while the habits (requiring money) increase. As they increase, salaries and allowances to the soldiers also increase. Therefore, the ruler must invent new kinds of taxes. He levies them on commerce. He imposes taxes of a certain amount on prices realized in the markets and on the various (imported) goods at the city gates. (The ruler) is, after all, forced to this because people have become spoiled by generous allowances, and because of the growing numbers of soldiers and militiamen. In the later (years) of the dynasty, (taxation) may become excessive. Business falls off, because all hopes (of profit) are destroyed, permitting the dissolution of civilization and reflecting upon (the status of) the dynasty. This (situation) becomes more and more aggravated, until (the dynasty) disintegrates.

Much of this sort happened in the Eastern cities during the later days of the 'Abbāsid and 'Ubaydīd(-Fātimid) dynasties. Taxes were levied even upon pilgrims making the pilgrimage. Šalâh-ad-dīn Ibn Ayyûb abolished all such institutions and replaced them with good works. The same also happened in Spain at the time of the reyes de taifas.

683 Cf. also 1:340 f., above.
684a The first part of the sentence refers to a sales tax, the second to a levy on imported merchandise.
Commercial Activity on the Part of the Ruler

Yûsuf b. Tâshfin, the Almoravid amir, put an end to it. The same has also been happening in the cities of the Jarîd in Ifrîqiyyah, ever since their chiefs gained control over them.654 God "is kind to His servants." 655

[ 38 ] Commercial activity on the part of the ruler is harmful to his subjects and ruinous to the tax revenue.656

It should be known that a dynasty may find itself in financial straits, as we have mentioned before, on account of its luxury and the number of (its luxurious) habits and on account of its expenditures and the insufficiency of the tax revenue to pay for its needs and expenditures. It may need more money and higher revenues. Then, it sometimes imposes customs duties on the commercial activities of (its) subjects, as we have mentioned in the previous section. Sometimes, it increases the kinds of customs duties, if (customs duties as such) had been introduced before. Sometimes, it applies torture to its officials and tax collectors and sucks their bones dry (of a part of their fortune). (This happens) when officials and tax collectors are observed to have appropriated a good deal of tax money, which their accounts do not show.657

Sometimes, the ruler himself may engage in commerce and agriculture, from desire to increase (his) revenues. He sees that merchants and farmers make (great) profits and have plenty of property. (He sees) that their gains correspond to the capital they invest. Therefore, he starts to acquire livestock and fields in order to cultivate them for profit, purchase goods, and (enter business and) expose himself to

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654 This refers to the reign of the Ḥafṣid Abû Bakr, down to the time of the restoration of Ḥafṣid power under Abû 1-Abbâs. Cf. "Ibar, VI, 587; de Slane (tr.), III, 91. Cf. also pp. 116 and 304, below.
655 Qur'ân 42.19 (18).
657 Cf. pp. 123 f., below.
fluctuations of the market. He thinks that this will improve (his) revenues and increase (his) profits.

However, this is a great error. It causes harm to the subjects in many ways. First, farmers and merchants will find it difficult to buy livestock and merchandise and to procure cheaply the things that belong to (farming and commerce). The subjects have (all) the same or approximately the same amount of wealth. Competition between them already exhausts, or comes close to exhausting, their financial resources. Now, when the ruler, who has so much more money than they, competes with them, scarcely a single one of them will (any longer) be able to obtain the things he wants, and everybody will become worried and unhappy.

Furthermore, the ruler can appropriate much of (the agricultural products and the available merchandise), if it occurs to him. (He can do it) by force, or by buying things up at the cheapest possible price. Further, there may be no one who would dare to bid against him. Thus, he will be able to force the seller to lower his price. Further, when agricultural products such as corn, silk, honey, sugar, and other kinds of agricultural products, or goods of any kind, become available, the ruler cannot wait for a (favorable) market and a boom, because he has to take care of government (needs). Therefore, he forces the merchants or farmers who deal in these particular products to buy from him. He will be satisfied only with the highest prices and more. (The merchants and farmers, on the other hand), will exhaust their liquid capital in such transactions. The merchandise they thus acquire will remain useless on their hands. They themselves will no longer be able to trade, which is what enables them to earn something and make their living. Often, they need money. Then, they have to sell the goods (that they were forced to buy from the ruler), at the lowest prices, during a slump in the market. Often, the merchant or farmer has to do the same thing over again. He thus exhausts his capital and has to go out of business.\footnote{Cf. also pp. 109 f., below.}
Commercial Activity on the Part of the Ruler

This becomes an often repeated process. The trouble and financial difficulties and the loss of profit which it causes the subjects, takes away from them all incentives to effort, thus ruining the fiscal (structure). Most of the revenue from taxes comes from farmers and merchants, especially once customs duties have been introduced and the tax revenue has been augmented by means of them. Thus, when the farmer gives up agriculture and the merchant goes out of business, the revenue from taxes vanishes altogether or becomes dangerously low.

Were the ruler to compare the revenue from taxes with the small profits (he reaps from trading himself), he would find the latter negligible in comparison with the former. Even if (his trading) were profitable, it would still deprive him of a good deal of his revenue from taxes, so far as commerce is concerned. It is unlikely that customs duties might be levied on (the ruler’s commercial activities). If, however, the same deals were made by others (and not by the ruler), the customs duties (levied in connection with them) would be included in the tax total.

Furthermore, (the trading of the ruler) may cause the destruction of civilization and, through the destruction and decrease of (civilization), the disintegration of the dynasty. When the subjects can no longer make their capital larger through agriculture and commerce, it will decrease and disappear as the result of expenditures. This will ruin their situation. This should be understood.

The Persians made no one king except members of the royal house. Further, they chose him from among those (members of the royal house) who possessed virtue, religion, education, liberality, bravery, and nobility. Then, they stipulated in addition that he should be just. Also, he was not to take a farm, as this would harm his neighbors. He was not to engage in trade, as this would of necessity raise the prices of all goods. And he was not to use slaves as servants, since they would not give good and beneficial advice.

It should be known that the finances of a ruler can be in-
creased, and his financial resources improved, only through the revenue from taxes. (The revenue from taxes) can be improved only through the equitable treatment of people with property and regard for them. This makes their hopes rise, and they have the incentive to start making their capital bear fruit and grow. This, in turn, increases the ruler’s revenues in taxes. Other (measures) taken by the ruler, such as engaging in commerce or agriculture, soon turn out to be harmful to the subjects, to be ruinous to the revenues, and to decrease cultural activity.

Amirs and other men in power in a country who engage in commerce and agriculture, reach a point where they undertake to buy agricultural products and goods from their owners who come to them, at prices fixed by themselves as they see fit. Then, they resell these things to the subjects under their control, at the proper times, at prices fixed by themselves. This is even more dangerous, harmful, and ruinous for the subjects than the afore-mentioned (procedure). The ruler is often influenced to choose such a (course) by that sort of people—I mean, merchants and farmers—who bring him into contact with the profession in which they have been reared. They influence the ruler to choose this (course). They work with him, but for their own profit, to garner quickly as much money as they may wish, especially through profits reaped from doing business without having to pay taxes and customs duties. Exemption from taxes and customs duties is more likely than anything else to cause one’s capital to grow, and it brings quick profits. These people do not understand how much damage is caused the ruler by each decrease in the revenue from taxes. The ruler, therefore, must guard against such persons, and not pay any attention to suggestions that are harmful to his revenues and his rule.

May God inspire us to choose the right course for ourselves, and may He make us profit from our beneficial actions. There is no Lord except Him.
The ruler and his entourage are wealthy only in the middle (period) of the dynasty.

The reason for this is that at the beginning of the dynasty, the revenues are distributed among the tribe and the people who share in the ruler's group feeling, in accordance with their usefulness and group feeling and because they are needed to establish the dynasty, as we have stated before. Under these circumstances, their leader refrains in their favor from (claiming) the revenues which they would like to have. He feels compensated for (his restraint) by the control over them that he hopes to establish. They can put pressure on him, and he needs them. His share of the revenues is restricted to the very small (amounts) he needs. Consequently, the members of his entourage and company, his wazirs, secretaries, and clients, usually can be observed to be destitute. Their position is restricted, because it depends on the position of their master, and the authority of (his position) is narrowed down by the competition of the people who share in his group feeling.

Then, when royal authority has come into its own and the ruler has obtained control over his people, he prevents them from getting (any part of) the revenues, beyond their official shares. Their portions shrink, because their usefulness to the dynasty has diminished. Their influence has been checked, and clients and followers have come to share with them in the support of the dynasty and the establishment of its power. At this time, the ruler disposes alone of the whole income from taxes, or the greater part of it. He keeps this money, and holds it for spending on important projects. His wealth grows. His treasuries are filled. The authority of his position expands, and he dominates all his people. As a consequence, the men of his entourage and retinue, the wazir, the secretary, the doorkeeper (ḥājib), the client, and the policeman, all be-

659 Bulaq: "the members of the tribe."
660 Cf., for instance, 1:359, above.
come more important, and their positions expand. They acquire property and enrich themselves.

Then, when the dynasty starts to become senile, as the result of the dissolution of group feeling and the disappearance of the tribe that founded it, the ruler needs supporters and helpers, because there are then many seceders, rivals, and rebels, and there is the fear of (complete) destruction. His revenues then go to his allies and supporters, military men who have their own group feelings. He spends his treasures and revenues on attempts to restore (the power of) the dynasty.\footnote{The idea of "restoration" is not found in the text of Bulaq.} Moreover, the revenue from taxes decreases, as we have stated before,\footnote{Cf. p. 92, above.} because there are many allowances to be paid and expenditures to be made. The revenues from the land tax decrease. The dynasty's need for money becomes more urgent. The intimates, the doorkeepers (ḥājib), and the secretaries no longer live under the shadow of prosperity and luxury, as their positions lose importance and the authority of the ruler's (position) shrinks.

The ruler's need for money at this time becomes even more urgent. The new generation within his inner circle and entourage spend the money with which their fathers had enriched themselves, for a purpose for which it was not intended, namely, that of helping the ruler. They begin to be no longer as sincerely loyal as their fathers and ancestors had been. The ruler, in turn; becomes of the opinion that he is more entitled than they to the wealth that was acquired (by their fathers) during the reign of his predecessors and with the help of their position. He takes it and appropriates it for himself, gradually (and) according to their ranks. (As a result,) the dynasty becomes detestable\footnote{A. Schimmel, \textit{Ibn Chaldun} (Tübingen, 1951), p. 134: "is unfriendly . . ."} to them, and, in turn, it is the dynasty that suffers therefrom. It loses its entourage and great personalities and its rich and wealthy intimates. A great part of the edifice of glory crumbles, after
having been supported and built up to a great height by those who shared in it.

One may compare what happened in this regard to the 'Abbāsid wazirs, such as the Banū Qahtabah, the Barmecides, the Banū Sahl, the Banū Ṭāhir, and others. One may further (compare) what happened at the time of the dissolution of the Umayyad dynasty in Spain in the days of the reyes de taifas, to the Banū Shuhayd, the Banū Abī 'Abdah, the Banū Ḥudayr, the Banū Burd, and others. The same is happening in the dynasty we have lived to see in our own time. "This is how God proceeds. . . . And verily, you will not be able to change God's way." 664

Anticipating such dangerous situations, most of the people in the dynasty try to avoid holding any government position. They try to escape from government control and go to some other region with the government property they have acquired. They are of the opinion that (to do) this will be more wholesome for them and give them the opportunity to spend and enjoy (their money) in greater safety. This assumption is a great mistake and a self-deception that will ruin them materially.

It should be known that it is difficult and impossible to escape (from official life) after having once been in it. When the person who has such intentions is the ruler himself, his subjects and the people who share in his group feeling and crowd around him will not for a moment permit him to escape. If any such (intention) on his part becomes visible, it means the destruction of his realm and the ruin of himself. (This would be) the usual result in such a case, for it is difficult to escape from the servitude of royal authority, especially when the dynasty has reached its peak and its authority is shrinking, and it is becoming more remote from glory and good qualities, and acquiring bad qualities.

If the person who intends to escape is one of the ruler's

664 Qur'an 33.62 (62); 35.43 (41); 48.25 (25).
inner circle and entourage or one of the dignitaries in his dynasty, he rarely is given the opportunity to do so. The reason is, in the first place, that rulers consider their people and entourage and, indeed, all their subjects as slaves familiar with their thoughts and sentiments. Therefore, they are not disposed to loosen the bonds of servitude binding the person (who may have the desire to escape). They want to avoid the chance that someone (outside) might come to know (their secrets) and their circumstances (through that person), and they are averse to letting him become the servant of others.

The Spanish Umayyads thus prevented their people from going abroad to fulfill the duty of the pilgrimage. They were afraid they might fall into the hands of the 'Abbásids. During all their days, none of their people made the pilgrimage. The pilgrimage was (again) permitted to (Spaniards) who belonged to the (various) dynasties in Spain, only after the Umayyad rule had come to an end and (Spain) had reverted to control of the reyes de taifas.

In the second place, even if rulers were kind enough to loosen the bonds (of a person who intended to escape from their control), their kindness would not extend to leaving his property alone. They consider it part of their own wealth—in the same way that its owner has been part of their dynasty—in as much as it was obtained only through the dynasty and under the shadow of its authority. Therefore, they are most eager to take his property and to let it remain as it is, as something belonging to the dynasty that they (are entitled to) use.

Furthermore, assuming that he gets away with his property to some other region, which happens in very rare cases, (he is not safe there either, because) the eyes of the rulers in that region fall on him, and they deprive him of (his property) by indirect threats and intimidation or by open force. They consider (his property) as revenue or as government property, which should be spent in the public interest. If the eyes of (rulers) can fall upon rich and wealthy people who have acquired their money in the exercise of a profession,
as we have mentioned, \textsuperscript{666} it is all the more understandable that their eyes can fall upon tax monies and government property, to which they have access by law and custom.

One may compare what happened to the Judge of Jabalah.\textsuperscript{666} He had revolted against Ibn 'Aminār, the master of Tripoli. The European Christians took Jabalah away from him. He fled to Damascus and then to Baghdad, which was under the rule of Sultan Barkiyārūq b. Malikshāh. That was at the end of the fifth [eleventh] century. The wazir of the Sultan went to the Judge of Jabalah and borrowed most of his money from him. Then, they cleaned him out completely. It was an inestimable amount.

Sultan Abū Yahyā Zakariyā' b. Aḥmad al-Lihyānī, the ninth or the tenth of the Ḥafṣid rulers in Ifriqiyyah,\textsuperscript{667} intended to get away from the responsibility of royal authority and to go to Egypt. He wanted to escape the ruler of the western border regions when (the latter) prepared for a raid on Tunis. (Ibn) al-Lihyānī, therefore, pretended to make a trip to the border region of Tripoli, in order to conceal the preparations (for his escape). There, he boarded ship and escaped to Alexandria. He had taken with him all the property and treasures he found in the treasury, and he had sold all the furniture, real property, and jewelry in the Ḥafṣid treasuries, even including the books. He took all that along with him to Egypt. He took up residence with al-Malik an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalâ‘ūn in the year 719 [1319].\textsuperscript{668} (Al-Malik an-Nāṣir)

\textsuperscript{666} Ibn Khaldūn probably refers to what he said on pp. 93 f.

\textsuperscript{667} The name of the Judge of Jabalah (south of Lattakiyah; cf. 1:148, above) was 'Ubaydallāh b. Masūr Ibn Ṣutayyāh, and the events referred to took place in 149 [1101] according to Ibn Khaldūn's source, Ibn al-Athīr, Kadh. X, 128 f., quoted again in 'Ibar, V, 185 f. The name of the wazir was al-A'azz Abū l-Maḥāsīn 'Abd-al-Jalīl b. Muḥammad, who died shortly afterwards, in 496 [1101].

\textsuperscript{668} On the numbering of the Ḥafṣids, see n. 155 to this chapter, and pp. 17, 72, above; pp. 116 222, below. Abū Yahyā reigned from 1311 until 1317, when his rule began to crumble under the onslaught of Abū Bakr [1318-1346], and he left the country in 718 [1318]. His death is usually assumed to have occurred in 797 [1396], a year earlier than Ibn Khaldūn puts it. Cf. R. Brunschwig, \textit{La Berbérie orientale}, I, 142 f.

\textsuperscript{668} Wrongly, Bulaq has 717.
Chapter III: Sections 39, 40, and 41

II, 92 treated him hospitably and gave him a place of honor. But he did not cease to deprive him of his treasure, gradually, by indirect demands, until he had gotten it all. The only livelihood remaining to Ibn al-Lihyānī was the salary that al-Malik an-Nāṣir granted him until his death in 728 [1327/28], as we shall mention in his history.669

This and similar things belong among the delusions to which the people of dynasties fall prey, when they suspect that the ruler is a danger to them. They may indeed escape with their lives, if they succeed in escaping. But to imagine that it is a necessity is an erroneous and baseless assumption. The renown they obtain in government service suffices for them to find livelihoods for themselves, either in the form of a salary paid by a ruler or in the form of a position in the profitable exercise of commerce and agriculture. Dynasties are (inter)related,670 but

The soul is ambitious, if it is given the opportunity.671

But if it is reduced to little, it is satisfied.

God "gives sustenance. He is strong and solid." 672

[ 40 ] Curtailment of the allowances given by the ruler implies curtailment of the tax revenue.

The 673 reason for this is that dynasty and government serve as the world’s greatest market place,674 providing the substance of civilization. Now, if the ruler holds on to property and revenue, or they are lost or not properly used by him, then the property in the possession of the ruler’s en-

669 Cf. ‘Ibar, VI, 930 f.; de Slane (tr.), II, 452 f.
670 Therefore, they always take care of their people.
672 Qur‘ān 51.58 (58).
673 Cf. Issawi, p. 91.
674 Cf. 1:46 f., above, and pp. 287 and 352, below.
tourage 675 will be small. The gifts which they, in their turn, had been used to give to their entourage and people, stop, and all their expenditures are cut down. They constitute the greatest number of people (who make expenditures), and their expenditures provide more of the substance of trade than (the expenditures of) any other (group of people). Thus (when they stop spending), business slumps and commercial profits decline because of the shortage of capital. Revenues from the land tax decrease, because the land tax and taxation (in general) depend on cultural activity, commercial transactions, business prosperity, and the people’s demand for gain and profit. It is the dynasty that suffers from the situation and that has a deficit, because under these circumstances the property of the ruler decreases in consequence of the decrease in revenues from the land tax. As we have stated, the dynasty is the greatest market, the mother and base of all trade. (It is the market that provides) the substance of income and expenditures (for trade). If government business slumps and the volume of trade is small, the dependent markets will naturally show the same symptoms, and to a greater degree. Furthermore, money circulates between subjects and ruler, moving back and forth. Now, if the ruler keeps it to himself, it is lost to the subjects.

This is how God proceeds with His servants.

[ 41 ] Injustice brings about the ruin of civilization.

676 It should be known that attacks on people’s property remove the incentive to acquire and gain property. People, then, become of the opinion that the purpose and ultimate destiny of (acquiring property) is to have it taken away from them. When the incentive to acquire and obtain property is gone, people no longer make efforts to acquire any. The extent and degree to which property rights are infringed upon determines the extent and degree to which the efforts of the subjects to acquire property slacken. When attacks (on

675 Bulaq adds: “and militia.”
676 Cf. Issawi, pp. 84 f.
property) are extensive and general, extending to all means of making a livelihood, business inactivity, too, becomes (general), because the general extent of (such attacks upon property) means a general destruction of the incentive (to do business). If the attacks upon property are but light, the stoppage of gainful activity is correspondingly slight. Civilization and its well-being as well as business prosperity depend on productivity and people’s efforts in all directions in their own interest and profit. When people no longer do business in order to make a living, and when they cease all gainful activity, the business of civilization slumps, and everything decays. People scatter everywhere in search of sustenance, to places outside the jurisdiction of their present government. The population of the particular region becomes light. The settlements there become empty. The cities lie in ruins. The disintegration of (civilization) causes the disintegration of the status of dynasty and ruler, because (their peculiar status) constitutes the form of civilization and the form necessarily decays when its matter (in this case, civilization) decays.  

One may compare (here) the story which al-Mas’ûdî tells in connection with the history of the Persians. In the days of King Bahrâm b. Bahrâm, the Môbedhân, the chief religious dignitary among the Persians, expressed to the King his disapproval of the latter’s injustice and neglect for the consequences that his injustice must bring upon the dynasty. He did this through a parable, which he placed in the mouth of an owl. The King, hearing the cry of (an owl), asked (the Môbedhân) whether he understood what it was saying. (The Môbedhân) replied: “A male owl wanted to marry a female owl. The female owl, as a condition prior to consent, asked the male owl for the gift of twenty villages ruined in the days of Bahrâm, that she might hoot in them.

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676a Cf. pp. 107 and 291 (n. 139), below.
(The male owl) accepted her condition and said to her: 'If the King continues to rule, I shall give you a thousand ruined villages. This is of all wishes the easiest to fulfill.'”

The King was stirred out of his negligence by that story. He had a private (talk) with the Môbedhân and asked him what he had in mind. (The Môbedhân) replied: “O King, the might of royal authority materializes only through the religious law, obedience toward God, and compliance with His commands and prohibitions. The religious law persists only through royal authority. Mighty royal authority is achieved only through men. Men persist only with the help of property. The only way to property is through cultivation. The only way to cultivation is through justice. Justice is a balance set up among mankind. The Lord set it up and appointed an overseer of it, and that is the ruler. You, O King, went after the farms and took them away from their owners and cultivators. They are the people who pay the land tax and from whom one gets money. You gave their farms as fiefs to (your) entourage and servants and to sluggards. They did not cultivate (the farms) and did not heed the consequences. (They did not look for the things) that would be good for the farms. They were leniently treated with regard to the land tax (and were not asked to pay it), because they were close to the king. The remaining landowners who did pay the land tax and cultivated their farms had to carry an unjust burden. Therefore, they left their farms and abandoned their settlements. They took refuge in farms that were far away or difficult (of access), and lived on them. Thus, cultivation slackened, and the farms were ruined. There was little money, and soldiers and subjects perished. Neighboring rulers coveted the Persian realm, because they were aware of the fact that the basic materials that alone maintain the foundation of a realm had been cut off.”

When the King heard that, he proceeded to look into (the affairs of) his realm. The farms were taken away from the intimates of the ruler and restored to their owners. They were again treated, as they had formerly been treated. They
began again to cultivate (their farms). Those who had been weak gained in strength. The land was cultivated, and the country became prosperous. There was much money for the collectors of the land tax. The army was strengthened. The enemies' sources of strength were cut off. The frontier garrisons were manned. The ruler proceeded to take personal charge of his affairs. His days were prosperous, and his realm was well organized.

The lesson this (story) teaches is that injustice ruins civilization. The ruin (of civilization) has as its consequence the complete destruction of the dynasty. In this connection, one should disregard the fact that dynasties (centered) in great cities often infringe upon justice and still are not ruined. It should be known that this is the result of a relationship that exists between such infringements and the situation of the urban population. When a city is large and densely populated and unlimited in the variety of its conditions, the loss it suffers from hostile acts and injustice is small, because such losses take place gradually. Because of the great variety of conditions and the manifold productivity of a particular city, any loss may remain concealed. Its consequences will become visible only after some time. Thus, the dynasty which committed the infringements (of justice) may be replaced before the city is ruined. Another dynasty may make its appearance and restore the city with the help of its wealth. Thus, the (previous) loss which had remained concealed, is made up and is scarcely noticed. This, however, happens only rarely. The proven fact is that civilization inevitably suffers losses through injustice and hostile acts, as we have mentioned, and it is the dynasty that suffers therefrom.

Injustice should not be understood to imply only the confiscation of money or other property from the owners, without compensation and without cause. It is commonly understood in that way, but it is something more general than that. Whoever takes someone's property, or uses him
for forced labor, or presses an unjustified claim against him, or imposes upon him a duty not required by the religious law, does an injustice to that particular person. People who collect unjustified taxes commit an injustice. Those who infringe upon property (rights) commit an injustice. Those who take away property commit an injustice. Those who deny people their rights commit an injustice. Those who, in general, take property by force, commit an injustice. It is the dynasty that suffers from all these acts, in as much as civilization, which is the substance of the dynasty, is ruined when people have lost all incentive.

It should be known that this is what the Lawgiver (Muhammad) actually had in mind when he forbade injustice. He meant the resulting destruction and ruin of civilization, which ultimately permits the eradication of the human species. This is what the religious law quite generally and wiscy aims at in emphasizing five things as necessary: the preservation of (1) the religion, (2) the soul (life), (3) the intellect, (4) progeny, and (5) property.

Since, as we have seen, injustice calls for the eradication of the (human) species by leading to the ruin of civilization, it contains in itself a good reason for being prohibited. Consequently, it is important that it be forbidden. There is ample evidence for that in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It is much too ample to have it accurately or fully presented here.

If injustice were to be committed by every individual, the list of deterring punishments that would then have been given for it (in the religious law) would be as large as that given for the other (crimes) which lead to the destruction of the human species and which everybody is capable of committing, such as adultery, murder, and drunkenness. However, injustice can be committed only by persons who cannot be touched, only by persons who have power and authority. Therefore, injustice has been very much censured, and re-
peated threats against it have been expressed in the hope that perhaps the persons who are able to commit injustice will find a restraining influence in themselves.

"Your Lord does not do injustice to His servants." 678

It should not be objected that punishment for highway robbery is provided for in the religious law, 679 and that (highway robbery) is an injustice that can be committed only by someone who has the ability to commit it, in as much as the highway robber, when he commits the robbery, must have the ability to do it. The reply to that would be twofold:

First, it may be said that the punishment laid down for (highway robbery) is for crimes against life or property that (the highway robber) commits. This is an opinion held by many. The (punishment applies) only after one has gained power over him and brought him to account for his crime. 680

Highway robbery itself has no fixed legal punishment.

Second, it may be said that the highway robber cannot be described as having the ability (to commit injustice), because we understand by ability to commit injustice that the person has a free hand and there is no rival power, which means that he has (a power to) bring about (complete) ruin. The ability of the highway robber is merely an ability to cause fear. (This fear) then enables the highway robber to take away the property of others. Everyone may defend himself against it, according to both the religious and the political law. It is not, then, an ability that could bring about (complete) ruin.

God has power to do what He wishes.

One of the greatest injustices and one which contributes most to the destruction of civilization is the unjustified im-

678 Qur'ân 41.46 (46). Cf. also Qur'ân 5.182 (178); 8.51 (55); 22.10 (10); 50.29 (29).


680 Ergo, it cannot be said that the highway robber still has the special ability to commit his crime, at the time the punishment becomes applicable.
position of tasks and the use of the subjects for forced labor. This is so because labor belongs to the things that constitute capital, as we shall explain in the chapter on sustenance.\textsuperscript{681} Gain and sustenance represent the value realized from labor among civilized people. All their efforts and all their labors are (means) for them (to acquire) capital and (to make a) profit. They have no other way to make a profit except (through labor). Subjects employed in cultural enterprises gain their livelihood and profit from such activities. Now, if they are obliged to work outside their own field and are used for forced labor unrelated to their (ordinary ways of) making a living, they no longer have any profit and are thus deprived of the price of their labor, which is their capital (asset). They suffer, and a good deal of their livelihood is gone, or even all of it. If this occurs repeatedly, all incentive to cultural enterprise is destroyed, and they cease utterly to make an effort. This leads to the destruction and ruin of civilization.

"God gives sustenance to whomever He wishes to give it, without accounting." \textsuperscript{682}

An injustice even greater and more destructive of civilization and the dynasty than (the one just mentioned) is the appropriation of people's property by buying their possessions as cheaply as possible and then reselling the merchandise to them at the highest possible prices by means of forced sales and purchases. Often, people have to accept (high) prices with the privilege of later payment. They console (themselves) for the loss they suffer (at the moment) with the hope that the market will fluctuate in favor of the merchandise that had been sold to them at such a high price, and that their loss will be canceled later on. But then, they are required to make payment at once, and they are forced to sell the merchandise at the lowest possible price. The loss involved in the two transactions affects their capital.\textsuperscript{683}

\textsuperscript{681} Cf. pp. 311 ff., below.
\textsuperscript{682} Qurʾān 2.212 (208); 3.37 (32); 24.38 (38).
\textsuperscript{683} Cf. also p. 94, above.
This (situation) affects all kinds of merchants, those resident in town and those who import merchandise from elsewhere. (It also affects) the peddlers and shopkeepers who deal in food and fruit, as well as the craftsmen who deal in the instruments and implements that are in general use. The loss affects all professions and classes quite generally. This goes on from hour to hour.\textsuperscript{684} It causes (all) capital funds to dwindle. The only possibility that remains is for the merchants to go out of business, because their capital is gone, as it can no longer be restored by the profits. Merchants who come from elsewhere for the purchase and sale of merchandise are slow to come, because of that situation. Business declines, and the subjects lose their livelihood, which, generally, comes from trading. Therefore, if no (trading) is being done in the markets, they have no livelihood, and the tax revenue of the ruler decreases or deteriorates, since, in the middle (period) of a dynasty and later on, most of the tax revenue comes from customs duties on commerce, as we have stated before.\textsuperscript{685} This leads to the dissolution of the dynasty and the decay of urban civilization. The disintegration comes about gradually and imperceptibly.

This happens whenever the ways and means of seizing property described above are used. On the other hand, if (the property) is taken outright and if the hostile acts are extended to affect the property, the wives, the lives, the skins,\textsuperscript{685a} and the honor of people, it will lead to sudden disintegration and decay and the quick destruction of the dynasty. It will result in disturbances leading to complete destruction.

On account of these evil (consequences), all such (unfair activities) are prohibited by the religious law. The religious law legalizes the use of cunning in trading, but forbids depriving people of their property illegally. The purpose is to

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\textsuperscript{684} 'Ala' ṣ-sā'dīt, as in Bulaq and MSS. A, B, and D. (C is supplied by a later hand in this section, indistinctly.) Paris has 'alā l-baydīt 'affects the trading.'

\textsuperscript{685} Cf. pp. 90 f., above, where it is said that in the later years of a dynasty, customs duties are levied. Cf. also pp. 97 ff., where it is said that only in the middle period of a dynasty are the ruler and his entourage wealthy.

\textsuperscript{685a} This refers to corporal punishment, torture, and the like.
Restricted Access to the Ruler

prevent such evil (consequences), which would lead to the destruction of civilization through disturbances or the lack of opportunity to make a living.

It should be known that all these (practices) are caused by the need for more money on the part of dynasty and ruler, because they have become accustomed to luxurious living. Their expenditures increase, and much spending is done. The ordinary income does not meet (the expenditures). Therefore, the ruler invents new sorts and kinds of taxes, in order to increase the revenues and to be able to balance the budget. But luxury continues to grow, and spending increases on account of it. The need for (appropriating) people’s property becomes stronger and stronger. In this way, the authority of the dynasty shrinks until its influence is wiped out and its identity lost and it is defeated by an attacker.

God determines all affairs. There is no Lord except Him.

[42] How it happens that access to the ruler becomes restricted 686 in the dynasty. (Such restriction) becomes important when the dynasty grows senile.

It should be known that at the beginning, as we have mentioned before, 687 the dynasty is remote from royal aspirations. It needs group feeling through which its power and domination can materialize, and the desert attitude is characteristic of group feeling.

A dynasty based upon religion is remote from royal aspirations. In one based exclusively upon superior (political) power, the desert attitude, through which superiority is achieved, likewise is remote from royal aspirations and ways.

Now, if a dynasty at the beginning of its rule is a Bedouin one, the ruler possesses austerity and the desert attitude. He is close to the people and easily accessible. Then, when his power is firmly established, he comes to claim all the glory for himself. He needs to keep away from the people and to

686 Hijāb, the verbal noun, not hujjāb “doorkeepers,” or hijādah “office of doorkeeper,” though the same idea is meant. For the hijād and his office, see pp. 14 ff., above. Here, the theoretical significance of the office is discussed.

687 Cf., for instance, 1:363, above.
remain aloof with his friends, in order to be able to talk with them about his special (private) affairs, since his following has by then become large. Therefore, he seeks to keep away from the common people as much as possible. He employs someone at his door to admit (only) those of his friends and of the people of the dynasty whom he cannot avoid, and to prevent people (in general) from having access to him. (That person) is stationed at the (ruler’s) door to exercise his function.

Then, when royal authority flourishes and royal ways and aspirations make their appearance, the ruler adopts royal character qualities. They are strange, peculiar qualities. They must be carefully handled in the proper way by those who are in contact with them. Persons in contact with (rulers) often do not know about these qualities and may do something that (rulers) do not like. He may become displeased with them and get into the mood of punishing them. Thus, knowledge of manners to be used in intercourse with (rulers) became the sole property of their special friends. (The rulers) kept all except their intimates from meeting them at all times, so as to protect themselves against noticing anything that might displease them and in order to protect the people against exposing themselves to punishment. Thus, (rulers) introduced another entrance restriction even more selective than the first. (The first) concerns special friends of the ruler and prevents everyone else’s admission. The second restriction concerns the meetings with those friends (of the rulers), and prevents admission of everyone else from among the common people.

The first entrance restriction is in existence at the beginning of a dynasty, as we have said. It originated in the days of Mu‘āwiyah and ‘Abd-al-Malik and the Umayyad caliphs. The person in charge of entrance restrictions was called by them “doorkeeper” (ḥājib), a word properly derived from the same root (as the word “entrance restriction”).

Then, the ‘Abbāsid dynasty made its appearance. Its famous luxury and power came into being, and the royal
qualities reached their proper perfection in it. This called for the second entrance restriction. The name of "doorkeeper" (ḥājib) was restricted to it. The court of the caliphs contained two buildings to house their retinue, one for the special group and another for the common people. This is stated in 'Abbāsid history.

In the later dynasties, a third entrance restriction came into being. It was even more selective than the two previous ones. This occurred at the period when the attempt was made to exclude the ruler. It resulted from the fact that the first step taken by the men of the dynasty and intimates of the ruler who set up the young princes and attempted to gain control over them, was to keep the inner circle and the special friends of (the young ruler's) father away from him. The person who attempted to gain control over the young ruler suggested to him that it would diminish respect for him and would destroy the rules of etiquette if these men were to be in contact with him. His purpose was to keep the young ruler from meeting anybody else and see to it that he would become so used to him that he would not want to replace him with anybody else until he securely dominated him. An entrance restriction such as (the third) was obviously required under these circumstances. As a rule, it comes into existence only in the later (years) of a dynasty, as we have mentioned before in connection with the seclusion of the ruler. It indicates the senility and decline of the dynasty. It is one of the things that the members of dynasties are afraid of. Those who support the dynasty will naturally attempt such a thing when the dynasty reaches senility and later-born members of the ruling family lose control. Human beings love very much to gain control over royal authority, especially when the soil is prepared and all the requirements and symptoms are there.

"God has the power to execute His commands."
Chapter 111: Section 48

[48] The division of one dynasty into two.

It should be known that the first (perceptible) consequence of a dynasty’s senility is that it splits. This is because, when royal authority comes into its own and achieves the utmost luxury and prosperity and when the ruler controls all the glory and has it all for himself, he is too proud to let anyone share in it. As far as possible, he eliminates all claims in this direction by destroying those of his relatives who are possible candidates for his position and whom he suspects.

Those who participate with the ruler in this (activity) often have fears for their own (safety) and take refuge in remote parts of the realm. People who are in the same situation as they of running a risk \(^{691}\) and becoming suspect, join them there and gather around them. (At that time,) the authority of the dynasty has already begun to shrink and to withdraw from the remote parts of the realm. Thus, the refugee who is related (to the dynasty) gains control there. His power grows continually, while the authority of the dynasty shrinks. Eventually he becomes, or almost becomes, an equal partner in the dynasty.

This may be observed in the Arab Muslim dynasty. Its power was great and concentrated, its authority far-flung, and the group feeling of the Banû ‘Abd-Manâf was one and supreme over all the Muṭār. Therefore, no dissension made itself felt over the whole period of (the Arab Muslim dynasty), except for the disturbances caused by the Khârijites, who were willing to die for their heresy. That (however) had nothing to do with royal authority and (political) leadership, and they were not successful, because they were up against a strong group feeling. Then, the Umayyads lost control, and the ‘Abbâsids took over. The Arab dynasty had, by then, achieved the utmost superiority and luxury, and

\(^{691}\) Possibly ighṭīrār, to be connected with gharar “risk.” Ḳīzāz, as in A, “showing their strength, being arrogant,” is perhaps not impossible. D reads ʿtirāf. One might also think of ighṭirdb “being exiled.”
was beginning to shrink. (At that time,) 'Abd-ar-Rahmân I ad-Dâkhil took refuge in Spain, the most remote region of the Muslim dynasty. He founded a realm there and severed it from the 'Abbâsid cause. Thus, he made two dynasties out of one. Then, Idrîs took refuge in the Maghrib and succeeded and seized power there. His son and successor commanded the Awrâbah, the Maghilah, and the Zanâtah Berbers, and took possession of both the Maghribis (Morocco and Algeria).

Later on, the 'Abbâsid dynasty shrank more and more. The Aghlabids were stirred up to resist (the 'Abbâsids). Then, the Shi'ah (the 'Ubaydid-Fâtimids) seceded. The Kutâmah and the Śinhâjah supported them, and they took possession of Ifrîqiyyah and the Maghrib, and then conquered Egypt, Syria, and the Hijâz. They defeated the Idrîsids and divided the ('Abbâsid) dynasty into two more, so that the Arab ('Abbâsid) dynasty now consisted of three (independent) dynasties: the 'Abbâsids at the center and base of the Arab world and at the source of Islam; the Umayyads, who had renewed their old royal authority and caliphate of the East in Spain; and the 'Ubaydid(-Fâtimids) in Ifrîqiyyah, Egypt, Syria, and the Hijâz. These dynasties continued to exist until their destruction was imminent or complete.

In the same way, the 'Abbâsid dynasty also split into other dynasties. There were the Šâmnânids and their successors, the Banû 'Uqayl, in the Jazîrah and Mosul. There were the Tûlûnids and their successors, the Banû Tughsh (Ikhshîdids), in Egypt and Syria. In the remote (East), there were the Sâmnânids in Transoxania and Khurâsân, and the 'Alawîs (Zaydîs) among the Daylam and in Šabaristan. This, finally, led to Daylam domination of Fârs and the two Iraqs, including Baghdad and the caliphs. Then, there came the Saljuqs. They took possession of all that (area). Later on, their dynasty, too, split after having flourished, as is known from their history.

The same thing may also be observed of the Śinhâjah dynasty in the Maghrib and Ifrîqiyyah. When it reached its
zenith in the days of Bâdîs b. al-Manṣûr, Bâdîs’ uncle Ḥammâd revolted against him and cut off the Maghrib provinces between Mount Awrâs and Tlemcen and the Moulouya (Malwiyah River) and took them for himself. He founded al-Qal’ah in the Mountain of the Kutâmah near Msila (al-Masīlah). He settled there and took possession of their center Ashîr on Mount Tîtîterî. He thus founded another realm split off from that of the family of Bâdîs. The family of Bâdîs remained in al-Qayrawân and environs. This remained this way, until the power of both of them was completely destroyed.

The same was the case with the Almohad dynasty. When the shadow it cast began to shrink, the Ḥafṣids revolted in Ifriqiyyah. They made themselves independent there and founded their own realm for their descendants in that region. Their power flourished and reached the limit, but then, one of their descendants, the amir Abû Zakarîyâ’ Yaḥyâ, the son of Sultan Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm, the fourth Ḥafṣid caliph, seceded in the western provinces and founded a new realm in Bougie and Constantine and environs. He passed it on to his children. (Abû Zakarîyâ’ and his children) thus split the dynasty in two. Then (his children) took possession of the capital in Tunis. Later on the realm was again divided, among their descendants, and then they regained full power.

The process of splitting may lead to the formation of more than two or three dynasties that are not controlled by members of the (original) ruling family. This was the case with the reyes de taîfas in Spain and with the non-Arab rulers in the East. It also was the case in the Śinhâjah (Zârid) realm in Ifriqiyyah. In the later (years) of the Śinhâjah dynasty, every castle in Ifriqiyyah was in the possession of an independent rebel, as we shall mention. The same was the case

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692 He died fighting Ḥammâd in 406 [1016].
693 Cf. n. 6 to this chapter, above.
694 Cf. p. 305, below, and ‘Ibar, VI, 163 ff.; de Slane (tr.), II, 29 ff. Bulaq has: “as we have mentioned,” which might have been said in connection with the following example; see the next note.
with the Jarîd and the Zâb in Isfâqiyah shortly before the present time, as we shall also mention.\textsuperscript{695}

This is the case with every dynasty. Inevitably, luxury, ease, and a decrease in the extent of its power cause it to be affected by the symptoms of senility. Then, members of the ruling family or people of the dynasty who have gained control divide it among themselves, and numerous dynasties come into existence where (there had been one).

God inherits the earth and whomever is upon it:

\[ 44 \] Once senility has come upon a dynasty, it cannot be made to disappear.

We have already cited the symptoms and causes of senility, one by one.\textsuperscript{696} We have explained that it is natural for the causes of senility to affect the dynasty. All of them are natural in (a dynasty). If, then, senility is something natural in (the life of) the dynasty, it must come about in the same way natural things come about, exactly as senility affects the temper of living beings. Senility is a chronic disease that cannot be cured or made to disappear because it is something natural, and natural things do not change.

Many a politically conscious person among the people of the dynasty becomes alert to it and notices the symptoms and causes of senility that have affected his dynasty. He considers it possible to make that senility disappear. Therefore, he takes it upon himself to repair the dynasty and relieve its temper of senility. He supposes that (senility) resulted from shortcomings or negligence on the part of former people of the dynasty. This is not so. These things are natural to the dynasty. Customs (that have developed in the dynasty) prevent him from repairing it. Customs are like a second nature. A person who, for instance, has seen his father and the older members of his family wear silk and brocade and use gold


\textsuperscript{696} Cf. 1:539 ff., above.
ornaments for weapons and mounts and be inaccessible to the people in their salons and at prayer, will not be able to diverge from the customs of his forebears in this respect. He will not be able to use coarse dress and apparel and mingle with the people. Custom would prevent him (from doing that) and expose him if he were to do it. Were he to do it, he would be accused of craziness and insanity for his brusque disregard of custom. There is the danger that it would have bad consequences for his government.

One might contrast (this with) the disregard for custom and opposition to it shown by the prophets. However, the prophets had divine support and celestial help.

Group feeling has often disappeared (at the time the dynasty grows senile), and pomp has taken the place it occupied in the souls of men. Now, when in addition to the weakening of group feeling, pomp, too, is discontinued, the subjects grow audacious vis-à-vis the dynasty, because the presumption of pomp remains.\(^697\) Therefore, the dynasty shields itself by holding on to pomp as much as possible, until everything is finished.

At the end of a dynasty, there often also appears some (show of) power that gives the impression that the senility of the dynasty has been made to disappear. It lights up brilliantly just before it is extinguished, like a burning wick the flame of which leaps up brilliantly a moment before it goes out, giving the impression it is just starting to burn, when in fact it is going out.

This should be considered, and one should not disregard the wise planning that God employs in having His creation follow its course toward the destiny He has determined for it. "Each term has a book." \(^698\)


It should be known that any royal authority must be built upon two foundations. The first is might and group

\(^697\) This is the reading of MSS. A, B, C, and D. However, Bulaq and E have bi-\(ḏẖaẖḏ\) “is gone,” which seems better, even if Ibn Khaldûn corrected it later on.

\(^698\) Qur'ān 13:38 (38).
The Disintegration of Dynasties

feeling, which finds its expression in soldiers. The second is money, which supports the soldiers and provides the whole structure needed by royal authority. Disintegration befalls the dynasty at these two foundations.

We shall mention first the disintegration that comes about through might and group feeling, and then, we shall come back and discuss the one that comes about through money and taxation.

It should be known that, as we have stated, the dynasty can be founded and established only with the help of group feeling. There must be a major group feeling uniting all the group feelings subordinate to it. This (major group feeling) is the family and tribal group feeling peculiar to the ruler.

When the natural luxury of royal authority makes its appearance in the dynasty, and when the people who share in the group feeling of the dynasty are humiliated, the first to be humiliated are the members of the ruler’s family and his relatives who share with him in the royal name. They are much more humiliated than anyone else. Moreover, luxury has a greater hold on them than on anyone else, because they have a share in royal authority, power, and superiority. Thus, two agents of destruction surround them, luxury and force. (The use of) force eventually leads to their being killed. They become sick at heart when they see the ruler firmly established in royal authority. His envy of them then changes to fear for his royal authority. Therefore, he starts to kill and humiliate them and to deprive them of the prosperity and luxury to which they had become in large measure accustomed. They perish, and become few in number. The group feeling that the ruler had through them is destroyed. (That group feeling) was the major group feeling, which united all the other groups and subordinated them to itself. It dissolves and its grip weakens. Its place is taken by the inner circle of clients and followers who enjoy the

666 Cf. 1:284 f., above.
700 That is, they become unreliable and rebellious.
701 Sr. Bulaq, C, and D. B has a meaningless w-y-t-l-w-n.
favors and benefactions of the ruler. A (new) group feeling is derived from them. However, (this new group feeling) does not have anything like the powerful grip (of the other group feeling), because it lacks direct and close blood relationships. We have mentioned before that the importance and strength of a group feeling results from close and direct blood relationships,\textsuperscript{702} because God made it that way.

The ruler thus isolates himself from his family and helpers, those who have natural affection (for him). This (in turn) is sensed by the people of other groups. Very naturally, they become audacious vis-à-vis the ruler and his inner circle. Therefore, the ruler destroys them and persecutes and kills them, one after the other. The later people of the dynasty follow the tradition of the former in that respect. In addition, they are exposed to the detrimental effect of luxury that we have mentioned before. Thus, destruction comes upon them through luxury and through being killed. Eventually, they no longer have the coloring of (their) group feeling. They forget the affection and strength that (used to) go with it. They become hirelings for the military protection (of the dynasty). They thus become few in number. As a consequence, the militia settled in the remote and frontier regions becomes numerically weak. This, then, emboldens the subjects in the remote regions to abandon the cause (of the dynasty) there. Rebels who are members of the ruling family and other (types of rebels) go out to these remote regions. They hope that under these circumstances, they will be able to reach their goal by obtaining a following among the inhabitants of the remote regions of the realm. (They hope that) they will be secure from capture by the (government) militia. This (process) keeps on and the authority of the ruling dynasty continues gradually to shrink until the rebels reach places extremely close to the center of the dynasty. The dynasty then often splits into two or three dynasties, depending on its original strength, as we

\textsuperscript{702} Cf., however, 1:264 f., above.

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have stated.\textsuperscript{703} People who do not share in the group feeling of (the dynasty) take charge of its affairs, though they obey the people who do share in the group feeling of (the dynasty) and accept their acknowledged superiority.

This may be exemplified by the Arab Muslim dynasty. At the beginning it reached as far as Spain, India, and China. The Umayyads had complete control of all the Arabs through the group feeling of 'Abd-Manaf. It was even possible for Sulaymân b. 'Abd-al-Malik in Damascus to order the killing of 'Abd-al-'Azîz b. Mûsâ b. Nuṣayr in Córdoba. He was killed, and (Sulaymân's) order was not disobeyed.\textsuperscript{704} Then, luxury came to the Umayyads, and their group feeling was wiped out (The Umayyads) were destroyed, and the 'Abbâsids made their appearance. They curbed\textsuperscript{705} the Hâshimites. They killed all the 'Alids (descendants of Abû Ṭâlib) and exiled them. In consequence, the group feeling of 'Abd-Manaf dissolved and was wiped out. The Arabs grew audacious vis-à-vis (the 'Abbâsids). People in the remote regions of the realm, such as the Aghlabids in Ifriqiyyah and the inhabitants of Spain and others, gained control over them, and the dynasty split. Then, the Idrisids seceded in the Maghrib. The Berbers supported them, in obedience to their group feeling. Also, they were secure from capture by the soldiers or mililimem of the dynasty.

Men with a cause, for which they make propaganda, eventually secede. They gain control over border areas and remote regions. There, they are able to make propaganda for their cause and achieve royal authority. As a result, the dynasty splits. As the dynasty shrinks more and more, this process often continues until the center is reached. The inner circle, thereafter, weakens, because luxury undermines it. It perishes and dissolves. The whole divided dynasty weakens.

\textsuperscript{703} Cf. pp. 114 ff., above.

\textsuperscript{704} This happened in 97 [718]. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, Kāmil, V, 10.

\textsuperscript{705} Lit., "lowered the reins," a phrase which is explained to mean gentling a horse. Cf. Līsān al-ʿArab, IX, 62, 1. 1; Lane, Arabic-English Dictionary, p. 264a. Here Ibn Khaldûn was apparently thinking of his theory that a dynasty tends to repress the members of its own family.
Occasionally, it lingers on long after that. (The dynasty) can dispense with group feeling now, because it has colored the souls of its subject people with the habit of subservience and submission for so many long years that no one alive can think back to its beginning and origin. They cannot think of anything except being submissive to the ruler. Therefore, he can dispense with group strength. In order to establish his power, hired soldiers and mercenaries are sufficient. The submissiveness generally found in the human soul helps in this respect. Should anyone think of disobedience or secession—which hardly ever happens—the great mass would disapprove of him and oppose him. Thus, he would not be able to attempt such a thing, even if he should try very hard. In this situation, the dynasty is often more secure (than ever), as far as rebels and rivals are concerned, because the coloring of submissiveness and subservience is firmly established. Individuals would scarcely admit to themselves the least thought of opposition, and the idea of straying from obedience would not enter anybody’s mind. (The dynasty,) therefore, is safer (than ever) so far as the trouble and destruction that comes from groups and tribes are concerned. The dynasty may continue in this condition, but its substance dwindles, like natural heat in a body that lacks nourishment. Eventually, (the dynasty) reaches its destined time. "Each term has a book," and each dynasty has an end. God determines night and day.

As for the disintegration that comes through money, it should be known that at the beginning the dynasty has a desert attitude, as was mentioned before. It has the qualities of kindness to subjects, planned moderation in expenditures, and respect for other people’s property. It avoids onerous taxation and the display of cunning or shrewdness in the collection of money and the accounting (required) from officials. Nothing at this time calls for extravagant expendi-
atures. Therefore, the dynasty does not need much money. Later comes domination and expansion. Royal authority flourishes. This calls for luxury. (Luxury) causes increased spending. The expenditures of the ruler, and of the people of the dynasty in general, grow. This (tendency) spreads to the urban population. It calls for increases in soldiers' allowances and in the salaries of the people of the dynasty. 709 Extravagant expenditures mount. It spreads to the subjects, because people follow the religion (ways) and customs of the dynasty. 710

The ruler, then, must impose duties on articles sold in the markets, in order to improve his revenues. (He does so,) because he sees the luxury of the urban population testifying to their prosperity, and because he needs the money for the expenditures of his government and the salaries of his soldiers. Habits of luxury, then, further increase. The customs duties no longer pay for them. The dynasty, by this time, is flourishing in its power and its forceful hold over the subjects under its control. Its hand reaches out to seize some of the property of the subjects, either through customs duties, or through commercial transactions, or, in some cases, merely by hostile acts directed against (property holdings), on some pretext or even with none.

At this stage, the soldiers have already grown bold against the dynasty, because it has become weak and senile as far as its group feeling is concerned. (The dynasty) expects that from them, and attempts to remedy and smooth over the situation through generous allowances and much spending for (the soldiers). It cannot get around that.

At this stage, the tax collectors in the dynasty have acquired much wealth, because vast revenues are in their hands and their position has widened in importance for this reason. Suspicions of having appropriated tax money, therefore, attach to them. It becomes common for one tax collector to denounce another, because of their mutual jealousy and envy. One after another is deprived of his money by confiscation

709 Bulaq adds: “Luxury then grows more and more.”
710 Cf. 1:38, 300, above, and p. 306, below.
and torture. Eventually, their wealth is gone, and they are ruined. The dynasty loses the pomp and magnificence it had possessed through them.

After their prosperity is destroyed, the dynasty goes farther afield and approaches its other wealthy subjects. At this stage, feebleness has already afflicted its (former) might. (The dynasty) has become too weak to retain its power and forceful hold. The policy of the ruler, at this time, is to handle matters diplomatically by spending money. He considers this more advantageous than the sword, which is of little use. His need for money grows beyond what is needed for expenditures and soldiers’ salaries. He never gets enough. Senility affects the dynasty more and more. The people of (other) regions grow bold against it.

At each of these stages, the strength of the dynasty crumbles. Eventually, it reaches complete ruin. It is open to domination by (any) aggressor. Anyone who wants to attack it can take it away from those who support it. If this does not occur, it will continue to dwindle and finally disappear—like the wick of a lamp when the oil is exhausted, and it goes out.

God owns all things and governs the whole creation. There is no God but Him.

11, 114

[46] The authority of the dynasty at first expands to its limit and then is narrowed down in successive stages, until the dynasty dissolves and disappears.713

Above, in the third (chapter) of this Muqaddimah,714 in the chapter on the caliphate and royal authority, we stated

711 For nakkah and its synonym muṣṣādah, cf. 1:368 (n. 156), above.
712 Cf. 1:346, above.
713 This section is found only in D. C has merely a sign in the text, indicating an intended addition. It may have been written on an inserted sheet, now lost. Ibn Khaldūn is almost certainly the author of this section, admittedly full of rather unusual words and usages not elsewhere found in the Muqaddimah. This, of course, is easily explained by the fact that the section is a later addition.
714 Cf. 1:lxviii, above.
that each dynasty has its specific share of provinces and districts and no more.\(^{716}\) (Its expansion) depends \(^{718}\) on the distribution of the dynasty’s group (strength) for the (military) protection of its territory and regions. Wherever its numbers go, their advance (eventually) comes to a stop at (what is called) the “border region.” This surrounds the dynasty on all sides like a belt. Its farthest extension may coincide with the original “belt” of authority of the (preceding) dynasty. (Or) it may be still wider, if the numerical (strength) of the (new) group is greater than that of the preceding dynasty.

All this takes place while the dynasty has the characteristics of desert life and rude courage.

Subsequently, power and superiority come into their own. Bounties and salaries become abundant as a result of improved revenues. Luxury and sedentary culture abound. New generations grow up accustomed to this situation. (At this time,) the character of the militia softens, and they lose their toughness. This makes them cowards and lazy fellows. They are caught up in the effeminacy \(^{717}\) of sedentary culture. It causes them to shed the characteristics of courage and manliness. They give up the desert attitude and desert toughness and seek power through assiduous competition for leadership. This causes some of them to kill others. The ruler prevents them from doing that, by killing their great men and destroying their leaders. Thus, amirs and great men no longer exist, and the number of followers and subordinates grows. This blunts the sharp edges of the dynasty and decreases its strength. The first element of disintegration afflicts the dynasty, that which comes through the soldiers and militia, as has been mentioned.\(^{718}\)

This is paralleled by extravagance in expenditures. (The people of the dynasty) suffer from the pomp of power and

\(^{716}\) Cf. 1:927 ff., above.
\(^{714}\) D: \textit{wu-ti'bdr}.
\(^{717}\) D: \textit{khanath}.
\(^{718}\) In the preceding section to which he refers, Ibn Khaldūn merely alludes to the facts mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, pp. 118 f., above.
limitless ostentation as they compete with each other in matters of food, clothing, large palaces, good weapons, and the horses in their stables. At this time, the income of the dynasty is too small to pay for such expenditures, and thus the second element of disintegration afflicts the dynasty, that which comes through money and taxation. Weakness and destruction are the results of these two elements of disintegration.

The leaders of (the dynasty) often compete with each other. They quarrel, and are too weak to stand up and defend themselves against rivals and neighbors. The people of the border and remote regions often sense the weakness of the dynasty at their backs, and they show their strength. They eventually gain independent control over the districts in their possession. The ruler is too weak to force them back on the (right) path. Thus, the authority of the dynasty becomes narrower than it had been at the beginning. The administration of (the dynasty) restricts itself to a smaller area. Eventually, the same weakness, laziness with regard to group strength, and the shortage of money and revenue that had come about in the first, larger, area also comes about in the second, smaller, area.

The person in charge of the dynasty now undertakes to change the norms the dynasty had adopted as its policy with regard to soldiers, money, and administrative functions. The purpose is to have norms suitable for balancing the budget, satisfying the militia, safeguarding the administrative districts, distributing the tax revenue for the (soldiers') salaries in the proper manner, and readjusting (the new conditions) to those that had existed at the beginning of the dynasty. However, evil happenings can still be expected from every quarter.

At this later stage, what had happened before in the first

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719 Cf. 1:338 and 348, above.
720 D: tadbiriḥd.
721 Cf. Issawi, p. 126.
722 For wilāyāt, cf. p. 5 (n. 445), above.
stage happens again. The ruler now considers the same (measures) that the first ruler had considered, and applies the old yardstick to the new conditions of the dynasty. He intends to repel the evil consequences of disintegration, which reappears at every stage and affects every part of the realm until the area of the dynasty is again narrower than it had been (before), and what had happened before happens again.

Each of the persons who changes the previous norms (of the dynasty) is in a way the builder of a new dynasty and the founder of a new realm. However, the dynasty is eventually destroyed. The nations around it push on to gain superiority over it. They then found a new dynasty of their own. And thus befalls what God has destined to befall.

This may be exemplified by the Muslim dynasty. Through its conquests and victories over (foreign) nations, its authority expanded. Its militia then increased, and the numerical (strength of the militia) grew as the result of the bounties and salaries granted to (the soldiers). Eventually, the power of the Umayyads was destroyed. The 'Abbāsids gained the upper hand. Luxury, then, increased. Sedentary culture emerged, and disintegration made its appearance. The creation of the Marwānid (Umayyad Spanish) and ‘Alid (Idrisid) dynasties cut down the authority of the 'Abbāsids in Spain and the Maghrib. These two border regions were cut off from ('Abbāsid) authority.

Then, dissension arose among the sons of ar-Rashid. ‘Alid propagandists appeared in every region, and ('Alid) dynasties were founded. Then, after the death of al-Muta'wakkil, the amirs gained control over the caliphs and kept them in seclusion. Provincial governors in the outlying regions became independent, and the land tax from there did not come in any longer. Luxury (however) still increased. Al-Mu'taḍid appeared. He changed the norms of the dynasty and adopted another policy. He gave the outlying regions,

723 D has a wrong al-hāl, instead of al-khalal.
724 D: iład mu’thūr dkhār.
over which the governors had won control, to them as fiefs. Thus, for instance, the Sâmânîds (were given) Transoxania, the Ģâhirîds the 'Irâq and Khurâsân, the Saffârids Western India (Sind) and Fârs, the Tûlûnîds Egypt, and the Aghlabîds Isfîqiyyah. Then, the power of the Arabs was broken up. The non-Arabs achieved superiority. The Bûyîds and the Daylam gained control of the Muslim dynasty. They kept the caliphs in seclusion. The Sâmânîds remained in control of Transoxania. The Fâṭîmîds pushed out of the Maghrib into Egypt and Syria and gained possession of (those countries). Then arose the dynasty of the Saljûq Turks. The Saljûqs gained domination over the Muslim empire. They kept the caliphs in seclusion, until their dynasties were destroyed. From the time of an-Nâşîr on, the caliphs were in control of an area smaller than the ring around the moon, namely, the Arab 'Irâq up to Isfahân, Fârs, and al-Bâhrayn. For some (time), the dynasty continued in that manner, until the power of the caliphs was destroyed by Hûlâgû b. Tûlî b. Dûshî Khân, the ruler of the Tatars and Mongols. They defeated the Saljûqs and took possession of the part of the Muslim empire that had been theirs.

Thus, the authority of the dynasty (at each stage) becomes successively narrower than it had been at the beginning. (This process) continues, stage by stage, until the dynasty is destroyed. (The fact) can be exemplified by examination of any dynasty, large or small. This is how God proceeds with dynasties, until the dissolution destined by Him comes upon His creatures. "Everything perishes except His face (person)."" 727


It should be known that when the ruling dynasty starts on the road to senility and destruction, the rise and beginning of the new dynasty takes place in two ways:

725 Elsewhere in the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldûn consistently uses 'Ubaydîds.
726 The 'Abbâsid who reigned from 1180 to 1225.
727 Qur'ān 28.88 (88).
The Origin of New Dynasties

(The one way is) for provincial governors in the dynasty to gain control over remote regions when (the dynasty) loses its influence there. Each one of them founds a new dynasty for his people and a realm to be perpetuated in his family. His children or clients inherit it from him. Gradually, they have a flourishing realm. They often compete bitterly with each other and aspire to gain sole possession of it. The one who is stronger than his rival will gain the upper hand and take away what the other had.

This happened in the 'Abbāsid dynasty when it started on the road to senility and its shadow receded from the remote regions. The Sāmānids gained control over Transoxania, the Ḥamdānids over Mosul and Syria, and the Tūlūnids over Egypt. The same thing happened in the Umayyad dynasty in Spain. Their realm was divided among the reyes de taifaś who had been their provincial governors. It was divided into several dynasties with several rulers, who passed their realms on after their death to their relatives or clients. This way of forming a new dynasty avoids the possibility of war between the (new rulers) and the ruling dynasty. (These new rulers) are already firmly established in their leadership and do not want to gain domination over the ruling dynasty. The latter is affected by senility, and its shadow recedes from the remote regions of the realm and can no (longer) reach them.

The other way is for some rebel from among the neighboring nations and tribes to revolt against the dynasty. He either makes propaganda for some particular cause to which he intends to win the people, as we have indicated, or he possesses great power and a great group feeling among his people. His power is already flourishing among them, and now he aspires with the help of (his people) to gain royal authority. (His people) are convinced that they will obtain it, because they feel that they are superior to the ruling dynasty, which is affected by senility. Thus, to (the rebel) and

78 Cf. p. 121, above.
his people, it is a fact that they will gain domination over it. They constantly attack it, until they defeat it and inherit its power.

This was the case with the Saljuqs in relation to the descendants of Sebuktigin, and with the Merinids in the Maghrib in relation to the Almohads.

"God has the power to execute His commands." 739

[ 48 ] A new dynasty gains domination over the ruling dynasty through perseverance, and not through sudden action.

We have (just) mentioned that new dynasties originate in two ways. The one way (is for them to originate) with the governors of outlying regions when the shadow of the ruling dynasty recedes from those regions and its waves are rolled back. As a rule, such (governors) do not attack the (ruling) dynasty, as we have mentioned before, because all they have to do is to be satisfied with what they already have. That is as far as their power goes. The other way is that of men who make propaganda for some cause and of rebels who rebel against the (ruling) dynasty. It is inevitable that they attack (the ruling dynasty), because their power warrants such (a course). They (revolt) only when they have a family with sufficient group feeling and strength to give them success. Indecisive battles take place between them and the ruling dynasty. (Such battles) are repeated and continued (all the time), until by perseverance they achieve domination and victory. As a rule, they do not gain victory through sudden action.

The reason for this is that victory in war, as we have mentioned before, 730 as a rule is the result of imaginary psychological factors. Numbers, weapons, and proper tactics may guarantee (victory). However, as has been mentioned above, (all these things) are less effective than the imaginary (psychological) factors, as has been mentioned above. Trickery is

739 Qur'an 12.21 (21).
730 Cf. pp. 85 ff., above.
one of the most useful things employed in warfare. It is the thing most likely to bring victory. A tradition says: "War is trickery." 731

Accepted custom has made obedience to the ruling dynasty a necessity and an obligation, as has been mentioned before in more than one place.732 This puts many hindrances in the way of the founder of a new dynasty. It discourages his followers and supporters. His closest intimates may be fully intent upon obeying him and helping him. Still, others are more numerous, who are affected by weakness and laziness under the influence of the belief that they owe submission to the ruling dynasty. Their zeal slackens. Therefore, the founder of a new dynasty is hardly able to make a stand against the ruler of the ruling dynasty. Consequently, he falls back on patience and perseverance, until the senility of the ruling dynasty has become obvious. Then his people lose the belief that they owe submission to the ruling dynasty. They become sufficiently spirited to make an open attack upon the ruling dynasty in concert with (the founder of the new dynasty). Victory and domination are the result.

Furthermore, the ruling dynasty has many luxuries. The royal authority of (the people of the ruling dynasty) had been firmly established. They had enjoyed prosperity and pleasures. To the exclusion of others, they had appropriated a good deal of the revenues from taxes. Thus, they have many horses in their stables and good weapons. There is much royal pomp among them. Gifts from their rulers, given either voluntarily or under constraint, have been showered upon them.733 With all this, they frighten their enemies.

The people of the new dynasty do not have (such things). They have the desert attitude and are poor and indigent. This leaves them unprepared for such (things). What they hear about the conditions and excellent state of preparedness of the ruling dynasty makes them apprehensive. They are

731 Cf. p. 86, above.
732 Cf., for instance, p. 122, above.
afraid to do battle against (the ruling dynasty) on account of it. Therefore, their leader is forced to wait until senility takes hold of the ruling dynasty and its group feeling and fisc(al structure) are disintegrating. Then, the founder of the new dynasty seizes the opportunity to gain the upper hand, quite some time after his attack (had begun). This is how God proceeds with His servants.

The men of the new dynasty differ from the men of the ruling dynasty with regard to descent, customs, and all other things. The (persistent) attacks and their desire to gain the upper hand estrange the men of the new dynasty more and more from the men of the ruling dynasty. Consequently, the people of the two dynasties become thoroughly estranged from each other, inwardly and outwardly. No information about the men of the ruling dynasty, either secretly or openly, reaches the men of the new dynasty, such as might enable them to find some unpreparedness among them, because all connection and intercourse between the two dynasties has been cut off. They thus continue to exert pressure,\(^7\) (but) they are in a state of fear and shy away from sudden action.

Eventually, God permits the ruling dynasty to end, its life to stop, and disintegration to afflict it from all sides. The senility and decay of (the ruling dynasty), which had been concealed from the people of the new dynasty, now become clear to them. (In the meantime,) their strength has grown, because they had cut off and taken away districts and outlying regions from (the ruling dynasty). Thus, they become spirited enough (to attempt) sudden action. The apprehensions that had hitherto weakened their resolution disappear. The long wait comes to an end, and sudden action finally brings domination.

This may be exemplified by the emergence and beginnings of the 'Abbâsid dynasty. The ('Abbâsid) Shi'ah remained in Khurâsân for ten years or more after the ('Ab-

\(^7\) Ibn Khaldûn has al-\(m\u{u}\ddot{\text{i}}\ddot{\text{d}}\text{labah}, but perhaps he had intended to write al-\(m\u{u}\ddot{\text{i}}\ddot{\text{d}}\text{walah} “to wait...” The same reading may also be appropriate in the third line of this paragraph.
bāsid) propaganda had consolidated and (the 'Abbāsids) had gathered for attack. Then, their victory materialized, and they gained the upper hand over the Umayyads.

The same was the case with the 'Alids (Zaydis) in Ṭabaristān at the time their propaganda appeared among the Daylam. They had to wait a long time before they gained domination over that region. The 'Alid rule then ended, and the Daylam aspired to rule over Fārs and the two 'Irāqs. They waited (patiently) for many years, until they were able to cut off Iṣfahān and Fārs (and take it for themselves). Then, they gained domination over the caliph in Baghdad.

The same was the case with the 'Ubaydīd(-Fāṭimids). Their missionary in the Maghrib, Abū 'Abdallāh ash-Shī'ī, stayed for more than ten years among the Kutāmah Berbers waiting to gain victory over the Aghlabids in Ifīriqiyah. (The 'Ubaydīd-Fāṭimids) then took possession of the Maghrib, and, later on, aspired to become rulers of Egypt. They spent about thirty years waiting for their chance, constantly sending armies and fleets against Egypt. Support for Egypt’s defense against (the 'Ubaydīd-Fāṭimids) came from Baghdad and Syria, by land and by sea. They took possession of Alexandria, the Fayyūm, and Upper Egypt. Their propaganda progressed from there to the Hijāz and found a home in Mecca and Medina. Then, their general, Jawhār al-Kātib, moved against the (capital) city of Egypt with his armies and took possession of it. He uprooted the dynasty of the Banū Ṭughsh (Ikhshīdīds) and founded Cairo. His caliph, Maʿadd al-Muʿizz-li-dīn-Allāh, came to (Cairo) and chose it as his residence. This was about sixty years after the ('Ubaydīd-Fāṭimids) had (for the first time) gained domination over Alexandria.

The same was the case with the Saljuq Turk rulers. They gained the upper hand over the Sāmānids and went beyond Transoxania, but then they had to spend about thirty years waiting to gain the upper hand over the (dynasty of) Ibn

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74 Cf. 1:241, above.
75 Cf. also 1:260, above.
Sebuktigin in Khurasan. After some time, they advanced against Baghdad and took possession of it and of the caliph there.

The same was the case with the Tatars who succeeded the Saljuqs. They came out of the steppe in 617 [1220/21], but it took them forty years thereafter to gain domination.

The same was also the case with the inhabitants of the Maghrib. The Lamtunah Almoravids declared themselves against their Maghrawah rulers. They waited for years to gain the upper hand over them. Then, the Almohads came forth with their propaganda against the Lamtunah. They spent about thirty years fighting them, until they gained domination over their capital in Marrakech. The same was the case with the Zanatuh Merinids. They declared themselves against the Almohads and spent about thirty years waiting to gain possession of Fez. They cut off (Fez) and environs from the Almohad realm. Then, they spent another thirty years fighting (the Almohads) until they gained domination over their capital in Marrakech. All this is mentioned in the histories of these dynasties.

A struggle of this sort, marked by (constant) attacks and long perseverance, is characteristic of the relationship between new and ruling dynasties. This is how God proceeds with his servants. "And verily, you will not be able to change God's way."

The events of the Muslim conquests cannot be used as an argument against (the preceding remarks). (The Muslims) gained the upper hand over the Persians and the Byzantines in the three or four years that followed the death of the Prophet, and there was no long waiting period. It should be realized that this was one of the miracles of our Prophet. The secret of it lay in the willingness of the Muslims to die in the holy war against their enemies because of their feeling that they had the right religious insight, and in the cor-

737 The decisive event was the defeat of Mas'ud I, the son of Mahmud of Ghaznah, by the Saljuqs in 481 [1090].
738 Qur'an 33.62 (v9); 55.43 (41); 48.23 (29).
739 Isiltsaran bi-l-iman. Cf. 1.921 (n. 21), above.
responding to fear and defeatism that God put into the hearts of their enemies. All these (miraculous facts) broke through the known custom of a long wait (governing the relationship) between new and ruling dynasties. Thus, (the rapid conquest) was one of the miracles of our Prophet. The fact of the appearance of (such miracles) in Islam is generally acknowledged. Miracles cannot be used as analogies for ordinary affairs and constitute no argument against them.

[49] There is an abundant civilization (large population) at the end of dynasties, and pestilences and famines frequently occur then.

In the previous (discussion) it has been established that, at the beginning, dynasties are inevitably kind in the exercise of their power and just in their administration. The reason is either their religion, when (the dynasty) is based upon religious propaganda, or their noble and benevolent attitude toward others, which is required by the desert attitude that is natural to dynasties (at the beginning).

A kind and benevolent rule serves as an incentive to the subjects and gives them energy for cultural activities. (Civilization) will be abundant, and procreation will be vigorous. All this takes place gradually. The effects will become noticeable after one or two generations at best. At the end of two generations, the dynasty approaches the limit of its natural life. At that time, civilization has reached the limit of its abundance and growth.

It should not be objected here that it was stated before that in the later (years) of a dynasty, there will be coercion of the subjects and bad government. This is correct, but it does not contradict what we have (just) said. Even though coercion makes its appearance at that time and the revenues

740 The words hididhulikha did not yet appear in the early text of Bulaq and E, though they are found in A, B, C, and D.
741 Cf. pp. 89 and 122, above
742 Cf. Issawi, pp. 98 f.
743 Cf. 1:345 ff., above.
744 Cf. p. 123, above.
decrease, the destructive influences of this situation on civilization will become noticeable only after some time, because things in nature all have a gradual development.

In the later (years) of dynasties, famines and pestilences become numerous. As far as famines are concerned, the reason is that most people at that time refrain from cultivating the soil. For, in the later (years) of dynasties, there occur attacks on property and tax revenue and, through customs duties, on trading.\textsuperscript{745} Or, trouble occurs as the result of the unrest of the subjects and the great number of rebels (who are provoked) by the senility of the dynasty to rebel. Therefore, as a rule, little grain is stored. The grain and harvest situation is not always good and stable from year to year. The amount of rainfall in the world differs by nature. The rainfall may be strong or weak, little or much. Grain, fruits, and (the amount of) milk given by animals varies correspondingly. Still, for their food requirements, people put their trust in what it is possible to store. If nothing is stored, people must expect famines. The price of grain rises. Indigent people are unable to buy any and perish. If for some years nothing is stored, hunger will be general.

The large number of pestilences has its reason in the large number of famines just mentioned. Or, it has its reason in the many disturbances that result from the disintegration of the dynasty. There is much unrest and bloodshed, and plagues occur. The principal reason for the latter is the corruption of the air (climate) through (too) large a civilization (population).\textsuperscript{746} It results from the putrefaction and the many evil moistures with which (the air) has contact (in a dense civilization). Now, air nourishes the animal spirit\textsuperscript{747} and is constantly with it. When it is corrupted, corruption affects the temper of (the spirit). If the corruption is strong, the

\textsuperscript{745} The reference to customs duties is added in the margin of C and taken over into the text of D.

\textsuperscript{746} But cf. p. 245, below, where the commotion within a large population is said to keep the air circulating and, thus, to prevent putrefaction. Cf. also p. 376, below.

\textsuperscript{747} Cf. 1:74 (n. 5), above.
lung is afflicted with disease. This results in epidemics, which affect the lung in particular. (Even) if the corruption is not strong or great, putrefaction grows and multiplies under (its influence), resulting in many fevers that affect the tempers, and the bodies become sick and perish. The reason for the growth of putrefaction and evil moistures is invariably a dense and abundant civilization such as exists in the later (years) of a dynasty. (Such civilization) is the result of the good government, the kindness, the safety, and the light taxation that existed at the beginning of the dynasty. This is obvious. Therefore, it has been clarified by science\(^{748}\) in the proper place that it is necessary to have empty spaces and waste regions interspersed between civilized areas. This makes circulation of the air possible. It removes the corruption and putrefaction affecting the air after contact with living beings, and brings healthy air. This also is the reason why pestilences occur much more frequently in densely settled cities than elsewhere, as, for instance, in Cairo in the East and Fez in the Maghrib.

God determines whatever He wishes.

\[ 50 \] Human civilization requires political leadership for its organization.

We have mentioned before in more than one place that human social organization is something necessary. It is the thing that is meant by "the civilization" which we have been discussing. (People) in any social organization must have someone who exercises a restraining influence and rules them and to whom recourse may be had. His rule over them is sometimes based upon a divinely revealed religious law. They are obliged to submit to it in view of their belief in reward and punishment in the other world, (things that were indicated) by the person who brought them (their religious law). Sometimes, (his rule is based) upon rational politics. People are obliged to submit to it in view of the reward

\(^{748}\) Lit., "philosophy."